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SUMMARY 
One of the primary reasons for the promulgation of the Regulation of Gatherings 
Act 205 of 1993 (“Gatherings Act”) was to repeal certain statutes that heavily restricted 
the ability of people to protest before and during apartheid. These apartheid-era 
statutes granted various state functionaries the power to prohibit gatherings. The end 
of apartheid indicated a break from the heavily restricted manner in which assemblies 
were regulated. The move away from the restrictive regulation of protests towards the 
constitutional protection of protests started with the establishment of the Goldstone 
Commission, and the protection of the right to assemble and demonstrate in the 
Interim Constitution of 1993. This was followed by the promulgation of the Gatherings 
Act and the recognition and protection of the right to assemble and demonstrate in the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
The definition of a gathering in section 1 of the Gatherings Act and its relationship 
with privately owned property received renewed attention when student protests 
across the country flared up in 2015. The increase of student protests led to the main 
research question of this thesis: whether the definition of a gathering in the Gatherings 
Act extends to privately owned property. If it does, the second question is whether the 
Gatherings Act permits a deprivation of property in conflict with section 25(1) of the 
Constitution. 
With regard to the first question, case law and academic commentary indicate that 
the Gatherings Act does indeed extend to privately owned property. The Gatherings 
Act will, however, only extend to private owned property if it is accessible to the public, 
and if it is open-air or not confined to the walls of a building. The second question 
required an extensive analysis of case law and academic commentary on section 
25(1) of the Constitution. It was found that only private owners may rely on section 
25(1), and the actions typically associated with gatherings would be sufficient for a 
gathering to amount to a deprivation of their property. It is easier for the deprivation 
permitted by the Gatherings Act to comply with two of the three requirements for a 
valid deprivation: that the deprivation be in terms of law of general application and that 
it be procedurally non-arbitrary. The third of these requirements – that the deprivation 
be substantively non-arbitrary – was more complicated, because determining the 
substantive non-arbitrariness would depend on the facts of each case. In this regard, 
courts should determine substantive non-arbitrariness with reference to the complexity 
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of constitutional rights being invoked during a gathering, but more significantly, the 
importance of holding a gathering in close proximity to privately owned property.  
This thesis thus concluded that the need for a new framework for the regulation of 
Gatherings in the new constitutional dispensation was necessary, especially given the 
manner in which protests were regulated before and during apartheid. The Gatherings 
Act serves as this new legislative framework, and extends to gatherings held on 
privately owned property in certain circumstances. It was found that while the 
Gatherings Act may permit a deprivation of property, this deprivation may be justified, 
depending largely on the content of the gathering itself. 
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OPSOMMING 
Een van die hoofredes vir die verordening van die Wet op die Regulering van 
Byeenkomste 205 van 1993 ("Byeenkomstewet") was om sekere wetgewing te 
herroep wat mense verbied het om voor en tydens die era van apartheid te protesteer. 
Hierdie apartheidswetgewing het aan verskeie staatsinstellings die mag verleen om 
byeenkomste te verbied. Die einde van apartheid het 'n breek met die verlede 
aangedui met betrekking tot die wyse waarop byeenkomste gereguleer was. Die 
wegbeweeg van die streng regulering van protes tot die grondwetlike beskerming van 
protes het begin met die instelling van die Goldstone-kommissie en die beskerming 
van die reg om te vergader en te betoog in die Interim Grondwet van 1993. Dit is 
opgevolg deur die verordening van die Byeenkomstewet en die erkenning en 
beskerming van die reg om te vergader en betoog in die Grondwet van die Republiek 
van Suid-Afrika, 1996. 
Die definisie van `n byeenkoms ingevolge artikel 1 van die Byeenkomstewet en die 
verhouding met die privaatbesit van eiendom het hernude aandag ontvang toe 
studente-protes regoor die land in 2015 toegeneem het. Hierdie toename in studente-
protes het gelei tot die hoofnavorsingsvraag van hierdie tesis, naamlik of die definisie 
van `n byeenkoms ingevolge die Byeenkomstewet strek tot eiendom in privaatbesit. 
As dit wel die geval is, is die tweede vraag of die Byeenkomstewet `n ontneming van 
eiendom in stryd met artikel 25(1) van die Grondwet veroorloof. 
Met betrekking tot die eerste vraag, dui regspraak en akademiese kommentaar 
daarop dat die Byeenkomstewet inderdaad tot eiendom in privaat besit strek. Die 
Byeenkomstewet sal egter slegs tot eiendom in privaat besit strek as dit toeganklik is 
vir die publiek, en dit oop of nie beperk tot die mure van `n gebou is nie. Die tweede 
vraag het `n uitgebreide ontleding van regspraak en akademiese kommentaar op 
artikel 25(1) van die Grondwet vereis. Daar is bevind dat slegs privaateienaars op 
artikel 25(1) kan staatmaak en die aksies wat tipies met byeenkomste geassosieer 
word, sal voldoende wees vir `n byeenkoms om `n ontneming van eiendom daar te 
stel.  
Dit is makliker vir die ontneming wat deur die Byeenkomstewet toegelaat word om 
aan twee van die drie vereistes vir `n geldige ontneming te voldoen: dat die ontneming 
plaasvind in terme van `n wet van algemene toepassing en dat dit prosedureel nie-
arbitrêr is. Die derde van hierdie vereistes – dat die ontneming substansieel nie-
arbitrêr moet wees – was meer ingewikkeld, omdat die bepaling van die substantiewe 
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nie-arbitrêrheid afhang van die feite van elke saak. In hierdie verband moet die howe 
substantiewe nie-arbitrêrheid bepaal met betrekking tot die kompleksiteit van 
grondwetlike regte wat tydens `n byeenkoms aangewend word, maar van nog meer 
betekenis, die belangrikheid om `n byeenkoms in die noue nabyheid van eiendom in 
privaat besit te hou. 
Hierdie tesis het dus tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat die behoefte vir `n nuwe 
raamwerk vir die regulering van byeenkomste in die nuwe grondwetlike bestel nodig 
was, veral as gevolg van die wyse waarop protes voor en tydens apartheid gereguleer 
was. Die Byeenkomstewet dien as hierdie nuwe wetgewende raamwerk, en strek tot 
byeenkomste wat in sekere omstandighede op eiendom in privaat besit plaasvind. 
Daar is bevind dat terwyl die Byeenkomstewet ` n ontneming van eiendom mag toelaat, 
hierdie ontneming geregverdig kan word, afhangend van die inhoud van die 
byeenkoms self. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1 1 Background to the research problem 
In Victoria and Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd v Police Commissioner, Western Cape 
(Legal Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae) (“Victoria and Alfred Waterfront”),1 the 
owners of a waterfront shopping complex wanted to prevent certain persons from 
entering the complex on a permanent basis. The owners sought the ban against these 
individuals because they had previously conducted themselves in a disorderly manner. 
This prior disorderly conduct included acts of intimidation, alleged sexual misconduct, 
interference with clients and assault. Their primary purpose for entering the waterfront 
premises was to beg for money, food and other items. The shopping complex was 
privately owned, but was open to the public. Members of the public were invited to visit 
and utilise the restaurants, shops and entertainment facilities on offer, regardless of 
whether they intended to conduct business at any of these establishments. The 
shopping complex was also unique, because it contained a police charge-office, post 
office and the only formal facility for members of the public to transfer to Robben 
Island. 
The court had to consider whether the owner’s right to exclude could justify an 
outright ban of these persons from the premises, or whether the right to exclude should 
be limited with due regard to the right to life and right to freedom of movement of the 
affected individuals. It then had to determine whether upholding the outright ban in 
favour of the owners’ right to exclude, and the subsequent limitation of the right to life 
and right to freedom of movement of the banned individuals, was justifiable. The court 
stated that the tension between the property rights of the property owner on the one 
hand, and the rights of the banned persons on the other, should be resolved in a 
manner that “permits the rights of both parties to be vindicated to the greatest extent 
possible.”2 The court found that the actions caused by the persons that infringe the 
rights of the property owner could be prevented without resorting to an outright ban on 
                                                          
1 2004 4 SA 444 (C). 
2 Victoria and Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd v Police Commissioner, Western Cape (Legal 
Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae) 2004 4 SA 444 (C) 452. 
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these persons.3 It concluded that in cases where the right to life depends on access 
to the property of another, the owner’s right to exclude should be limited.4  
In Growthpoint Properties Limited v South Africa Commercial Catering and Allied 
Workers Union (SACCAWU) (“Growthpoint”),5 members of a trade union occupied the 
basement parking lot of a shopping mall. The occupation of the parking lot formed part 
of a picket against the employer of the members of the trade union. The business 
premises of the employer formed part of the shopping mall, so it was necessary for 
the picketers to enter the shopping mall premises to perform the picket. The shopping 
mall was privately owned, and the owner of the shopping mall leased the business 
premises to the employer targeted by the picket. The entry of picketers onto the 
premises of the privately owned shopping mall, in order to direct a picket at the lessee 
of the property owner, brings into question a number of issues.  
The court described the problem before it as one requiring a balancing of “the right 
of owners and occupiers to their property, to the environment and to trade on the one 
hand, and the right of strikers to freedom of expression, to bargain collectively, to 
picket, protest, and demonstrate peacefully on the other hand.”6 The court resolved 
the dispute in terms of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, which regulates pickets 
in support of a strike.7 The conflict between the “rights of owners and occupiers to their 
property”8 on the one hand, and the right of the trade union to “picket, protest and 
                                                          
3 Victoria and Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd v Police Commissioner, Western Cape (Legal 
Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae) 2004 4 SA 444 (C) 452. 
4 Victoria and Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd v Police Commissioner, Western Cape (Legal 
Resources Centre as Amicus Curiae) 2004 4 SA 444 (C) 448. P Dhliwayo A constitutional 
analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD dissertation Stellenbosch 
(2015) 182 argues that property is inherently limited, and the owners’ right to exclude is thus 
not absolute. See also AJ van der Walt “The modest systemic status of property rights” (2014) 
1 Journal of Law, Property, and Society 15 49-51. 
5 2010 JDR 1015 (KZD). 
6 Growthpoint Properties Limited v South Africa Commercial Catering and Allied Workers 
Union (SACCAWU) 2010 JDR 1015 (KZD) para 1. 
7 Section 69 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 regulates picketing. 
8 Growthpoint Properties Limited v South Africa Commercial Catering and Allied Workers 
Union (SACCAWU) 2010 JDR 1015 (KZD) para 1. 
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demonstrate peacefully”9 on the other hand, was not considered by the court.10 While 
the balancing of these rights is what the court intended and claimed to do,11 the 
decision to resolve the matter in terms of the Labour Relations Act instead leaves the 
issue of balancing property rights with the right to assemble and demonstrate 
unresolved.12 
These cases raise a number of incidental issues that led to the motivation for this 
thesis. It highlights the fact that a property owner does not have an absolute right to 
exclude others from her property. In Victoria and Alfred Waterfront, the owner’s right 
to exclude was limited in order to protect the rights to life and freedom of movement 
of other persons. In this regard, it needs to be determined whether an owner’s right to 
exclude can similarly be limited when other non-property constitutional rights, such as 
the right to assemble and demonstrate, are exercised on privately owned property. 
This question became pertinent with the increase in student protests since 2015,13 
where students gathered on privately owned university property, and were often 
excluded from the property when universities relied on interdicts to enforce their right 
to exclude against the students.14  
                                                          
9 Growthpoint Properties Limited v South Africa Commercial Catering and Allied Workers 
Union (SACCAWU) 2010 JDR 1015 (KZD) para 1. 
10 AJ van der Walt “The modest systemic status of property rights” (2014) 1 Journal of Law, 
Property, and Society 15 77 argues that the balancing had already been performed and 
determined under the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
11 Growthpoint Properties Limited v South Africa Commercial Catering and Allied Workers 
Union (SACCAWU) 2010 JDR 1015 (KZD) paras 60; 62. 
12 Despite the question being left unanswered by the court, the case was correctly decided in 
terms of the subsidiarity principles, which requires reliance on legislation giving effect to a 
particular constitutional right, rather than the constitutional right itself. See further South 
African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 2007 8 BCLR 863 (CC) para 51; P de 
Vos & W Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law in context (2014) 586. 
13 See L Naidoo “Contemporary student politics in South Africa” in A Heffernan & N 
Nieftagodien (eds) Students must rise: Youth struggle in South Africa before and beyond 
Soweto ’76 (2016) 180 180-190; J Jansen As by fire: The end of the South African university 
(2017) 1-2. 
14 See for example Rhodes University v Student Representative Council of Rhodes University 
2017 1 All SA 617 (ECG); S Wilson & I de Vos in Ex Parte: Council for the Advancement of 
the South African Constitution In Re: Restraint of protest on or near university campuses 
Chambers, Johannesburg (22 December 2016) paras 8-13; L Naidoo “Contemporary student 
politics in South Africa” in A Heffernan & N Nieftagodien (eds) Students must rise: Youth 
struggle in South Africa before and beyond Soweto ’76 (2016) 180 187-189. 
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Furthermore, the picket in Growthpoint was regulated in terms of section 69 of the 
Labour Relations Act. In terms of section 69(2), a picket may be held “in any place to 
which the public has access but outside the premises of an employer” or on the 
employers premises with her permission, despite “any law regulating the right of 
assembly”. For purposes of this thesis, this provision may have two major implications 
on the rights of private property owners. Firstly, it grants picketers the power to perform 
a picket in any place, provided the public has access to such place. This provision 
does not distinguish between privately owned property and publicly owned property. 
Instead, the provision merely limits its application to places that are publicly-
accessible. Therefore, it is clear that picketers may enter privately owned property to 
perform a picket, provided the property is accessible to the public. This was the case 
in Growthpoint, because the picketers were required to enter the privately owned 
shopping mall in order to direct the picket at its employer, whose premises formed part 
of the privately owned shopping mall. 
Secondly, the provision grants employees the power to picket on the premises of 
the employer, provided permission from the employer is obtained. There may be cases 
in which the employer is a private business owner, and other cases where the 
employer is the state. In terms of this provision, employees could thus exercise their 
right to picket on privately owned property, regardless of whether they are accessible 
to the public or not. Therefore, this provision shows that a picket may be held on 
privately owned property if certain requirements are met. In this regard, it needs to be 
determined whether gatherings in terms of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 
1993 (“Gatherings Act”) may be held on privately owned property, which is the case 
with pickets in terms of the Labour Relations Act.  
Growthpoint, therefore, opens the possibility to question whether the Gatherings 
Act similarly permits gatherings on privately owned property, provided they are 
accessible to the public. It also raises the question of whether it is possible for people 
to exercise their right to assemble and demonstrate on the privately owned property 
of the intended recipient of the assembly or demonstration. It is likely that this would 
only be permissible should the assemblers or demonstrators and the property owner 
have a similar relationship to the relationship between an employer and an employee, 
because this relationship forms the basis for allowing employees to picket on an 
employer’s premises. 
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1 2 Research problem, research aims, hypotheses and methodology 
This thesis aims to establish whether the Gatherings Act permits a gathering on 
privately owned property. Once this is established, it will then be considered whether 
the Gatherings Act permits a deprivation of property in conflict with section 25(1) of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, and, if so, in which 
circumstances.  
In order to do so, a comprehensive discussion on the right to assemble and 
demonstrate before and during apartheid is necessary. This will involve a historical 
overview of the right before the constitutional dispensation, and will include an analysis 
of legislation used to suppress mass political dissent. Furthermore, an analysis of the 
right in the new constitutional dispensation will highlight the position and protection of 
the right since the end of apartheid. This discussion will be based on the premise that 
this right was formerly suppressed, but is now a justiciable right in the Bill of Rights.  
The Gatherings Act was promulgated as a response to a long history of suppression 
of the right to freedom of assembly under apartheid. This suppression was imposed 
through the enactment of legislation to curb the effects of resistance against the 
apartheid government.15 The operation of these statutes can be seen in a number of 
cases. For instance, in PG Castel NO v Metal & Allied Workers Union,16 the wide 
powers of the Minister of Law and Order to prohibit a gathering were confirmed,17 
provided they were exercised in accordance with section 46(3) of the Internal Security 
Act 74 of 1982. In terms of section 46(3), the Minister of Law and Order could prohibit 
any gathering or any class of gathering if he was of the view that it will maintain public 
peace. Similarly, in S v Turrell,18 the powers of the Minister of Justice were confirmed 
as being just as broad, because it granted him the power to prohibit particular 
gatherings.19 These cases display the wide powers authorities had in attempting to 
                                                          
15 These statutes include, inter alia, the Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950, the 
General Law Amendment Act 8 of 1953, the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956, the Internal 
Security Act 74 of 1982 as well as regulations handed down in terms of the Public Safety Act 
3 of 1953. 
16 1987 4 SA 795 (A). 
17 PG Castel NO v Metal & Allied Workers Union 1987 4 SA 795 (A) para 14. 
18 1973 1 SA 248 (C). 
19 In this case, the court held that a magistrate may only prohibit a particular gathering from 
occurring under section 2 of the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956, and not a particular class 
of gatherings, which was a power vested only in the Minister of Justice. 
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curb resistance towards the apartheid government, and how the need for a new 
constitutional dispensation giving effect to assembly rights had become necessary. 
The Gatherings Act was promulgated after the Commission of Inquiry Regarding 
the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation (“Goldstone Commission”) created 
a new legislative framework for the right to assemble and demonstrate, and is the only 
statute that deals with gatherings generally. Therefore, the Gatherings Act, as the 
primary source regulating gatherings, will be analysed with reference to cases that 
have considered whether the procedures set out in the Act have been followed. The 
requirements for a lawful gathering in sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Gatherings Act need 
to be met before a lawful gathering may commence. These requirements are in place 
to ensure that the Gatherings Act fulfils its purpose, which is to “regulate the holding 
of public gatherings and demonstrations at certain places; and to provide for matters 
connected therewith.”20 The definition of a gathering will subsequently be considered 
in light of the fact that it may extend to privately owned property. According to section 
1 of the Gatherings Act, a “gathering” is defined as: 
 
“…any assembly, concourse or procession of more than 15 persons in or on any public 
road as defined in the Road Traffic Act, 1989 (Act 29 of 1989), or any other public place or 
premises wholly or partly open to the air- 
(a)   at which the principles, policy, actions or failure to act of any government, political party 
or political organization, whether or not that party or organization is registered in terms of 
any applicable law, are discussed, attacked, criticized, promoted or propagated; or 
(b)   held to form pressure groups, to hand over petitions to any person, or to mobilize or 
demonstrate support for or opposition to the views, principles, policy, actions or omissions 
of any person or body of persons or institution, including any government, administration 
or governmental institution”.21 
 
The phrase “or any other public place or premises wholly or partly open to the air”22 
is of particular importance for this study, as it has not yet been authoritatively 
interpreted by the courts. The interpretation of this term will aid in determining the 
circumstances in which the definition of a gathering extends to privately owned 
                                                          
20 Preamble of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. Own emphasis. 
21 Section 1 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. 
22 Own emphasis. 
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property. This interpretation will involve the use of foreign cases and academic 
commentary to determine when a place or premises may be considered “public” for 
purposes of the definition of a gathering. These sources will illustrate how courts have 
dealt with situations where people gathered on privately owned property, in order to 
determine the circumstances in which a place or premises may be considered “public” 
for purposes of the Gatherings Act. 
Given the circumstances in which the legislative scheme permits a gathering on 
privately owned property, it is necessary to investigate how the right to assemble and 
demonstrate, when exercised on privately owned property, impacts on the property 
rights of the property owner. In particular, the impact and role of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution will be assessed. Due to the uncertainty regarding the manner in which 
this conflict should be resolved, an analysis of cases will be used to emphasise the 
fact that private property rights may be limited by other constitutional rights. This 
uncertainty arises from the fact that such a case is yet to be decided by the courts in 
South Africa. In Growthpoint, the court held that the owners of the shopping mall had 
a right “not to be arbitrarily deprived of the use of their property as a result of the noise 
[caused by the picketers]”.23 However, the finding that they suffered an “unacceptable 
and unjustifiable limitation on their right to their property”24 was not based on an 
analysis on section 25(1) of the Constitution,25 but instead on the relevant sections of 
the Labour Relations Act. The failure by the court to perform an analysis based on 
section 25(1), means that there may be a possibility that section 25(1) could play a 
role in situations where legislation fails to offer guidance on how these types of 
disputes should be resolved. Therefore, the need to determine whether private 
property owners may rely on section 25(1) of the Constitution when a lawful gathering 
is held on their property becomes relevant. Foreign cases will be used to illustrate 
situations where property rights came into conflict with the right to assemble and 
                                                          
23 Growthpoint Properties Limited v South Africa Commercial Catering and Allied Workers 
Union (SACCAWU) 2010 JDR 1015 (KZD) para 30. 
24 Growthpoint Properties Limited v South Africa Commercial Catering and Allied Workers 
Union (SACCAWU) 2010 JDR 1015 (KZD) para 60. 
25 Section 25 of the Constitution was only mentioned in a footnote to para 9 of 
Growthpoint Properties Limited v South Africa Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union 
(SACCAWU) 2010 JDR 1015 (KZD), which contained a brief analysis of the constitutional 
rights in question. 
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demonstrate, and the manner in which this conflict was resolved by the courts of 
foreign jurisdictions will aid in determining the manner in which this problem could be 
solved by South African courts. 
Given this conflict, it is necessary to consider whether the Gatherings Act permits a 
deprivation of property in a manner inconsistent with section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
The conflict between property rights and the right to assemble and demonstrate will 
thus need to be considered, keeping in mind that the right to assemble and 
demonstrate is often interlinked with the right to freedom of expression. Furthermore, 
policy reasons may indicate that it is important to hold a gathering on privately owned 
property, and these reasons will need to be assessed in light of the importance of the 
right to assemble and demonstrate, as well as the right to freedom of expression. This 
should yield an answer as to whether the exercise of these rights during a gathering 
may place a limitation on the rights of the property owner, and may thus be justifiable 
in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
The question of whether a “gathering” in terms of the Gatherings Act permits a 
deprivation of property in a manner inconsistent with section 25(1) of the Constitution 
is of vital importance due to the reasons outlined above. The above analysis of the 
research problem serves as a starting point in determining whether the deprivation 
permitted by the Gatherings Act is in accordance with section 25(1) of the Constitution, 
and whether the Gatherings Act places a justifiable limitation on the rights of a property 
owner in terms of section 25(1).  
 
1 3 Outline of substantive chapters 
Chapter two focuses on the history of the right to assemble and demonstrate in 
South Africa. This will involve a discussion on gatherings before and during apartheid, 
with a particular focus on legislation that was promulgated to suppress mass 
government resistance. The impact of this legislation will be assessed by discussing 
the manner in which courts applied the legislation that restricted the ability to assemble 
and demonstrate. In the new constitutional dispensation, the right to assemble and 
demonstrate was included as a justiciable right. Given the clear break from the 
suppression of assembly and demonstration, the focus of the chapter will then shift to 
the manner in which the right to assemble and demonstrate is recognised in the new 
constitutional dispensation. Reference will be made to the protection of the right in the 
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Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (“Interim Constitution”), 
which recognised the right to assemble, demonstrate and present petitions. 
Furthermore, the role of the submissions made by the multinational panel to the 
Goldstone Commission will be assessed, with a particular focus on the submissions 
regarding notice of a gathering and negotiations before a gathering. The work of the 
Goldstone Commission led to the promulgation of the Gatherings Act, which will be 
discussed with reference to the purpose and role of the Act in the new constitutional 
dispensation. The protection afforded to the right to assemble and demonstrate by the 
Constitution will be evaluated, by referring to the process that led up to the drafting of 
the right, and the inclusion of the right to assemble, demonstrate, picket and present 
petitions in the 1996 Constitution. 
Chapter three focuses on a “gathering” in terms of the Gatherings Act. The 
requirements for holding a lawful gathering will be discussed, with a focus on the 
procedures to be followed immediately before the commencement of a gathering. 
These include notice of a gathering, the appointment of key persons involved before 
and during a gathering, the amendment of notices, conditions placed on gatherings, 
time periods, logistics and the behaviour of participants during a gathering. The 
definition of a “gathering” will be analysed, and it will be used to determine whether it 
extends to privately owned property and, if so, to what extent. This analysis will focus 
on privately owned places or premises that qualify as “public” for purposes of the 
definition of a gathering. In this regard, reference will be made to certain characteristics 
of privately owned property that may render it public. These characteristics will be 
drawn from various sources, including apartheid-era legislation that regulated 
assemblies and demonstrations, as well as cases and commentary dealing with the 
public-accessibility of privately owned places. The characteristics will also be drawn 
from commentary on the relationship between public places and the ability to evict 
unwanted persons from privately owned property, as well as commentary and cases 
on circumstances that may change the public nature of privately owned property. 
Furthermore, an interpretation will be given to the phrase “wholly or partly open to the 
air” to further qualify the types of privately owned property on which a gathering may 
be held. This qualification will be determined with reference to academic commentary 
and apartheid-era legislation, and will aid in determining the types of privately owned 
property to which the Gatherings Act applies. 
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Chapter four focuses on whether the Gatherings Act permits a deprivation of 
property in a manner inconsistent with section 25(1) of the Constitution. In this regard, 
the beneficiaries of section 25(1) of the Constitution will be discussed, with reference 
to case law and academic commentary. The definition of a deprivation will then be 
established, with reference to jurisprudence from the Constitutional Court and 
academic commentary. Actions typically associated with a gathering will then be 
tested against this definition to display the manner in which a gathering permits a 
deprivation of property. The requirements for a valid deprivation in terms of section 
25(1) – that the deprivation be in terms of law of general application and that it be non-
arbitrary – will be outlined. The law of general application requirement will likely be 
uncomplicated, since the Gatherings Act is the law central in solving the primary 
research problem. However, the arbitrariness inquiry will be more complicated, 
because the deprivation should be both procedurally and substantively non-arbitrary. 
The procedural non-arbitrariness requirement will need to be distinguished from 
procedural fairness in administrative law. In this regard, the relationship between 
section 33 of the Constitution, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
and section 25(1) of the Constitution will need to be outlined before a determination 
on the procedural non-arbitrariness of the deprivation can be made. It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine – in the abstract – whether a gathering held on privately 
owned property will be substantively arbitrary. The inquiry into whether a deprivation 
is substantively arbitrary will depend on the facts of each particular case. However, it 
is possible to identify various factors that the court could consider when determining 
whether sufficient reason for a gathering on privately owned property exists. Sufficient 
reason for the deprivation permitted by the Gatherings Act will be determined by 
referring to the Gatherings Act itself, the complexity of constitutional rights being 
exercised by participants during a gathering, and the importance of the proximity of a 
gathering to the privately owned property. These factors will thus identify the 
circumstances in which sufficient reason for permitting a gathering on privately owned 
property exists. 
 
1 4 Limitations and qualifications 
This thesis will be subject to various qualifications, and will be limited in scope 
regarding a number of issues. Firstly, the use of foreign jurisdictions will not serve to 
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compare the South African position to the position of a foreign jurisdiction. While a 
comparative analysis between South Africa and another jurisdiction would be useful 
to compare two clear legal positions from two different jurisdictions, the position 
regarding the primary research problem is not clear under South African law. The 
research problem central to this thesis has not yet been adjudicated by a local court, 
so this thesis will primarily aim to address the problem, rather than compare the South 
African position with the position of a foreign jurisdiction. Therefore, since the position 
in South African law is unclear, it would instead be more fruitful to use foreign law as 
an interpretive source to help find a solution to the research problem. In this regard, 
foreign cases and foreign commentary from various jurisdictions will be used to 
illustrate certain points, and offer guidance on how to resolve certain issues that are 
yet to be adjudicated by the courts in South Africa. 
Secondly, this thesis does not consider section 17 of the Constitution in its entirety. 
While section 17 also recognises the right to picket and present petitions, it remains 
beyond the scope of this thesis. The right to picket was not included in section 23 of 
the Constitution, because this section deals with labour relations and the drafters of 
the Constitution wanted to broaden the protection of the right to picket beyond labour 
disputes.26 The right to picket is intricate and complicated, and considering the right to 
picket in this thesis would detract from the discussion on whether a gathering may 
lawfully be held on privately owned property. Furthermore, this thesis will not address 
the right to present petitions, even though it is recognised and protected in section 17 
of the Constitution. While presenting petitions may involve entry onto privately owned 
property, it is doubtful whether mere entry onto privately owned property to present a 
petition will amount to a deprivation for purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
It is also doubtful whether the Gatherings gives effect to the right to picket and present 
petitions. While the Gatherings Act may be invoked during certain pickets not involving 
labour disputes, it certainly does not cater for instances in which a petition is to be 
presented in isolation of a gathering or demonstration.27 
                                                          
26 S Woolman “Freedom of assembly” in S Woolman & M Chaskalson (eds) Constitutional law 
of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2005) ch 43 25.  
27 Section 3(3)(j) of the Gatherings Act makes provision for the presentation of a petition during 
the course of a gathering. However, it does not cater for instances where a petition is 
presented outside the scope of a gathering. 
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Thirdly, this thesis does not analyse the Gatherings Act in its entirety, but merely 
the provisions that lead up to a gathering being held on privately owned property. This 
thesis will thus not consider any provisions relating to conduct and procedures during 
and after the gathering, as well as conduct and procedures relating to gatherings and 
demonstrations near courts, buildings of Parliament and the Union Buildings. In this 
regard, sections 7-16 of the Gatherings Act remain beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Fourthly, this thesis does not take into account section 25 of the Constitution as a 
whole, but merely focuses on section 25(1). The provisions of section 25 dealing with 
land reform will not be of any use in finding a solution to the research problem.28 
Furthermore, the Gatherings Act does not authorise or permit expropriations. As a 
result, sections 25(2) and (4) of the Constitution are irrelevant, because no 
expropriation was authorised, and no just and equitable compensation is thus payable 
in terms of section 25(3).  
Lastly, this thesis refers to the effect the provisions in the Gatherings Act may have 
on property owners. Despite this, the provisions may have a similar effect on people 
who have rights or interests in property other than ownership. For example, the effect 
a gathering may have on property owners would likely have a similar effect on property 
interest holders such as lessees or servitude holders. Therefore, it should be borne in 
mind that people with interests in property other than ownership could also be deprived 
of their property in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
                                                          
28 Section 25(5)-(9) of the Constitution contains the land reform provisions. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE AND DEMONSTRATE: A HISTORICAL 
ANALYSIS 
 
2 1 Introduction 
This thesis seeks to determine whether the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 
1993 (“Gatherings Act”) permits a deprivation of property in a manner inconsistent with 
section 25(1) of the Constitution. While one of the main aims of this thesis is to analyse 
the Gatherings Act, it is important to consider the reasons why such a statute was 
promulgated. This Act came about as a direct result of the recommendations made by 
the multinational panel of experts to the Goldstone Commission, which was appointed 
to investigate political violence between 1991 and 1994.1 One of these 
recommendations included the need for new legislation to be enacted to regulate 
protests that is consistent with the values of the new constitutional dispensation. 
This chapter serves to discuss the legislative framework leading to the appointment 
of the Goldstone Commission, and the subsequent enactment of the Gatherings Act. 
In doing so, this chapter will highlight the need for the creation of a new regulatory 
framework for assemblies and demonstrations in South Africa. It will do so, firstly, by 
discussing the history of the legislative framework of protests in South Africa. This will 
be examined through the lens of legislation passed to curb resistance against the 
apartheid regime and the manner in which these statutes were interpreted by courts. 
Reference will be made to the position before 1950, as well as the position from 1950 
until 1993. This discussion will display the manner in which legislation was used to 
suppress mass political dissent. 
Secondly, the right to freedom of assembly in the new constitutional dispensation 
will be discussed. This will include a description of the right under the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (“Interim Constitution”), as well as the 
impact the submissions made by the multinational panel of experts to the Goldstone 
Commission had on the drafting of the Gatherings Act. The purpose of the Gatherings 
Act will also be outlined, with reference to the impact it had on apartheid-era legislation. 
                                                          
1 The Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation 
was appointed by former president FW de Klerk. See further S Woolman “Assembly, 
demonstration and petition” in I Currie & J de Waal (eds) The bill of rights handbook 6 ed 
(2013) 377 381. 
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The drafting of the right to assemble and demonstrate in section 17 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 will also be discussed. 
Ultimately, this chapter will aim to set the scene for a concise discussion of the 
procedures and core definitions in the Gatherings Act. This will provide assistance in 
determining whether the Gatherings Act permits a deprivation of property in a manner 
inconsistent with section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
 
2 2 The legislative framework of protests before the new constitutional 
dispensation 
2 2 1 The position prior to 1950 
Before the draconian regulation of protests through the enactment of the 
Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950, notions of dissent were mostly regulated 
by the common law.2 Under the common law, everyone was entitled to assemble 
unless it was expressly prohibited or limited by the common law.3 However, in certain 
limited circumstances, legislation also regulated protests in relation to specific classes 
of people or specific situations. As a result, various statutes were passed prior to 1950, 
which regulated certain aspects of assembly, while the remaining aspects were still 
regulated by the common law. Furthermore, separate statutes were passed, which 
regulated assembly for white and black people respectively.4  
The first and only statute passed to regulate the assembly of white South Africans 
was the Riotous Assemblies Act 27 of 1914. According to Woolman, this statute 
granted the government the power to deal with unrest amongst the white working 
class.5 Dugard argues that the Riotous Assemblies Act granted the government wide 
powers to establish a special criminal court to charge workers with the crimes of 
treason, sedition and public violence.6 This court typically comprised of two or three 
                                                          
2 S Woolman & J de Waal “Voting with your feet” in D van Wyk, J Dugard, B de Villiers & D 
Davis (eds) Rights and constitutionalism – The new South African legal order (1994) 292 293. 
3 S Woolman & J de Waal “Voting with your feet” in D van Wyk, J Dugard, B de Villiers & D 
Davis (eds) Rights and constitutionalism – The new South African legal order (1994) 292 293. 
4 S Woolman “Freedom of assembly” in S Woolman & M Chaskalson (eds) Constitutional law 
of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2005) ch 43 5. 
5 S Woolman “Freedom of assembly” in S Woolman & M Chaskalson (eds) Constitutional law 
of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2005) ch 43 5. 
6 J Dugard Human rights and the South African legal order (1978) 231. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
15 
 
judges from the Supreme Court and, unlike other courts of its time, was not 
accompanied by a jury.7 
The first statute enacted to regulate the assembly of black South Africans was the 
Black Administration Act 38 of 1927. The purpose of this statute was to “provide for 
the better control and management of native affairs.”8 Section 27(1)(c) granted the 
Governor-General the power to pass regulations or declare any proclamation on the 
“prohibition, control or regulation of gatherings or assemblies of Blacks.”9  
 
2 2 2 The position from 1950 until the end of apartheid 
2 2 2 1 Overview  
The Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950, the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 
1956, and the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 were the primary statutes used by state 
authorities to ban gatherings and assemblies.10 However, emergency regulations 
handed down in terms of the Public Safety Act 3 of 1953 also played a role in 
suppressing political dissent.  
 
2 2 2 2 The role of the Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950 in 
suppressing dissent 
The rise of liberation movements such as the African National Congress (“ANC”) 
and the South African Communist Party (“SACP”) during the height of segregation, 
and later apartheid, led to the enactment of the Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 
1950 by the National Party (“NP”) government.11 The ANC and SACP were deemed 
communist parties, and were seen as a threat to the capitalist system advanced by 
the NP government. This is reflected in the purpose of the Act, which banned the 
SACP, as well as any other organisation, activity, event or publication that may 
promote communistic views.12 
                                                          
7 J Dugard Human rights and the South African legal order (1978) 231. 
8 Preamble of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927. 
9 Section 27(1)(c) of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927. 
10 Tsoaeli v S [2016] ZAFSHC 217 (17 November 2016) para 18. 
11 The Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 was later consolidated to include the Suppression of 
Communism Act 44 of 1950. 
12 Preamble of the Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950. 
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While the purpose of the Suppression of Communism Act related specifically to the 
suppression of communist-related activities, the effect of the Act cast the net much 
wider.13 The definition of a “communist” in section 1 of the Suppression of Communism 
Act gave the State President the power to declare anyone a communist.14 As a result, 
the provisions of the Act were enforced against those who professed to be 
communists, as well as those who were not, because the definition of communism 
was broad enough to include all groups radically opposing the practices of the 
apartheid government.15  
Section 9(1) of the Suppression of Communism Act granted the Minister of Justice 
wide powers to prohibit a gathering if he was of the belief that the objects of 
communism would be advanced or furthered at such a gathering.16 This prohibition 
was only subject to the definition of a “gathering” in section 1(1) of the Suppression of 
Communism Act,17 and the gathering having a common purpose.18 Furthermore, the 
Minister of Justice could also utilise the opportunity to invoke a prohibition in terms of 
section 9 of the Suppression of Communism Act on the listed persons in section 5. In 
terms of this power, he could give notice to a person listed in section 5, prohibiting her 
from attending and participating in any particular gathering. However, this prohibition 
                                                          
13 J Dugard Human rights and the South African legal order (1978) 155. 
14 Section 1 of the Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950 defined a communist as “a 
person who professes to be a communist or a person who is deemed by the State President 
to be one on the ground that he has advocated or is advocating the achievement of any of the 
objects of communism or any act or omission which is calculated to further the achievement 
of those objects.” 
15 J Dugard Human rights and the South African legal order (1978) 155. 
16 Section 9(1) of the Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950 stated:  
“Whenever the Minister is satisfied that any person engages in activities which are furthering or are 
calculated to further the achievement of any of the objects of communism, he may by notice under 
his hand addressed and delivered or tendered to that person, prohibit him from attending, except in 
such cases as may be specified in the notice or as the Minister or a magistrate acting in pursuance 
of his general or special instructions may at any time expressly authorize.” 
17 In terms of section 1(1) of the Suppression of Communism Act, a “gathering” refers to “any 
gathering, concourse or procession in, through or along any place, of any number of persons”. 
18 According to AS Mathews Law, order and liberty in South Africa (1971) 78-79, this common 
purpose can be interpreted with reference to its interpretation in criminal law, and requires 
some objective aside from the act of gathering itself. See further R v Khan 1955 3 SA 177 
(AD); R v Lan 1956 2 SA 246 (AD); Dudley v Minister of Justice 1963 2 SA 464 (AD). 
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was only subject to the definition of a “gathering” in section 1(1), and no common 
purpose was required.19 
 
2 2 2 3 The role of the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956 in suppressing dissent 
Despite the promulgation of the Suppression of Communism Act, anti-apartheid 
resistance groups embarked on the Defiance Campaign in 1952.20 As a result, the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act 8 of 1953 and the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956 
were enacted as a response to the activities of the Defiance Campaign.21 Both statutes 
sought to increase criminal sanctions for crimes related to political protest. The 
purpose of the Riotous Assemblies Act was to consolidate existing laws regarding 
assemblies, with the aim of strengthening the harmony between “European and non-
European inhabitants”22 of South Africa.23 
Section 2(1) of the Riotous Assemblies Act granted the magistrate in the particular 
district the power to prohibit any gathering upon the receipt of a complaint from an 
interested or affected party. Furthermore, section 2(3) of the Act granted the Minister 
of Justice the power to prohibit any class of gatherings or to prohibit any person from 
attending any particular gathering.24 
In S v Turrell,25 a mass protest was organised by the Student Representatives’ 
Council of the University of Cape Town. The organisers gave notice of their intention 
to hold the protest via the daily press and through the distribution of pamphlets. The 
protest was set to commence at St George’s Cathedral in Wale Street, Cape Town. 
Prior to the protest, discussions were held between the organisers of the protest and 
the police in an attempt to ensure the orderly and peaceful nature of events. However, 
                                                          
19 AS Mathews Law, order and liberty in South Africa (1971) 80-83. 
20 S Woolman “Assembly, demonstration and petition” in I Currie & J de Waal (eds) The bill of 
rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 377 380. 
21 S Woolman “Assembly, demonstration and petition” in I Currie & J de Waal (eds) The bill of 
rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 377 380. 
22 Preamble of the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956. 
23 Preamble of the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956. 
24 Section 2(4)(b) of the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956 made it an offence to act in 
contravention of a banning order imposed in terms of section 2(3). According to Molemela JP 
in Tsoaeli v S [2016] ZAFSHC 217 (17 November 2016) para 19, the Minister of Justice had 
a “wide discretion” in exercising this power. This discretion extended to imposing blanket bans 
on gatherings for as long as he desired. 
25 1973 1 SA 248 (C). 
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a notice prohibiting the demonstration was granted by the magistrate in terms of 
section 2(1) of the Riotous Assemblies Act. Despite this notice, the Student 
Representatives’ Council continued with the demonstration as planned. As a result of 
the violation of this notice and the related statutory provision, a number of people were 
arrested. In its interpretation of this provision, the court made the following remarks: 
 
“Freedom of speech and freedom of assembly are part of the democratic rights of every 
citizen of the Republic and Parliament guards these rights jealously for they are part of the 
very foundations upon which Parliament itself rests. Free assembly is a most important 
right for it is generally only organised public opinion that carries weight and it is extremely 
difficult to organise it if there is no right of public assembly. It is against this background 
that the provisions of the Riotous Assemblies Act must be read.”26 
 
Despite this remark by the court, it held that the Riotous Assemblies Act “restricts 
neither the right of free speech nor the right of free assembly”.27 Therefore, the court 
confirmed the power of the Minister of Justice as being the power to prohibit any 
gathering. Furthermore, the court held that a magistrate may only prohibit a particular 
gathering, and not a particular class of gatherings. Instead, the power to prohibit a 
particular class of gatherings only vested in the Minister of Justice.28 
In September 1977, the Minister of Justice published a notice in the Government 
Gazette prohibiting all open-air gatherings,29 except those of a bona fide sporting 
nature. The validity of this notice was contested in S v Mtutuzeli.30 The court held that 
a notice prohibiting “any gathering” is not ultra vires when it only identifies those 
gatherings excluded from the prohibition.31 Therefore, the mere exclusion of bona fide 
sporting events from the prohibition did not render the notice invalid.32  
                                                          
26 S v Turrell 1973 1 SA 248 (C) 256. 
27 S v Turrell 1973 1 SA 248 (C) 256. 
28 S v Turrell 1973 1 SA 248 (C) 256. 
29 GG 5758 of 30-09-1977. 
30 1979 1 SA 764 (T). 
31 S v Mtutuzeli 1979 1 SA 764 (T) 766. 
32 S v Mtutuzeli 1979 1 SA 764 (T) 766. 
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Woolman and De Waal are critical of the judiciary’s approach to the interpretation 
of these statutes at a time when political protest was at its peak.33 Their criticism mainly 
concerns the failure by judges to acknowledge the circumstances the country found 
itself in at the time.34 In this regard, the political climate in which these statues operated 
was hardly taken into account when the courts were faced with interpreting them.35 
This shows the reluctance by the judiciary to interpret legislation in a manner that 
would essentially challenge the systematic suppression of mass dissent by the 
apartheid government. 
 
2 2 2 4 The role of the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 in suppressing dissent 
In order to tighten security legislation, the Rabie Commission was instituted by the 
government to investigate the reform of the law regulating protests.36 The Commission 
presented its report and recommendations in February 1982. The recommendations 
led to the promulgation of the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982, as well as the 
Demonstration in or near Court Buildings Act 71 of 1982.37 The purpose of the Internal 
Security Act was to provide for measures in upholding the security of the country and 
maintaining law and order.38 
Although the Internal Security Act was only one of the statutes enacted to suppress 
dissent, it was, according to Molemela JP, the “primary legislative tool to restrict 
political activity and freedom of assembly”.39 Similar to the powers contained in section 
                                                          
33 S Woolman & J de Waal “Voting with your feet” in D van Wyk, J Dugard, B de Villiers & D 
Davis (eds) Rights and constitutionalism – The new South African legal order (1994) 292 293. 
34 S Woolman & J de Waal “Voting with your feet” in D van Wyk, J Dugard, B de Villiers & D 
Davis (eds) Rights and constitutionalism – The new South African legal order (1994) 292 293. 
35 S Woolman & J de Waal “Voting with your feet” in D van Wyk, J Dugard, B de Villiers & D 
Davis (eds) Rights and constitutionalism – The new South African legal order (1994) 292 293. 
36 S Woolman & J de Waal “Voting with your feet” in D van Wyk, J Dugard, B de Villiers & D 
Davis (eds) Rights and constitutionalism – The new South African legal order (1994) 292 294. 
37 S Woolman & J de Waal “Voting with your feet” in D van Wyk, J Dugard, B de Villiers & D 
Davis (eds) Rights and constitutionalism – The new South African legal order (1994) 292 294. 
38 Preamble of the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982. 
39 Tsoaeli v S [2016] ZAFSHC 217 (17 November 2016) para 21. In para 22, further reference 
was made to other statutes that were used to suppress political dissent. These include the 
Gatherings and Demonstrations in the Vicinity of Parliament Act 52 of 1973, the National 
Roads Act 54 of 1971 and the Trespass Act 6 of 1959. While Molemela JP briefly outlined the 
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2 of the Riotous Assemblies Act, wide powers were granted to magistrates in particular 
regions to prohibit gatherings. Section 46(1) of the Internal Security Act granted 
magistrates the power to prohibit any gathering in any district, or any particular 
gathering or class of gathering in a particular district.40 These powers were wider than 
those afforded by the Riotous Assemblies Act, and came about as a result of the 
tendency of local authorities in particular districts to habitually authorise gatherings.41 
This provision thus granted magistrates the power to prohibit gatherings, including 
those that were otherwise authorised by local authorities. 
While this provision displays the powers vested in the magistrate in a particular 
region, other individuals also had similar powers to prohibit gatherings. For example, 
section 46(3) of the Internal Security Act granted the Minister of Law and Order the 
power to prohibit any gathering.42 In PG Castel NO v Metal & Allied Workers Union,43 
the court described the powers of the Minister of Law and Order to prohibit a gathering 
                                                          
importance of these statutes in para 22, it will not be discussed further in this section of this 
chapter. 
40 Section 46(1) of the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 stated: 
“Whenever a magistrate has reason to apprehend that the public peace would be seriously 
endangered–  
(a) by any gathering in his district; or 
(b) by a particular gathering or any gathering of a particular nature, class or kind at a particular 
area or wheresoever in his district, he may –  
(i) Prohibit for a period not exceeding forty-eight hours every gathering in his district or that 
particular gathering or any gathering of a particular nature, class or kind at a particular place or in a 
particular area or everywhere in his district, except in such cases as he may expressly authorize in 
the prohibition in question or at any time thereafter…” 
41 J Dugard Human rights and the South African legal order (1978) 188. 
42 Section 46(3) of the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 stated: 
“(3) The Minister may, if he deems it necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of the 
State or for the maintenance of the public peace or in order to prevent the causing, encouraging or 
fomenting of feelings of hostility between different population groups or parts of population groups 
of the Republic, prohibit in a manner determined in subsection (2)(a)- 
 (a) any gathering in any area; or 
(b) any particular gathering or any gathering of a particular nature, class or kind at a particular place 
or in a particular area or wheresoever in the Republic, during any period or on any day or during 
specified times or periods within any period, except in those cases determined in the prohibition in 
question by the Minister or which the Minister or a magistrate acting in pursuance of the Minister's 
general or special instructions may at any time expressly authorize.” 
43 1987 4 SA 795 (A). 
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in terms of section 46(3) as having “no bounds”,44 provided they were exercised in 
accordance with the guidelines contained in this section. The description by the court 
of the Minister of Law and Order’s powers succinctly indicate the far-reaching powers 
the government adopted to resist any dissent to the apartheid regime. 
 
2 2 2 5 The role of The Public Safety Act 3 of 1953 in suppressing dissent 
The mid-1980s saw the crisis surrounding political protest getting worse.45 As a 
result, emergency regulations were handed down by the government in terms of the 
Public Safety Act 3 of 1953. In terms of these regulations, the respective Divisional 
Commissioners of Police were granted the power to prohibit gatherings. These 
regulations were subordinate legislation and thus only required action by an 
administrator. As a result, courts often focused their attention on the regulations rather 
than the legislation. For instance, in United Democratic Front (Western Cape Region) 
v Van der Westhuizen NO,46 the Divisional Commissioner of Police of the Western 
Cape prohibited a gathering.47 The Commissioner acted in terms of regulation 7(1) of 
the regulations made in terms of section 3 of the Public Safety Act. The applicant 
contended that the prohibition by the Commissioner should be set aside on the 
grounds that he failed to consider any alternatives to a complete prohibition of the 
gathering. The applicant argued that the Commissioner should have considered 
placing conditions on the gathering as planned, instead of prohibiting it outright. The 
court subsequently granted the application on the grounds that the Commissioner 
failed to exercise his discretion in terms of the regulation in an objective manner.48  
In another decision, During NO v Boesak,49 the Divisional Commissioner of Police 
of the Western Cape appealed against the court a quo decision, in which the judge 
invalidated a notice issued by the Commissioner that sought to prohibit a gathering. 
The Commissioner had exercised his powers in terms of regulation 10(1)(c) of the 
                                                          
44 PG Castel NO v Metal & Allied Workers Union 1987 4 SA 795 (A) para 14. 
45 S Woolman “Assembly, demonstration and petition” in I Currie & J de Waal (eds) The bill of 
rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 377 380-381. 
46 1987 4 SA 926 (C). 
47 United Democratic Front (Western Cape Region) v Van der Westhuizen NO 1987 4 SA 926 
(C) 927. 
48 United Democratic Front (Western Cape Region) v Van der Westhuizen NO 1987 4 SA 926 
(C) 932. 
49 1990 3 SA 661 (A). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
22 
 
emergency regulations made in terms of the Public Safety Act. The gathering in 
question was a public concert taking place on 17 July 1988 at the University of the 
Western Cape to celebrate the birthday of then-incarcerated Nelson Mandela. In this 
particular appeal, the concert organisers alleged that at the time the prohibition was 
granted, the jurisdictional facts necessary for the Commissioner to exercise his 
discretion had not yet existed. In the alternative, they argued that the Commissioner’s 
actions were ultra vires as he had failed to apply his mind to the criteria necessary for 
a prohibition to be imposed, as contemplated by section 3(1) of the Public Safety Act. 
The court disagreed with the respondents, but instead held that the Commissioner had 
applied his mind when granting the notice to prohibit the gathering. Furthermore, the 
court agreed with the Commissioner’s contention that he was afraid that the gathering 
would result in violence and stone-throwing and that it was thus necessary for the 
gathering to be prohibited in order to prevent injury or death. 
These two cases display the courts’ unwillingness to simply accept the decision by 
the state to prohibit gatherings. Instead, it shows that the courts were willing to look at 
the reasons for the administrative decision to prohibit a gathering. Effectively, this 
allowed the courts to exercise its discretion more freely when cases appeared before 
it, instead of simply blindly accepting notices that sought to prohibit gatherings. This 
marked a significant change from the past, as courts were at least willing to consider 
the political climate of the country when they had to interpret prohibition notices before 
them. 
 
2 2 2 6 Concluding remarks 
The commencement of apartheid in 1948 saw various statutes being passed, which 
codified many of the segregationist practices in place at the time. The year 1950 was 
significant as it marked the first major step in regulating assemblies. In Tsoaeli v S,50 
Molemela JP stated that during apartheid, magistrates were responsible for approving 
gatherings, while the police played a major role during the gathering itself.51 This 
remark encapsulates the essence of this section, which dealt with the manner in which 
various bodies implemented the suppression of dissent imposed by the legislative 
framework from 1950 onward. While the above statement by Molemela JP is simple, 
                                                          
50 [2016] ZAFSHC 217 (17 November 2016). 
51 Tsoaeli v S [2016] ZAFSHC 217 (17 November 2016) para 18. 
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it reflects the reality that the regulation of protest during and prior to apartheid was far 
more complex. Various statutes, often referred to as being of a “draconian nature”52 
were enacted to suppress dissent. This dissent was suppressed by state authorities 
through the prohibition and criminalisation of all forms of mass protest.53  
Based on the above discussion of the apartheid-era statutes seeking to regulate 
assembly, and the interpretation of these statutes by courts, a number of conclusions 
can be drawn. Demonstrations on public property initially required permission by the 
local authorities, who were “jealous of their powers”54 and often refused permission for 
demonstrations to proceed.55 In this regard, the government at the time amended 
existing legislation, passed new legislation, or handed down emergency regulations to 
advance their stance on suppressing mass political dissent.  
However, when local authorities started granting permission, legislative measures 
were put in place that granted magistrates the power to prohibit gatherings.56 This led 
to a decline in the number of protests, because magistrates could effectively veto any 
demonstrations that the local authorities may have permitted.57 As a result, various 
forms of mass dissent were a “rarity”.58 The effect of these legislative measures was 
that local authorities, with the assistance of magistrates, effectively performed the 
government’s functions by carrying out its policies on suppressing political dissent.59 
Effectively, the powers of the judiciary in interpreting these statutes were limited to the 
confines of the statute itself, and often did not take into account the political climate in 
which these cases were heard. However, the judiciary was more willing to do so as 
the magnitude of political protests and violence intensified in the 1980s. 
The suppression of mass political dissent, performed through the promulgation of 
these statutes, as well as the interpretation thereof by the courts, displays the far-
reaching impact these apartheid-era statutes had on anti-apartheid movements. It also 
                                                          
52 Tsoaeli v S [2016] ZAFSHC 217 (17 November 2016) para 24. 
53 Tsoaeli v S [2016] ZAFSHC 217 (17 November 2016) para 18. 
54 J Dugard Human rights and the South African legal order (1978) 187. 
55 J Dugard Human rights and the South African legal order (1978) 187. 
56 J Dugard Human rights and the South African legal order (1978) 188. 
57 J Dugard Human rights and the South African legal order (1978) 188. 
58 J Dugard Human rights and the South African legal order (1978) 186. 
59 J Dugard Human rights and the South African legal order (1978) 188. 
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provides a fruitful understanding of the importance of a new constitutional dispensation 
given the manner in which mass political dissent was regulated in the past. 
 
2 3  The right to assemble and demonstrate in the new constitutional 
dispensation 
2 3 1 The right to assemble and demonstrate in the Interim Constitution 
In February 1990, when FW de Klerk announced that various apartheid-era statutes 
would be repealed and a number of political prisoners would be released, a new period 
of South Africa’s history was born. The first part of this history was the formulation and 
adoption of the Interim Constitution. 
The Interim Constitution was adopted as a result of the Multi-party Negotiation 
Process, which commenced in 1993.60 It was during this process that the text of the 
Interim Constitution was signed, the framework for the 1996 Constitution was adopted 
and a binding set of Constitutional Principles were established.61 The intention was to 
set out on a two-stage transition process, as agreed upon by various stakeholders at 
the Conference for a Democratic South Africa (“CODESA”).62 During this period, 
consensus amongst these stakeholders was reached regarding the need to grant 
protection to those wishing to exercise their right to freedom of assembly. This position 
was described by Woolman and De Waal: 
 
                                                          
60 I Currie & J de Waal The bill of rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 5; J Brickhill & R Babiuch 
“Political rights” in S Woolman & M Chaskalson (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 2 ed 
(OS 2007) ch 45 5; IM Rautenbach “Introduction to the bill of rights” in Y Mokgoro & P Tlakula 
(eds) Bill of rights compendium (RS 2015) ch 1A 11. 
61 I Currie & J de Waal The bill of rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 5. 
62 I Currie & J de Waal The bill of rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 4. The Constitutional Court in 
Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: in re Certification of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) para 13 described this process: 
“Instead of an outright transmission of power from the old order to the new, there would be a 
programmed two-stage transition. An interim government, established and functioning under an 
interim constitution agreed to by the negotiating parties, would govern the country on a coalition 
basis while a final constitution was being drafted. A national legislature, elected (directly and 
indirectly) by universal adult suffrage, would double as the constitution-making body and would draft 
the new constitution within a given time.” 
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“For the first time real attempts were made to balance the fundamental rights of protestors, 
demonstrators, and assemblers against the state’s interest in public order, the 
government’s interest in carrying out its tasks, and the general public’s liberty interests.”63 
 
Ultimately, the first indications of the attempt described above can be found in the 
Interim Constitution.64 Section 16 of the Interim Constitution, entitled “assembly, 
demonstration and petition” granted every person the “right to assemble and 
demonstrate with others peacefully and unarmed, and to present petitions.”65 
 
2 3 2 The importance of recommendations made to the Goldstone Commission of 
Inquiry 
2 3 2 1 Overview 
While section 16 of the Interim Constitution recognised and protected the right to 
assemble and demonstrate, the Goldstone Commission was appointed to set a 
framework for legislation giving effect to section 16 of the Interim Constitution, as well 
as its equivalent in the 1996 Constitution. The Goldstone Commission was assisted 
by a multinational panel of experts, and together they outlined a new approach towards 
assembly jurisprudence.66 The multinational panel of experts also assisted the 
Goldstone Commission in drafting new legislation based on this approach.67 The result 
was the enactment of the Gatherings Act, which repealed legislation enacted under 
the apartheid regime that sought to prohibit gatherings.68 The multinational panel’s 
approach was premised on the idea that public demonstration, whether it be in support 
of, or in opposition to state policies or government leaders, is an integral part of a 
democratic society.69  
                                                          
63 S Woolman & J de Waal “Voting with your feet” in D van Wyk, J Dugard, B de Villiers & D 
Davis (eds) Rights and constitutionalism – The new South African legal order (1994) 292 294. 
64 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
65 Section 16 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
66 S Woolman “Freedom of assembly” in S Woolman & M Chaskalson (eds) Constitutional law 
of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2005) ch 43 7. 
67 S Woolman “Freedom of assembly” in S Woolman & M Chaskalson (eds) Constitutional law 
of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2005) ch 43 7. 
68 The specific statutes repealed will be discussed in 2 3 3.  
69 P Heymann Towards peaceful protests in South Africa (1992) 1. This source contains the 
recommendations the multinational panel made to the Goldstone Commission. 
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Based on this principle, the multinational panel made numerous recommendations 
to the Goldstone Commission relating to the need for a new legislative framework for 
the regulation and protection of the right to assemble and demonstrate. It also made 
various recommendations about the content of the new legislative framework. These 
recommendations will be discussed in light of the requirements for a lawful gathering 
in sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Gatherings Act. The requirements for a lawful gathering 
are a direct result of the recommendations made by the multinational panel. This will 
impact the discussion in chapter three, which will address the procedures to be 
followed before a lawful gathering in terms of the Gatherings Act may be held. 
 
2 3 2 2  Notice of a gathering 
One of the major recommendations made by the multinational panel related to 
notice, namely that the relevant authorities must be notified of a gathering before its 
commencement.70 The multinational panel recommended that those who intend to 
hold a demonstration should simply be required to give notice to the necessary 
authorities before the commencement thereof.71 It stated that the best functionary or 
authority to give notice of a demonstration to would be the local government authority, 
because it is best equipped to make the necessary arrangements prior to the 
commencement of a demonstration.72 In its recommendations to the Goldstone 
                                                          
70 P Heymann Towards peaceful protests in South Africa (1992) 10. 
71 According to the multinational panel, the notice requirement emphasised the fact that any 
right to assemble or demonstrate is not dependent on authorisation or permission at the peril 
of local authorities. Instead, this requirement only granted the authorities the power to enforce 
measures to restrict the effect that the demonstration may have on the public. This symbolised 
the fact that a mere failure to follow the necessary procedures before an assembly or 
demonstration does “not necessarily require some forceful action”. As a result, any restrictions 
imposed on the demonstration by the local authorities that sought to limit the effect on the 
public could be challenged before a court of law. Therefore, the knowledge of the existence of 
a remedy would encourage organisers and authorities to negotiate the terms and logistics of 
the demonstration. See further P Heymann Towards peaceful protests in South Africa (1992) 
10.  
72 This recommendation was made despite the fact that many believed that this authority would 
either be unsympathetic towards those who wish to organise or participate in a demonstration 
or that the authority would be biased towards certain parties or organisations. The 
multinational panel, however, found that any concerns could be debunked should a copy of 
the notice be given to the South African Police, which would subsequently play a large role in 
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Commission, the multinational panel suggested that six working days’ notice should 
be sufficient for local authorities to arrange and hold meetings with all interested 
parties, to ensure the location and logistics have been arranged, and to prepare for 
the demonstration itself.73  
The multinational panel recognised that certain events may take place that will 
trigger an instantaneous reaction by members of a particular community.74 This 
reaction will often result in a spontaneous demonstration, in which the notice 
requirement could be bypassed.75 It is universally accepted that these types of 
demonstrations are not formally organised through appointed organisers, which would 
typically be those who would be held responsible.76 These specific types of 
demonstrations do not have to be dealt with in a violent manner by the police.77 
Instead, the past actions of the police in similar situations have shown that they are 
capable of dealing with demonstrations without notice in a non-violent manner.78 
Therefore, mere failure to give notice of a gathering should not warrant a violent 
reaction by the police. 
 
2 3 2 3 Negotiations before a gathering 
The multinational panel emphasised the importance of holding negotiations 
between local authorities, organisers and the police.79 This will ensure that the 
                                                          
the negotiation process. See further P Heymann Towards peaceful protests in South Africa 
(1992) 10-11. 
73 This should also give organisers sufficient time to have any restrictions challenged in court 
and to inform participants of the conditions under which the demonstration would take place. 
The multinational panel also stated that failure by the local authority to act in terms of the 
notice should amount to an automatic acceptance of the content of the notice. See further P 
Heymann Towards peaceful protests in South Africa (1992) 12-13. 
74 P Heymann Towards peaceful protests in South Africa (1992) 13. 
75 P Heymann Towards peaceful protests in South Africa (1992) 13. 
76 P Heymann Towards peaceful protests in South Africa (1992) 13. 
77 P Heymann Towards peaceful protests in South Africa (1992) 13. 
78 The multinational panel recommended that mere failure to provide the necessary notice 
should not immediately mean that steps should be taken for the demonstration to be 
prevented, as it merely amounts to an inconvenience. Instead, the authorities should try and 
accommodate the needs of the demonstrators, while keeping the needs of other members of 
the public in mind. See further P Heymann Towards peaceful protests in South Africa (1992) 
13. 
79 P Heymann Towards peaceful protests in South Africa (1992) 14. 
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demonstrators’ message is heard, while causing as little disruption for members of the 
public as possible.80 The panel maintained that it is the responsibility of the local 
authority concerned to arrange the meeting between all stakeholders.81 The 
procedures followed by the local authorities during this stage should be made clear 
and published so that it is accessible to the public.82 The multinational panel 
recommended to the Goldstone Commission that the role of local authorities and the 
police should be viewed to “facilitate and protect”83 demonstrations, even in cases 
where the police or the local authorities are the target of the demonstration itself.84  
The multinational panel suggested that inviting private parties to attend these 
negotiations could assist in the process being free from bias.85 This negotiation 
process thus sought to place the responsibility of the course of the demonstration in 
more than one set of hands.86 This would grant the organisers of the demonstration a 
greater sense of protection should the local authorities attempt to place a restriction 
on a demonstration that the police were otherwise willing to accommodate.87 
 
                                                          
80 P Heymann Towards peaceful protests in South Africa (1992) 13. 
81 P Heymann Towards peaceful protests in South Africa (1992) 13. 
82 P Heymann Towards peaceful protests in South Africa (1992) 13. 
83 P Heymann Towards peaceful protests in South Africa (1992) 14. 
84 In this regard, it is essential for these parties to negotiate in good faith in order to ensure 
that the local authorities and the police can provide “fair and effective” assistance to all those 
participating in the demonstration. Apart from acting in good faith, the multinational panel 
advised that the local authorities and the police participate in the negotiation process 
enthusiastically. This would ensure that organisers would be more satisfied with the 
negotiation process and would thus be more willing to accept any conditions imposed on the 
demonstration. It is essential that the organisers are satisfied with the process, as it would be 
easier for the organisers (and their marshals) to prevent the destruction or property and 
injuries during the course of the demonstration than it would be for the police. It would also be 
easier for the marshals to ensure that any restrictions or conditions are complied with, and 
that the procession is kept in check without resorting to violence. See further P Heymann 
Towards peaceful protests in South Africa (1992) 14-15. 
85 P Heymann Towards peaceful protests in South Africa (1992) 11. 
86 P Heymann Towards peaceful protests in South Africa (1992) 11. 
87 P Heymann Towards peaceful protests in South Africa (1992) 11. 
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2 3 3 The promulgation of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 
The recommendations made by multinational panel to the Goldstone Commission 
brought about the promulgation of the Gatherings Act.88 The purpose of the Gatherings 
Act is “[t]o regulate the holding of public gatherings and demonstrations at certain 
places; and to provide for matters connected therewith.”89 The purpose of the 
Gatherings Act thus defines, and subsequently limits, the regulatory nature of the Act 
itself. It does so, firstly, by limiting its scope to “public gatherings and demonstrations”. 
Secondly, it limits the types of property to which the Act extends by referring to “certain 
places”. 
The Gatherings Act also sought to repeal various apartheid-era statutes, including 
the Gatherings and Demonstrations in the Vicinity of Parliament Act 52 of 1973, the 
Demonstrations in or near Court Buildings Prohibition Act 71 of 1982, and the 
Gatherings and Demonstrations at or near the Union Buildings Act 103 of 1992 in its 
entirety.90 The Gatherings Act also repealed various sections of the Internal Security 
Act 74 of 1982.91 
According to a policy document issued by the Ministry of Police, entitled “Policy and 
guidelines: Policing of public protests, gatherings and major events” (“Policy document 
on public protests”),92 the basic premise of the Gatherings Act is that everyone has a 
right to partake in gatherings peacefully, and thus deserve the protection of the South 
African Police Services.93 The Policy document on public protests also states that the 
Gatherings Act sets out the key individuals involved in making submissions before a 
request to hold a gathering may be approved,94 as well as the procedures that certain 
                                                          
88 S Woolman “Assembly, demonstration and petition” in I Currie & J de Waal (eds) The bill of 
rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 377 381. 
89 The Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. 
90 Schedule 3 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. See also The Ministry of Police 
Policy and guidelines: Policing of public protests, gatherings and major events (2011) 6.  
91 The Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 repealed sections 46(1) and (2), 47, 48, 49, 
51, 53, 62 and 75 of the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982. See also The Ministry of Police Policy 
and guidelines: Policing of public protests, gatherings and major events (2011) 6. 
92 The Ministry of Police Policy and guidelines: Policing of public protests, gatherings and 
major events (2011). 
93 The Ministry of Police Policy and guidelines: Policing of public protests, gatherings and 
major events (2011) 6. 
94 The Ministry of Police Policy and guidelines: Policing of public protests, gatherings and 
major events (2011) 7. 
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individuals need to follow before a gathering may commence.95 These procedures will 
be addressed in detail in chapter three. 
 
2 3 4  The right to assemble and demonstrate in terms of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 
The protection of the right to freedom of assembly in terms of the Interim 
Constitution was replaced by section 17 of the 1996 Constitution. Even though the 
Gatherings Act was enacted to give effect to section 16 of the Interim Constitution, it 
is the only statute that deals with the procedures surrounding the exercise of rights in 
section 17 of the Constitution, and can thus be viewed to give effect to section 17 as 
such. 
The drafting of the right to assemble, demonstrate, picket and present petitions, 
was performed by the Constitutional Assembly.96 The task of the Constitutional 
Assembly was to draft the wording of the right to freedom of assembly, while giving 
effect to Constitutional Principle II.97 The process involved the consideration of 
submissions made by political parties, government structures and institutions, 
organisations and the public at large. 
The Constitutional Assembly Theme Committee 4 on fundamental rights (Freedom 
of assembly, demonstration and petition) (“The Committee”) was tasked with drafting 
the provisional text of section 17, while taking the views of political parties and other 
stakeholders into account. It found that the nature of the right should not only include 
the right to assemble, demonstrate and picket, but should also extend to the right to 
present petitions.98 Internal modifiers were included that required these rights to be 
                                                          
95 The Ministry of Police Policy and guidelines: Policing of public protests, gatherings and 
major events (2011) 6-7. 
96 I Currie & J de Waal The bill of rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 6. Section 68(1) of the Interim 
Constitution stated that the Constitutional Assembly would comprise of the joint sitting of the 
National Assembly and the Senate, which included the members of Parliament elected during 
the 1994 elections.  
97 Constitutional Principle II states: 
“Everyone shall enjoy all universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and civil liberties, which 
shall be provided for and protected by entrenched and justiciable provisions in the Constitution, 
which shall be drafted after having given due consideration to inter alia the fundamental rights 
contained in Chapter 3 of this Constitution.” 
98 While all interested parties agreed that the right to freedom of assembly and demonstration 
are universally accepted as being fundamental rights, they disagreed on the inclusion of the 
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exercised peacefully and unarmed.99 With regard to the application of the right, the 
Committee was of the opinion that the state, as well as private actors,100 had a duty to 
“respect and protect the exercise of the rights.”101 Natural persons were found to be 
bearers of the right, as well as juristic persons, despite some reservations by certain 
interested parties.102 The Committee also indicated that the right could be limited in 
                                                          
right to petition. Not only did the Freedom Front Plus submit that this right should not be 
included in the same section as the right to assemble and demonstrate, but they also 
maintained that this right is not fundamental and should thus be omitted from the Constitution 
in its entirety. Their argument was based on the fact that this right is not recognised in 
international instruments and agreements, and is omitted in the constitutions of other nations. 
Their views were also based on the fact that its inclusion would create the impression that 
those to whom the petition is addressed is compelled to meet the demands contained therein. 
However, the Committee noted that including the right to petition alongside the right to 
assemble and demonstrate would not detract from the protection of the right to petition outside 
the context of an assembly or demonstration. The report also indicated that mere inclusion of 
this right in the Constitution should not be interpreted to compel those to whom the petitions 
are addressed to comply with the contents thereof. See further Constitutional Assembly 
Theme Committee 4 report on fundamental rights “Freedom of assembly, demonstration and 
petition” (1995) 6. The importance of the inclusion of the right to petition was summarised by 
L du Plessis & H Corder Understanding South Africa's transitional bill of rights (1994) 160: 
“While some might regard the right to petition as somewhat archaic, its importance historically as a 
means of registering grievances seems to have diminished little in present circumstances.” 
99 All interested parties agreed that the recognition of the right is necessary for the functioning 
of a constitutional democracy, but admitted that this right needs to be exercised peacefully 
and unarmed. See further Constitutional Assembly Theme Committee 4 report on fundamental 
rights “Freedom of assembly, demonstration and petition” (1995) 6. 
100 Along with this duty, the Committee also agreed that the right must apply to customary law 
and the common law. See further Constitutional Assembly Theme Committee 4 report on 
fundamental rights “Freedom of assembly, demonstration and petition” (1995) 6-7, 12. 
101 Constitutional Assembly Theme Committee 4 report on fundamental rights “Freedom of 
assembly, demonstration and petition” (1995) 6. 
102 While all interested parties agreed that natural persons would be bearers of the right, three 
political parties (the African Christian Democratic Party, the Democratic Party and the National 
Party) argued that the right should extend to juristic persons. The Committee noted the 
argument, but stated that it would only be taken into account when the Memorandum on the 
general application of the Bill of Rights is drafted. This Memorandum subsequently led to the 
adoption of section 8 of the Constitution, which extended the rights in the Bill of Rights to 
juristic persons. Section 8(4) states that “[a] juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of 
Rights to the extent required by the nature of the rights and the nature of that juristic person.” 
See further Constitutional Assembly Theme Committee 4 report on fundamental rights 
“Freedom of assembly, demonstration and petition” (1995) 7, 12. 
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terms of a general limitations clause,103 and that it could only be suspended during a 
state of emergency, provided it occurred under judicially-controlled circumstances.104 
As a result of the Committee’s findings, it agreed upon a provisional text for section 17 
of the Constitution, subject to the approval of the Constitutional Assembly. This text 
was subsequently amended by the Constitutional Assembly, and the final text of 
section 17 of the Constitution thus read: 
 
“Everyone has the right, peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket 
and to present petitions.”105 
 
The wording of section 17 makes it clear that some assemblies, demonstrations, 
pickets and petitions will fall outside the scope of the protection afforded by section 
17.106 It includes assemblies, demonstration, pickets and petitions that overstep the 
“boundary set by the Constitution”,107 which requires that they be exercised “peacefully 
and unarmed”. These terms thus serves as an internal modifier of the right in section 
17 of the Constitution.108 Rautenbach argues that had these internal modifiers been 
omitted from section 17, participants in non-peaceful or armed assemblies, 
demonstrations and pickets would still not enjoy constitutional protection.109 Instead, 
the participants’ rights in section 17 of the Constitution could be justifiably limited in 
                                                          
103 Further contention was present in agreeing upon the limitation of the right. While there was 
agreement about the fact that the right could be limited, the nature and extent of the limitation 
was contentious. See Constitutional Assembly Theme Committee 4 report on fundamental 
rights “Freedom of assembly, demonstration and petition” (1995) 7, 12. 
104 This specific issue was raised by the African National Congress. The Committee found that 
the position of the right during a state of emergency was covered by section 34 of the Interim 
Constitution. See further Constitutional Assembly Theme Committee 4 report on fundamental 
rights “Freedom of assembly, demonstration and petition” (1995) 8, 12. 
105 Section 17 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
106 S Woolman “Assembly, demonstration and petition” in I Currie & J de Waal (eds) The bill 
of rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 377 383. 
107 Hotz v UCT 2016 4 All SA 723 (SCA) para 31. 
108 S Woolman “Freedom of assembly” in S Woolman & M Chaskalson (eds) Constitutional 
law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2005) ch 43 19. 
109 IM Rautenbach “Introduction to the bill of rights” in Y Mokgoro & P Tlakula (eds) Bill of rights 
compendium (RS 2015) ch 1A 171. 
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terms of section 36(1) of the Constitution,110 due to the non-peaceful or armed manner 
in which the right was exercised. 
Gatherings will not be peaceful in cases where public or private interests, such as 
public order, injury to persons, and damage to property, are threatened by violent 
action.111 A useful example of such action was seen in Fourways Mall (Pty) Ltd v South 
African Commercial Catering.112 While commenting on the conduct of the respondent, 
the court held that neither the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, nor section 17 of the 
Constitution, can be used to protect picketers where acts of intimidation are used to 
target members of the public and subsequently interfere with the rights of other 
lessees in a shopping mall. This shows that the section 17 internal modifier refers not 
only to violent acts, but also structurally violent acts such as intimidation. 
A further internal modifier states that the right in section 17 be exercised “unarmed”. 
This means that participants of an assembly, demonstration, picket or petition carrying 
arms will be excluded from the protection afforded by section 17 of the Constitution.113 
 
2 4 Conclusion 
                                                          
110 IM Rautenbach “Introduction to the bill of rights” in Y Mokgoro & P Tlakula (eds) Bill of rights 
compendium (RS 2015) ch 1A 171. 
111 IM Rautenbach “Introduction to the bill of rights” in Y Mokgoro & P Tlakula (eds) Bill of rights 
compendium (RS 2015) ch 1A 171. 
112 1999 3 SA 752 (W). This case dealt with a dispute between two trade unions (the 
respondents) and two separate owners and lessors of two separate shopping malls (the 
applicants). The applicants sought an order confirming an interim order granted against the 
respondents that prohibited them from blocking the shopping centre entrances, impeding the 
movement of members of the public and intimidating members of the public, employees and 
other lessees. The respondents had been on the premises of the applicant as part of a 
protected strike. The strike was conducted against Edgars Stores Limited, one of the lessees 
at the respective shopping malls. An earlier order of the Labour Court forbade members of the 
respondent from interfering with the customers and employees of Edgars Stores Limited. The 
same order placed a burden on the respondents to negotiate with the applicants about the 
logistics of the picket or demonstration on the applicant’s property, before such action 
commenced. As a result, the applicants sought urgent relief preventing the respondents from 
conducting themselves in the manner mentioned above. 
113 S Woolman “Freedom of assembly” in S Woolman & M Chaskalson (eds) Constitutional 
law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2005) ch 43 20; S Woolman “Assembly, demonstration and 
petition” in I Currie & J de Waal (eds) The bill of rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 377 385. 
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This chapter served to discuss the legislative and constitutional framework of the 
right to assemble and demonstrate before, during and after apartheid. This was done, 
firstly, by analysing the history of protests during apartheid. Reference was made to 
various statutes, as well as the manner in which these statutes were interpreted by 
courts. The discussion of these statutes and cases displayed heavy attempts by the 
government to curb any form of dissent. It was found that magistrates, ministers and 
other authorities used the legislative framework at the time to prohibit gatherings. 
However, from the 1980s, the judiciary was more willing to take the political context at 
the time into account when interpreting these statutes. 
Secondly, the position of the right to assemble and demonstrate in the new 
constitutional dispensation was analysed. This included a discussion of the right under 
the Interim Constitution, which recognised and protected the right to assemble, 
demonstrate and present petitions. The submissions made by the multinational panel 
of experts to the Goldstone Commission regarding notice and negotiations before a 
gathering, aided in drafting provisions of the Gatherings Act. The Act was found to 
give effect to section 16 of the Interim Constitution, and repealed apartheid-era 
statutes that sought to prohibit gatherings outright. The drafting of the 1996 
Constitution was subject to a tedious drafting process, which saw submissions from 
various stakeholders being made on what should form part of the recognition of the 
right to freedom of assembly. The result of this process was section 17 of the 
Constitution, which recognises the right to assemble, demonstrate, picket and present 
petitions. 
The Gatherings Act encourages and regulates assemblies and demonstrations, 
rather than prohibits it in a manner consistent with its predecessors. In this regard, this 
chapter ultimately set out to provide a useful basis to discuss the content of the 
Gatherings Act. 
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CHAPTER 3: “GATHERING” IN TERMS OF THE REGULATION OF GATHERINGS 
ACT 205 OF 1993 
 
3 1 Introduction 
While the previous chapter discussed the legislative and constitutional framework 
of the right to assemble and demonstrate before and during the new constitutional 
dispensation, this chapter will focus on the definition of a gathering and the 
requirements for a lawful gathering in terms of the Regulation of  Gatherings Act 205 
of 1993 (“Gatherings Act”). This will be done, firstly, by briefly outlining and interpreting 
the definition of a “gathering”. Reference will also be made to the differences between 
a “gathering” and “demonstration” in terms of the Gatherings Act. 
Secondly, the requirements for conducting a lawful gathering will be discussed. This 
discussion will focus on sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Gatherings Act, which deal with the 
procedures that need to be followed before the commencement of a gathering. A 
discussion of the impact a gathering may have on rights protected in section 25(1) of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, require that these requirements 
are met. 
Thirdly, the types of property to which the definition of a “gathering” extends will be 
determined. In this regard, emphasis will be placed on whether the Gatherings Act 
applies to privately owned property and, if so, in which circumstances. This discussion 
will focus on the concepts of “public road”, “any other public place or premises” and 
“wholly or partly open to the air”, which form part of the definition of a “gathering”. This 
determination will be made with reference to legislation, academic commentary and 
case law.  
Ultimately, this chapter will seek to draw conclusions on the circumstances in which 
the Gatherings Act may apply to privately owned property. This will provide a useful 
basis for discussing the impact the Gatherings Act may have on section 25(1) of the 
Constitution, which will be discussed in chapter 4. If it is found that the Gatherings Act 
applies to privately owned property, then chapter 4 will need to address whether the 
Act permits a deprivation of property in a manner inconsistent with section 25(1) of the 
Constitution.  
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3 2 Requirements for holding a lawful gathering in terms of the Gatherings 
Act 
3 2 1 Overview 
The Gatherings Act makes provision for procedures to be followed before a 
gathering may commence, which applies only to a gathering, and not a 
demonstration.1 In section 1 of the Gatherings Act, a distinction is made between a 
“gathering” and a “demonstration”. Section 1 defines a demonstration as “any 
demonstration by one or more persons, but not more than 15 persons, for or against 
any person, cause, action or failure to take action.”2 Demonstrations need to be 
distinguished from gatherings because they do not attract the “strictures”3 of a 
gathering,4 and can thus bypass the procedural requirements in sections 2, 3 and 4 of 
the Gatherings Act. Section 1 of the Gatherings Act defines a “gathering”: 
 
“‘[G]athering’ means any assembly, concourse or procession of more than 15 persons in 
or on any public road as defined in the Road Traffic Act, 1989 (Act No. 29 of 1989), or any 
other public place or premises wholly or partly open to the air- 
   (a)   at which the principles, policy, actions or failure to act of any government, political 
party or political organization, whether or not that party or organization is registered in terms 
of any applicable law, are discussed, attacked, criticized, promoted or propagated; or 
   (b)   held to form pressure groups, to hand over petitions to any person, or to mobilize or 
demonstrate support for or opposition to the views, principles, policy, actions or omissions 
of any person or body of persons or institution, including any government, administration 
or governmental institution.”5 
 
                                                          
1 The only other mention of a demonstration relates to demonstrations in the vicinity of courts, 
Parliament and the Union Buildings in section 7 of the Gatherings Act (which is beyond the 
scope of this thesis), and other issues related to the course of a demonstration (which is 
beyond the scope of this thesis). 
2 Section 1 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. 
3 S Wilson & I de Vos in Ex Parte: Council for the Advancement of the South African 
Constitution In Re: Restraint of protest on or near university campuses Chambers, 
Johannesburg (22 December 2016) para 33. 
4 S Wilson & I de Vos in Ex Parte: Council for the Advancement of the South African 
Constitution In Re: Restraint of protest on or near university campuses Chambers, 
Johannesburg (22 December 2016) para 33. 
5 Section 1 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. 
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The above definition of a gathering refers to “any assembly”. Woolman argues that 
assemblies are “gatherings that may or may not have political content.”6 This raises 
concern, because his definition includes the term “gathering”, while the definition of a 
“gathering” in the Gatherings Act includes an “assembly” as a subset, or type of 
gathering. In other words, the Gatherings Act classifies an assembly as a type of 
gathering, while Woolman classifies a gathering as a type of assembly. Even though 
this thesis does not aim to clarify any of the confusion in these definitions, highlighting 
this issue displays the various ways in which these terms could be interpreted. The 
remainder of the definition of a “gathering” is fairly straightforward, either because 
certain terms can be understood within their ordinary meaning, or are defined 
elsewhere in the Gatherings Act or another statute.7 
 
3 2 2 Section 2 of the Gatherings Act: The appointment of conveners, authorised 
members and responsible officers  
The first requirement for conducting a lawful gathering relates to the appointment 
of persons involved in the procedures to be followed under the Gatherings Act. Section 
2 of the Gatherings Act enlists the procedures to be followed regarding the 
appointment of conveners,8 authorised members,9 and responsible officers.10 These 
                                                          
6 S Woolman “Assembly, demonstration and petition” in I Currie & J de Waal (eds) The bill of 
rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 377 386. 
7 The definition of a gathering contains reference to an organisation, which is defined in section 
1 of the Gatherings Act as “any association, group or body of persons, whether or not such 
association, group or body has been incorporated, established or registered in accordance 
with any law.” Furthermore, reference is made to the definition of a public road, as defined in 
the Road Traffic Act 29 of 1989. This definition will be discussed later in this chapter.  
8 Section 1 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act defines “convener”:  
“‘[C]onvener’ means –  
(a)   any person who, of his own accord, convenes a gathering; 
 (b)   in relation to any organization or branch of any organization, any person appointed by such 
organization or branch in terms of section 2 (1).” 
9 Section 1 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 defines “authorised member” as 
“a member of the Police authorized in terms of section 2 (2) to represent the Police as 
contemplated in the said section.” 
10 Section 1 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 defines “responsible officer” as 
“a person appointed in terms of section 2 (4) (a) as responsible officer or deputy responsible 
officer, and includes any person deemed in terms of section 2 (4) (b) to be a responsible 
officer.” 
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three parties are essential to the negotiations and organisation of the gathering before 
it commences.  
 
3 2 3 Section 3 of the Gatherings Act: Granting notice of a gathering   
The second requirement for conducting a lawful gathering relates to notice.11 
Section 3 of the Gatherings Act enlists the procedures regarding the granting and 
receiving of notice of a gathering, the contents of such notice and the duties of the 
local authorities, responsible officer, convener and authorised member. Section 3(1) 
of the Gatherings Act requires the convener to give written notice of the intended 
gathering to the responsible officer concerned. Section 3(2) requires that this notice 
be given at least seven days before the gathering. Section 3(2), however, makes 
provision for the fact that seven days’ notice may not be desirable, and allows the 
notice to be given at the earliest opportunity possible. In such cases, however, section 
3(2) grants the responsible officer the power to prohibit the gathering if notice is given 
less than 48 hours beforehand. 
This provision clearly displays the impact that the recommendations of the 
multinational panel had on the drafting of the Gatherings Act.12 Despite the impact of 
the recommendations of the multinational panel on the above provision, Woolman is 
critical thereof.13 He argues that the seven day notice period creates “doctrinal 
problems and practical difficulties.”14 This notice period does not take into account the 
possibility that gatherings are often an immediate response by a segment of the 
population to some form of injustice or wrongdoing.15 Therefore, it has the effect of 
suppressing immediate dissent by allowing the state an opportunity to counteract any 
intended gatherings before they can actually commence.16  
                                                          
11 See also 2 3 2 2 above. 
12 See 2 3 2 2 above. The remainder of section 3 of the Gatherings Act is beyond the scope 
of this thesis.  
13 S Woolman “Freedom of assembly” in S Woolman & M Chaskalson (eds) Constitutional law 
of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2005) ch 43 8. 
14 S Woolman “Freedom of assembly” in S Woolman & M Chaskalson (eds) Constitutional law 
of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2005) ch 43 8. 
15 S Woolman “Freedom of assembly” in S Woolman & M Chaskalson (eds) Constitutional law 
of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2005) ch 43 8. 
16 S Woolman “Freedom of assembly” in S Woolman & M Chaskalson (eds) Constitutional law 
of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2005) ch 43 9. 
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3 2 4 Section 4 of the Gatherings Act: Other miscellaneous procedures before a 
gathering  
The final requirement for the organisation of a lawful gathering relates to the 
remainder of the procedures between various affected parties. Section 4 of the 
Gatherings Act enlists the procedures relating to consultations and negotiations 
between all relevant stakeholders,17 the amendment of notices by the convener, and 
any conditions placed on the gathering related to logistics, time periods, and the 
behaviour of participants.  
The importance of holding meetings in terms of section 4 of the Gatherings Act 
could also be explained by referring to other sections of the Gatherings Act. According 
to the Policy document on public protests,18 the responsibility of conveners or 
organisers to hold a meeting in terms of section 4 prior to such gathering could aid in 
avoiding prosecution in terms of section 12 of the Gatherings Act.19 The document 
states that to ensure that section 12 of the Gatherings Act is “effectively utilized”,20 the 
outcomes of these meetings should result in strict conditions being placed on the 
approval of the intended gathering.21 This meeting needs to address issues such as 
the route of the gathering, the amount of marshals to be used, the number of 
participants and any other conditions to be imposed on the gathering itself.22 
The Policy document on public protests emphasises that the responsibility of 
organising and executing a successful gathering under the Gatherings Act does not 
solely lie in the South African Police Services.23 Instead, the South African Police 
Services is simply there to protect those who are exercising their right to peacefully 
                                                          
17 See also 2 3 2 3 above. 
18 The Ministry of Police Policy and guidelines: Policing of public protests, gatherings and 
major events (2011). 
19 The Ministry of Police Policy and guidelines: Policing of public protests, gatherings and 
major events (2011) 25. 
20 The Ministry of Police Policy and guidelines: Policing of public protests, gatherings and 
major events (2011) 25. 
21 The Ministry of Police Policy and guidelines: Policing of public protests, gatherings and 
major events (2011) 25. 
22 The Ministry of Police Policy and guidelines: Policing of public protests, gatherings and 
major events (2011) 19. 
23 The Ministry of Police Policy and guidelines: Policing of public protests, gatherings and 
major events (2011) 13. 
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participate in the gathering,24 while organisers and conveners are tasked with ensuring 
that the gathering remains peaceful, and proceeds according to the route and 
guidelines decided upon at the meeting.25 
Woolman argues that section 5(2) of the Gatherings Act grants the local authorities 
a “significant degree of discretion”26 in determining whether the gathering should be 
prohibited, provided they have organised a meeting with the conveners and other 
affected parties within 24 hours of the notice being granted.27 He is critical of the role 
of local authorities, and how they have failed to meet their constitutional obligations, 
as well as their obligations under the Gatherings Act.28 
 
3 3 Privately owned property affected by a “gathering” in terms of the 
Gatherings Act  
3 3 1 Overview 
The Gatherings Act limits the application of the Act to “certain places”. These places 
are gatherings that are held “[i]n or on any public road as defined in the Road Traffic 
Act, 1989 (Act 29 of 1989), or any other public place or premises wholly or partly open 
to the air”.29 
This section will determine whether the definition of a gathering extends to privately 
owned property, and, if so, in which circumstances. This will be determined with 
                                                          
24 The Ministry of Police Policy and guidelines: Policing of public protests, gatherings and 
major events (2011) 6. 
25 The Ministry of Police Policy and guidelines: Policing of public protests, gatherings and 
major events (2011) 13. 
26 S Woolman “Freedom of assembly” in S Woolman & M Chaskalson (eds) Constitutional law 
of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2005) ch 43 10. 
27 This meeting is one of the procedures required by section 4(3) of the Regulation of 
Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. 
28 S Woolman “Freedom of assembly” in S Woolman & M Chaskalson (eds) Constitutional law 
of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2005) ch 43 9-11 argues that this failure includes the failure by local 
authorities to reply to a notice within the required 24-hour period in terms of section 4(3) of the 
Gatherings Act. This also includes the failure by local authorities to discuss amendments to 
the notice as well as conditions to be placed on the gathering with responsible officers and 
members of South African Police Services, as required in terms of section 4(2)(b) of the 
Gatherings Act. He also argues that responsible officers often fail in negotiating conditions 
with organisers, and have instead resorted to prohibiting gatherings outright. 
29 Section 1 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. 
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reference to the definitions of a “public road”, “any other public place or premises” and 
“wholly or partly open to the air” respectively. 
 
3 3 2 “Public road” for the purposes of the definition of a gathering 
Section 1 of the Gatherings Act states that a gathering could occur “in or on any 
public road as defined in the Road Traffic Act, 1989 (Act 29 of 1989)”. However, the 
Road Traffic Act 29 of 1989 referred to in the definition of a gathering was repealed by 
the National Road Traffic Act 93 of 1996. Therefore, the definition of a “public road” in 
section 1 of the National Road Traffic Act is the only definition that could be used to 
determine what constitutes a “public road” for the purpose of the definition of a 
gathering in the Gatherings Act. Section 1 of the National Road Traffic Act defines a 
“public road”: 
 
“‘[P]ublic road’ means any road, street or thoroughfare or any other place (whether a 
thoroughfare or not) which is commonly used by the public or any section thereof or to 
which the public or any section thereof has a right of access, and includes - 
   (a)   the verge of any such road, street or thoroughfare; 
   (b)   any bridge, ferry or drift traversed by any such road, street or thoroughfare; and 
   (c)   any other work or object forming part of or connected with or belonging to such road, 
street or thoroughfare.”30 
 
Based on this definition, gatherings on a “public road” are limited to public roads as 
defined by the National Road Traffic Act. Any other gatherings, which fall outside the 
scope of the definition above, will either not qualify as a “gathering” for the purposes 
of the Gatherings Act or will fall under the definition of “any other public place or 
premises wholly or partly open to the air”.31 This definition offers little scope in 
extending the definition of a “public road” to privately owned property, and will not be 
discussed further as such. 
 
                                                          
30 Section 1 of the National Road Traffic Act 93 of 1996. 
31 Section 1 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. 
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3 3 3 “Any other public place or premises” in terms of section 1 of the Gatherings Act 
3 3 3 1 Overview 
In order to determine whether the definition of a gathering extends to privately 
owned property, it is necessary to formulate an understanding of the term “any other 
public place or premises”. This phrase is central to the definition of a gathering in 
section 1 of the Gatherings Act, and the procedures contained in the Act are thus 
dependent on this part of the definition of a gathering being met. 
The term “any other public place or premises” does not expressly require that the 
place or premises be publicly owned or state owned, but merely that it be public. 
According to Layard, public ownership is not a prerequisite for property to be 
considered “public”.32 Furthermore, McLean argues that publicly owned property does 
not always amount to a public place.33 This means that privately owned places and 
premises could qualify as “public”, and publicly owned places do not necessarily 
qualify as “public”. 
 
3 3 3 2 Lessons from the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956 
The easiest manner in which to find an interpretation for “any other public place or 
premises” could be to determine whether similar wording was used in apartheid-era 
statues.34 Although the Riotous Assemblies Act sought to suppress forms of dissent, 
and thus contrasts with the purpose of the Gatherings Act, which seeks to regulate 
and protect assembly, reference to the apartheid-era statute provides useful guidance. 
In terms of section 1 of the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956, a public place 
included “any street, road, passage, square, park or recreation ground, or any open 
space, to which all members of the public habitually or by right have access, and 
                                                          
32 A Layard “Public space: Property, lines, interruptions” (2016) 2 Journal of Law, Property and 
Society 1 19. 
33 J McLean “Property as power and resistance” in J McLean (ed) Property and the constitution 
(1999) 1 5, 9 questions whether it really matters whether property is privately owned or publicly 
owned for it to be considered “public”. She argues that with certain publicly owned property, 
the government’s proprietary rights will be the same as a private owner due to the nature of 
the property. Therefore, some state owned properties are similar to private property. As a 
result, these publicly owned properties enjoy similar exclusivity rules than those typically 
enjoyed by privately owned properties. 
34 See L du Plessis Re-interpretation of statutes (2002) 262-263. 
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includes any place described in this definition notwithstanding that it is private property 
and has not been dedicated to the use of the public.”35 The definition of a “public place” 
had to be met before a “public gathering”36 could be prohibited. This definition 
expressly includes private property to which the public has access, even if the property 
had not been made available for public use. Should the above legislative framework 
be used as a guide to interpret the definition of a “gathering” in section 1 of the 
Gatherings Act, it would seem as if the definition extends to certain types of privately 
owned property. 
However, the above legislative framework should be understood in the context of 
the time during which it was promulgated. Similarly, the Gatherings Act also needs to 
be understood in the context of the time during which it was enacted. While the former 
was passed in a time of the repression of mass political dissent, the latter was passed 
in the new constitutional dispensation. Furthermore, the definition of a gathering being 
met in terms of the Riotous Assemblies Act was required to prohibit gatherings, which 
resulted in the suppression of mass dissent. This contrasts with the definition of a 
gathering in terms of the Gatherings Act being met, which seeks to protect and 
advance the right to assemble and demonstrate in section 17 of the Constitution. 
Despite the different contexts in which these two statutes operated, a similar 
interpretation of the places to which the Riotous Assemblies Act applies could be 
extended to the places to which the Gatherings Act applies. The interpretation of 
“public place” in the Riotous Assemblies Act places emphasis on the access enjoyed 
by the public and the actual use of the place, instead of the ownership or intended use 
of the place. In this regard, places that were privately owned, which were accessible 
to the public and actually used by the public would qualify as a “public place” for 
purposes of the Riotous Assemblies Act. If this statute is used as a guide to interpret 
“any other public place or premises” for purposes of the Gatherings Act, it would mean 
that the requirements for a lawful gathering would extend to privately owned places or 
premises to which the public has access, which is actually used by the public, 
regardless of the intended use by the property owner. This interpretation of “any other 
                                                          
35 Section 1 of the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956. 
36 Section 1 of the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956 defines a “public gathering” as “any 
gathering, concourse, or procession in, through, or along any public place, of twelve or more 
persons having a common purpose, whether such purpose be lawful or unlawful.” 
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public place or premises” is a useful starting point in determining the circumstances in 
which the definition of a “gathering” may extend to privately owned property.37 
 
3 3 3 3 Public-accessibility as a prerequisite before a place or premises may be 
considered “public” 
Based on the analysis above, the ability of the public to access and use a place or 
premises will determine whether a privately owned place or premises may be 
considered “public” for purposes of the Gatherings Act. In this regard, the extent of 
public-accessibility to a place may be a determinant factor in determining whether a 
place or premises is “public”. 
Page defines public property as being property that is “not private property.”38 While 
he warns against trying to define “public property” in certain terms, he argues that it 
usually involves the type of property to which one individual has no greater claim than 
another.39 In this regard, “public property” usually embodies some sort of communal 
property, which is open for all individuals to use and enjoy, and is measured by the 
sum of the individual claims thereto.40 This argument rests on the fact that a place or 
premises may be considered public if, at the very least, it is open to the public for their 
use and enjoyment, and that no individual may have a greater claim to use and enjoy 
it than another. 
This argument provides a useful starting point for the notion of “quasi-public” 
property, which could assist in identifying when a place or premises may be 
considered “public”. The concept of “quasi-public” was used by Gray and Gray, who 
argue that “private property is never truly private and rarely truly absolute.”41 They 
argue that because the public social order builds its foundations on the 
                                                          
37 See L du Plessis Re-interpretation of statutes (2002) 262-263. 
38 J Page “Towards an understanding of public property” in N Hopkins (ed) Modern studies in 
property law: Volume 7 (2013) 195 196.  
39 J Page “Towards an understanding of public property” in N Hopkins (ed) Modern studies in 
property law: Volume 7 (2013) 195 196. 
40 J Page “Towards an understanding of public property” in N Hopkins (ed) Modern studies in 
property law: Volume 7 (2013) 195 196. 
41 K Gray & SF Gray “Private property and public propriety” in J McLean (ed) Property and the 
constitution (1999) 11 18. 
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“restrictiveness, rather than the amplitude”42 of the property regime, it confirms that all 
property has a public nature.43 It is in this sense that they argue that the divide between 
private and public property cannot be strictly defined, but that property as a whole 
rather amounts to a “‘spectrum’ concept.”44 
Gray and Gray argue that “quasi-pubic” property is best displayed with reference to 
shopping malls and civil commercial centres.45 While these types of places are often 
privately owned, they are open to the general public.46 The mere fact that such places 
seek to invite members of the public to be included in the enjoyment and use of the 
property, raises serious questions about whether exercising ownership rights over 
these types of property occur within a “purely private zone”.47 Therefore, despite their 
private ownership, places such as shopping malls and civil commercial centres have 
a “profoundly public dimension”.48 
Van der Walt elaborates by giving content to the concept “quasi-public”.49 He 
argues that a quasi-public space is a privately owned space used for some sort of 
public purpose, which the public can more or less access freely.50 Furthermore, the 
space must be “suitable and actually used for”51 some public purpose, such as 
exercising a right to demonstrate, for it to qualify as quasi-public. These requirements 
                                                          
42 K Gray & SF Gray “Private property and public propriety” in J McLean (ed) Property and the 
constitution (1999) 11 19. 
43 K Gray & SF Gray “Private property and public propriety” in J McLean (ed) Property and the 
constitution (1999) 11 19. 
44 K Gray & SF Gray “Private property and public propriety” in J McLean (ed) Property and the 
constitution (1999) 11 13. 
45 K Gray & SF Gray “Private property and public propriety” in J McLean (ed) Property and the 
constitution (1999) 11 20. 
46 K Gray & SF Gray “Private property and public propriety” in J McLean (ed) Property and the 
constitution (1999) 11 20. 
47 K Gray & SF Gray “Private property and public propriety” in J McLean (ed) Property and the 
constitution (1999) 11 20. 
48 K Gray & SF Gray “Private property and public propriety” in J McLean (ed) Property and the 
constitution (1999) 11 20. 
49 AJ van der Walt “The modest systemic status of property rights” (2014) 1 Journal of Law, 
Property, and Society 15 29. 
50 AJ van der Walt “The modest systemic status of property rights” (2014) 1 Journal of Law, 
Property, and Society 15 29. 
51 AJ van der Walt “The modest systemic status of property rights” (2014) 1 Journal of Law, 
Property, and Society 15 29. 
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confirm that the space merely needs to be suitable for public use and actually used 
publicly. In other words, the primary use of the property does not have to be for the 
exercise of the right to demonstrate for it to be classified as quasi-public. Instead, the 
place merely needs to be used for a public purpose and be freely accessible to the 
public for it to be considered quasi-public. 
Closely related to the term “quasi-public” is a concept that Page calls an “illusory 
public”52 place. He refers to the best example of an illusory public place: the shopping 
mall.53 He argues that such places create the illusion that they are public spaces.54 
However, such places are usually privately owned, even though they are accessible 
to the public.55 He argues, however, that “[t]he illusion is shattered when private 
owners enforce behaviour or dress codes, or restrain public assembly or political 
protest.”56 Therefore, the enforcement by private owners of their right to exclude has 
the effect of reinforcing their private ownership, in a place to which the public has free 
access. Page claims that this will have severe implications for the owners’ right to 
exclude,57 which Van der Walt argues should be limited in certain circumstances, 
because the “pursuit of non-property objectives is sometimes systemically more 
important than protecting property rights.”58 This view is supported by Dhliwayo, who 
argues that the rights of owners to exclude non-owners from their property is limited 
                                                          
52 J Page “Towards an understanding of public property” in N Hopkins (ed) Modern studies in 
property law: Volume 7 (2013) 195 201. 
53 J Page “Towards an understanding of public property” in N Hopkins (ed) Modern studies in 
property law: Volume 7 (2013) 195 201-202. See also K Gray & SF Gray “Private property and 
public propriety” in J McLean (ed) Property and the constitution (1999) 11 19-20. 
54 J Page “Towards an understanding of public property” in N Hopkins (ed) Modern studies in 
property law: Volume 7 (2013) 195 202. See also K Gray & SF Gray “Private property and 
public propriety” in J McLean (ed) Property and the constitution (1999) 11 20. 
55 J Page “Towards an understanding of public property” in N Hopkins (ed) Modern studies in 
property law: Volume 7 (2013) 195 202. See also K Gray & SF Gray “Private property and 
public propriety” in J McLean (ed) Property and the constitution (1999) 11 20. 
56 J Page “Towards an understanding of public property” in N Hopkins (ed) Modern studies in 
property law: Volume 7 (2013) 195 202. 
57 J Page “Towards an understanding of public property” in N Hopkins (ed) Modern studies in 
property law: Volume 7 (2013) 195 202. 
58 AJ van der Walt “The modest systemic status of property rights” (2014) 1 Journal of Law, 
Property, and Society 15 43. 
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by non-property constitutional rights.59 Therefore, when private owners enforce dress 
codes or restrain assembly, the illusion that public places, such as shopping malls, are 
actually privately owned, is shattered. In this regard, it may be necessary to restrict 
the owners’ ability to enforce dress codes or restrain assembly in light of the arguments 
by Van der Walt and Dhliwayo. Should the owners’ right to exclude in these 
circumstances be restricted, the illusion could be maintained. In this regard, it is 
evident that such places bear striking resemblances to “quasi-public” places as argued 
by Gray and Gray,60 because they are typically open-access private properties, which 
“foster illusory expectations of public rights of inclusion.”61 
Therefore, the above arguments support the fact that some privately owned places 
or premises may be considered “public” for purposes of the Gatherings Act. At its core, 
a public place or premises is one where no-one has a greater claim to such place as 
another. These places or premises may only be considered public should they be 
freely accessible to the public. Furthermore, these places and premises should be 
suitable to be used publicly, and should actually be used publicly. Should private 
property owners wish to grant access to the public, and to allow them to use the 
property, it is necessary that the owners’ right to exclude be limited in order to ensure 
the continued public-accessibility and public use of the property. 
 
3 3 3 4 The ability to lawfully evict persons from property as a prerequisite 
before a place or premises may be considered “public” 
Based on the arguments above, a place or premises can only retain its public nature 
should an owner be willing to allow her right to exclude to be limited in certain 
circumstances. These circumstances could include scenarios where members of the 
public wish to demonstrate or assemble on her property. In other words, a place will 
not be considered public when there is no limitation of the owners’ right to exclude, 
and she retains her ability to lawfully evict persons from her property. Therefore, she 
                                                          
59 P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude 
LLD dissertation Stellenbosch (2015) 113. 
60 K Gray & SF Gray “Private property and public propriety” in J McLean (ed) Property and the 
constitution (1999) 11 11. 
61 J Page “Towards an understanding of public property” in N Hopkins (ed) Modern studies in 
property law: Volume 7 (2013) 195 201. 
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may only evict persons from her property where she retains her right to exclude 
because the property is no longer public. 
This accords with the arguments of Layard who argues that despite a place being 
accessible to the public, and actually used for a public purpose, this is not the 
determinant factor when deciding whether a place or premises is “public”. She states 
that “public space is produced through property relationships, partially realized through 
lines and that opportunities exist for public space ‘interruptions’”.62 She refers to a case 
study involving a protest at Paternoster Square in London in October 2011.63 This 
square was physically open to the public, but was privately owned.64 As soon as 
protestors entered Paternoster Square, legal measures were taken to prevent the 
occupation of the property by protestors.65 These measures included the use of 
signage preventing entry to the property, the use of private bodyguards at entrances, 
and the use of injunctions to evict the protestors.66 
Layard argues that public or state ownership is not a prerequisite for property to be 
considered a “public space”.67 She states that while Paternoster Square had the 
appearance of a “public space”,68 the owners thereof were able to evict the protestors 
with relative ease, despite it being considered public. In this sense, the “ease with 
which members of the public can be evicted or prevented from entering privately 
owned land”69 could be important in determining whether privately owned property can 
be considered a “public space”. This could help determine whether a privately owned 
                                                          
62 A Layard “Public space: Property, lines, interruptions” (2016) 2 Journal of Law, Property and 
Society 1 3.  
63 A Layard “Public space: Property, lines, interruptions” (2016) 2 Journal of Law, Property and 
Society 1 5. 
64 A Layard “Public space: Property, lines, interruptions” (2016) 2 Journal of Law, Property and 
Society 1 6. 
65 A Layard “Public space: Property, lines, interruptions” (2016) 2 Journal of Law, Property and 
Society 1 6. 
66 A Layard “Public space: Property, lines, interruptions” (2016) 2 Journal of Law, Property and 
Society 1 6. 
67 A Layard “Public space: Property, lines, interruptions” (2016) 2 Journal of Law, Property and 
Society 1 19. 
68 A Layard “Public space: Property, lines, interruptions” (2016) 2 Journal of Law, Property and 
Society 1 6. 
69 A Layard “Public space: Property, lines, interruptions” (2016) 2 Journal of Law, Property and 
Society 1 12. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
49 
 
place or premises is public for purposes of the definition of a gathering in section 1 of 
the Gatherings Act. This could hinge mainly on the ability of the owner of the property 
to evict unwanted persons from her property. In other words, the more ability the owner 
has to evict unwanted persons, the less likely the place or premises will be considered 
“public”. 
This dilemma could be illustrated with reference to BVerfGE 128, 226 (2011), 
Fraport. In this case, a ban was issued against the complainant by the defendant, 
which prohibited the complainant from accessing the entire airport with the aim of 
holding a demonstration. The court had to decide upon the validity of this ban, by 
considering the property rights of the defendant, as well as the right to freedom of 
assembly and freedom of expression of the complainant. The court held that an 
owner’s reliance on the right to undisturbed possession depends on the access the 
owner grants the public to their property.70 In other words, the owner could not exclude 
members of the public from her property purely based on the rights enjoyed by the 
owner. Instead, due regard had to be given to the rights of the members of the public 
before the owner excluded members of the public from her property. Therefore, a 
limitation on the public’s right to freedom of assembly required a legitimate purpose 
before the limitation could be enforced. In this case, the court found that the ban could 
only be upheld for areas of the airport to which the public did not have general access, 
such as security areas, luggage collection areas, and air-side restaurants and shops.71 
Therefore, the ban on demonstrations in areas of the airport to which the public had 
general access, such as land-side restaurants and shops, could not be upheld.72 In 
this regard, the owner could only lawfully evict people from her property from areas in 
the airport to which the public did not have general access. 
In South Africa, a property owner would need to rely on the Trespass Act 6 of 1959 
to evict unwanted persons, such as those temporarily on their property for an assembly 
or demonstration, from her property. According to section 1 of the Trespass Act: 
 
“(1) Any person who without the permission- 
 (a) of the lawful occupier of any land or any building or part of a building; or 
                                                          
70 BVerfGE 128, 226 (2011), Fraport para 86. 
71 BVerfGE 128, 226 (2011), Fraport para 72. 
72 BVerfGE 128, 226 (2011), Fraport para 72. 
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(b) of the owner or person in charge of any land or any building or part of a building that 
is not lawfully occupied by any person,  
enters or is upon such land or enters or is in such building or part of a building, shall be 
guilty of an offence unless he has lawful reason to enter or be upon such land or enter 
or be in such building or part of a building.” 
 
These provisions of the Trespass Act indicate that the property owner may not 
invoke these provisions when the alleged trespasser either has “permission” from the 
property owner, or has “lawful reason” to enter or be on the property. An interpretation 
of “permission” or “lawful reason” requires the identification of the circumstances in 
which the provisions of the Trespass Act may not be invoked. These circumstances 
would thus deem the property “public” for the purposes of Layard’s argument, and thus 
add weight in determining what exactly constitutes “any other public place or premises” 
for purposes of the definition of a gathering. 
Firstly, “permission” could be granted expressly or tacitly. Express permission could 
be granted in instances where private property owners invite the public to enter their 
premises. For example, the owner of a shopping mall would often invite members of 
the public to enjoy the wide selection of shopping, entertainment and restaurant 
facilities it has to offer. Such an invite automatically limits the rights of the property 
owner, and thus makes it challenging for the property owner to invoke the provisions 
of the Trespass Act. This accords with the position in Marsh v Alabama,73 in which the 
court held that a property owner’s rights become more circumscribed the more they 
make their property available to the public in general.74 Furthermore, a similar 
restriction could be imposed on the rights of the property owner in the case of tacit 
permission. This could be granted by the property owner should she fail to object to 
alleged trespassers regularly entering her property.75 For example, the owner of a 
shopping mall or public square may not necessarily invite the public to enter her 
                                                          
73 326 US 501 (1946). 
74 Marsh v Alabama 326 US 501 (1946) 506. 
75 S Wilson & I de Vos in Ex Parte: Council for the Advancement of the South African 
Constitution In Re: Restraint of protest on or near university campuses Chambers, 
Johannesburg (22 December 2016) para 104. Although this was written in the context of 
universities, it can be extended to other circumstances.  
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premises, but she will also fail to object to the entry when members of the public 
periodically enter her property. 
Secondly, the provisions of the Trespass Act indicate that the property owner may 
not invoke these provisions when the person on the property has “lawful reason” to 
enter or be on the property. “Lawful reason” could arise out of a contract between the 
property owner and the alleged trespasser, which grants the alleged trespasser an 
implied right to be on the property.76 This will include situations in which members of 
the public access a privately owned park or square that is open to the public, as well 
as shopping malls. Furthermore, an alleged trespasser who mistakenly believes that 
she has lawful reason to be on the property, lacks the necessary knowledge of the 
unlawfulness of her actions, and thus the necessary intention to trespass.77 Therefore, 
she will still have “lawful reason” to be on the property.78 
By using the arguments of Layard, it can be concluded that a place could be 
considered “any other public place or premises” for purposes of section 1 of the 
Gatherings Act in the above circumstances. The ability of a property owner to rely on 
her right to exclude and use the provisions of the Trespass Act are limited in certain 
circumstances. These include scenarios where the public is invited to use the property, 
where members of the public regularly enters the property without objection, where 
the public has a lawful reason to be on the property in terms of a contractual right, or 
the member of the public has no intention to trespass. The only manner in which the 
property owner may withdraw permission for the alleged trespasser to be on the 
                                                          
76 S Wilson & I de Vos in Ex Parte: Council for the Advancement of the South African 
Constitution In Re: Restraint of protest on or near university campuses Chambers, 
Johannesburg (22 December 2016) para 103. This was also written in the context of 
universities, but is broad enough to extend to various other circumstances. 
77 S v Peter Joseph Davids 1966 1 PH H26 (N) 52. See further S Wilson & I de Vos in Ex 
Parte: Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution In Re: Restraint of 
protest on or near university campuses Chambers, Johannesburg (22 December 2016) para 
105. 
78 S v Peter Joseph Davids 1966 1 PH H26 (N) 52. See further S Wilson & I de Vos in Ex 
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protest on or near university campuses Chambers, Johannesburg (22 December 2016) para 
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property is if it has a “lawful basis”.79 For the purposes of the Gatherings Act, it is 
unlikely that the prevention of the right to assemble and demonstrate on the privately 
owned property is enough of a “lawful basis” to allow the property owner to rely on the 
provisions of the Trespass Act. This position would accord with the arguments by Van 
der Walt and Dhliwayo,80 because the owners’ right to exclude would be limited due 
to the exercise of a non-property constitutional right being sought.81  
Based on the analysis above, it is clear that a place or premises may be considered 
“public” when the property owner no longer retains the ability to lawfully evict unwanted 
persons from her property. According to South African law, the ability to lawfully evict 
persons from her property will depend mainly on the access granted to the public. In 
this regard, the greater the access a property owner grants members of the public, the 
less likely it would be for the owner to lawfully evict unwanted persons from her 
property. 
 
3 3 3 5 The effect of temporarily restricting access to places or premises on the 
public-nature thereof 
Given the arguments above, a place or premises may be considered “public” for 
purposes of the Gatherings Act when it is accessible to the public, it is actually used 
for a public purpose, and the private property owner is unable to lawfully evict persons 
from the property. However, despite these indicators that a place or premises may be 
public, a change in circumstances could change the public nature of the place or 
premises. In this regard, Semple v Howes,82 as well as Semple v Carson,83 could 
provide assistance. These cases are especially relevant, as they involve alleged 
criminal offences conducted during a demonstration on privately owned property.  
The circumstances surrounding the demonstration were outlined in Semple v 
Howes. This demonstration was held to oppose the use of uranium at the Olympic 
                                                          
79 S Wilson & I de Vos in Ex Parte: Council for the Advancement of the South African 
Constitution In Re: Restraint of protest on or near university campuses Chambers, 
Johannesburg (22 December 2016) para 105. 
80 AJ van der Walt “The modest systemic status of property rights” (2014) 1 Journal of Law, 
Property, and Society 15 43; P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit 
landowners’ right to exclude LLD dissertation Stellenbosch (2015) 113. 
81 See 3 3 3 3 above. 
82 (1985) 38 SASR 34. 
83 (1984) 35 SASR 589. 
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Dam mining area in the north of the state of South Australia. The demonstration 
commenced at the end of August 1983. The land on which the mining operations 
occurred was being held through a pastoral lease from the Crown, but the actual 
mining operations were being carried out by Roxby Management Services (Pty) Ltd 
(“Roxby”) on behalf of three companies acting as a joint venture. Roxby had taken 
active steps to restrict access to their property and any movement by demonstrators 
already on their property. These steps include notices placed at the entrances of the 
mines by Roxby restricting entrance to authorised persons only. 
Charges were brought against the respondent in terms of section 18(3) of the Police 
Offences Act.84 This provision permitted charges to be brought against anyone who 
continued to loiter in a public place after being asked to desist from doing so by a 
police officer, provided such officer had a reasonable belief or apprehension that such 
person had been loitering. Section 18 of the Police Offences Act does not define the 
term “public place”, but section 4 states that a public place includes: 
 
“(a) a place to which free access is permitted to the public, with the express or tacit consent 
of the owner or occupier of that place; and  
(b) a place to which the public are admitted on payment of money, the test of admittance 
being the payment of money only; and  
(c) a road, street, footway, court, alley or thoroughfare which the public are allowed to use, 
notwithstanding that that road, street, footway, court, alley or thoroughfare is on private 
property”.85 
 
This provision confirms that a public place is determined with reference to the use 
thereof, and level of access granted to the public, rather than by determining who the 
owner of the place is. The court had to decide whether the respondent could be 
charged in terms of section 18(3) of the Police Offences Act, based on the uncertainty 
of the interpretation of the words “public place”.86 While the court held that the above 
provision does not amount to a definition in the strict sense, it admitted that formulating 
                                                          
84 Semple v Howes (1985) 38 SASR 37. See further section 18(3) of the Police Offences Act 
1953-1983.  
85 Section 4 of the Police Offences Act 1953-1983.  
86 Semple v Howes (1985) 38 SASR 37. 
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a definition for the term “public place” is “hardly possible”.87 Despite this concern, the 
court was left to decide whether the privately owned property in question amounted to 
a “public place” for the purposes of the Police Offences Act. 
The court referred to Semple v Carson,88 to determine whether privately owned 
property could be deemed a public place for purposes of the Police Offences Act. This 
case dealt with the same group of demonstrators who occupied property in Semple v 
Howes.89 The court stated that in circumstances where the occupation itself is key in 
the demonstration on the property, the privately owned space cannot be deemed 
“public” for the purposes of section 18 of the Police Offences Act for the duration of 
the occupation.90 The court stated that “something more”91 than just the act of 
demonstration was required to deem the place a “public place”.92 
The court in Semple v Howes thus had to turn its inquiry into whether the public at 
large was admitted to enter the private property. The court considered a notice placed 
at the entrances of the property, which restricted entry to authorised persons and 
vehicles only. The notice required that all other persons should report to an 
administrative office on the property to obtain permission to enter. 
Despite the notice, Roxby allowed persons entry even if they did not report to the 
administration office, provided they remained on the roads on the property. A witness 
from Roxby testified that the public access was also subject to good behaviour. 
Despite the notices restricting access to the public, the failure by Roxby to strictly 
enforce the terms of the notice was sufficient to deem the place “public”. During the 
course of the demonstration, access to the property was limited to persons on foot, 
and all cars and similar vehicles were prohibited from entering the property. The court 
                                                          
87 Semple v Howes (1985) 38 SASR 37. 
88 (1984) 35 SASR 589. 
89 (1985) 38 SASR 34. 
90 Semple v Howes (1985) 38 SASR 42-43.  
91 Semple v Howes (1985) 38 SASR 43. 
92 Semple v Howes (1985) 38 SASR 43. A Layard “Public space: Property, lines, interruptions” 
(2016) 2 Journal of Law, Property and Society 1 34 argues that “[i]t is also striking that if a 
protest becomes too settled, it transforms from a public space… to a private one.” Therefore, 
based on the commentary of Layard, it could be argued that the occupation of property in 
Semple v Carson turned the public place into a private one. This, Layard argues, could have 
the effect of turning the issue from the right to freedom of assembly, expression and 
association, to the right to a home.  
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held that the place remained public, even though access was only granted to a limited 
class of persons, namely those on foot. 
Therefore, the above cases offer guidance should a similar scenario occur in terms 
of the Gatherings Act. In other words, circumstances surrounding a gathering could 
change, which may affect the public nature of a place or premises. These include 
circumstances in which privately owned property is restricted to certain classes of 
persons. 
 
3 3 3 6 Concluding remarks 
As a result of the discussion above, it is clear that the Gatherings Act applies to 
privately owned places or premises in certain cases. This confirms Layard’s argument 
that public ownership is not a prerequisite for property to be considered a “public 
space”.93 This also confirms McLean’s argument that the nature of the owner of the 
property should not determine whether it is “public”94 and whether it would 
subsequently amount to “any other public place or premises”. 
Despite the fact that the Gatherings Act does not specifically mention privately 
owned property, the wording in the definition of a gathering, as well as the authority 
mentioned above, indicates that “any other public place or premises” includes privately 
owned property. This hinges on the fact that a place or premises does not have to be 
publicly owned for it to be considered “public”. This would, however, require that the 
privately owned property be open or accessible to the public, or accessible to certain 
members of the public who have a contractual right to be on the property. There does 
not need to be a formal invitation for the public to enter the property, because the 
omission on the part of the property owner to object to the regular entry by persons 
would suffice. The property also needs to be used publicly, regardless of the intended 
use by the property owner. Should these circumstances exist, a property owner may 
not lawfully evict persons from the property by using the Trespass Act, because the 
circumstances are sufficient to justify a limitation on the owners’ right to exclude. It is 
doubtful whether the owner could lawfully withdraw a person’s right to be on her 
                                                          
93 A Layard “Public space: Property, lines, interruptions” (2016) 2 Journal of Law, Property and 
Society 1 19. 
94 J McLean “Property as power and resistance” in J McLean (ed) Property and the constitution 
(1999) 1 9. 
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property if such person is exercising a non-property constitutional right, because the 
exercise of such right would be a justifiable limitation on the owners’ right to exclude.95 
Furthermore, privately owned property typically open to the public remains public when 
occupied by demonstrators, even when measures restricting access are put in place. 
However, this may change depending on the length of time the demonstrators occupy 
such property. 
 
3 3 4 “Wholly or partly open to the air” in terms of section 1 of the Gatherings Act 
While a “public place or premises” has been defined, the remainder of the definition 
of a “gathering” relevant to this thesis requires the public place or premises to be 
“wholly or partly open to the air”.96 Places or premises wholly or partly open to the air 
are usually those areas to which the public has greater access and use rights, and 
areas in which it may be difficult for an owner to exclude others. This is unsurprising, 
given the indicators of privately owned public places or premises discussed above.  
Layard refers to the term “wholly or partly open to the air” in the context of protests 
in the United Kingdom: 
 
“Public assemblies, particularly protest camps, can also interrupt. Defined as two or more 
people assembling in a public place that is wholly or partly open to the air, these protests 
do not require notification and do not of themselves need to involve movement; they can 
be static.”97 
 
This definition has striking resemblances to the definition of a gathering in the 
Gatherings Act, but does not have a lower limit in terms of participants, and does not 
require notice. However, Layard later argues that this definition usually extends to 
public assemblies on public land, which, in the context of her arguments, could refer 
                                                          
95 AJ van der Walt “The modest systemic status of property rights” (2014) 1 Journal of Law, 
Property, and Society 15 27-30; P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit 
landowners’ right to exclude LLD dissertation Stellenbosch (2015) 113. 
96 A Layard “Public space: Property, lines, interruptions” (2016) 2 Journal of Law, Property and 
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to publicly owned land.98 Even though her definition refers specifically to “wholly or 
partly open to the air”, it adds little in determining what the phrase means for purposes 
of section 1 of the Gatherings Act. 
Therefore, other sources will need to be considered when determining what the 
phrase “wholly or partly open to the air” means. In this regard, reference can be made 
to statutes that the Gatherings Act sought to repeal, but contained similar definitions 
related to protests. Section 2(3)(a) of the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956 granted 
the Minister of Justice the power to prohibit any class of gatherings. While exercising 
this power, the Minister of Justice issued a notice that was published in Government 
Gazette 5758 on 30 September 1977.99 The notice stated that all gatherings, except 
those taking place within the walls of a building, those of a bona fide sporting nature 
and those expressly authorised by the magistrate in the particular district, are to be 
prohibited.100 
Based on this notice, gatherings that take place wholly inside the walls of a building 
may be conducted lawfully. Therefore, any gatherings that were not expressly 
authorised or were not of a bona fide sporting nature, which occurred outside of the 
walls of a building, were expressly prohibited. This interpretation is a useful guide in 
interpreting “wholly or partly open to the air”, because it indicates what types of 
gatherings sought to be prohibited in terms of the Riotous Assemblies Act. Based on 
this interpretation, the Gatherings Act’s reference to “wholly or partly open to the air” 
could be given similar content to those gatherings not inside the walls of a building, as 
envisaged by the above notice. 
Similarly, the term “wholly or partly open to the air” extends to “open-air” gatherings, 
which is typically the case with gatherings of a bona fide sporting nature. However, 
events such as sporting events will not meet the requirements of a gathering even if 
they take place in a public place or premises “wholly or partly open to the air”, because 
they do not contain the political or moral content required by sections (a) and (b) of the 
definition of a gathering. According to the multinational panel of the Goldstone 
                                                          
98 A Layard “Public space: Property, lines, interruptions” (2016) 2 Journal of Law, Property and 
Society 1 34. 
99 GG 5758 of 30-09-1977. See also the discussion of S v Mtutuzeli 1979 1 SA 764 (T) in 2 2 
2 3 above, in which it was pointed out that this specific notice was central to the case at hand. 
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Commission, similar exceptions should be granted to events such as funerals, parties 
and church services.101 
Therefore, while little has been written on the interpretation on “wholly or partly open 
to the air” in terms of section 1 of the Gatherings Act, the above discussion provides 
insight into a possible interpretation. A gathering occurring in or on any other public 
place or premises “wholly or partly open to the air” thus means that such a gathering 
is an open-air gathering, or one that is not confined wholly inside the walls of a building. 
The definition of a gathering will not extend to certain events, such as sporting events, 
parties, funerals and church services even though they would otherwise fall within the 
scope of occurring in or on any other public place or premises “wholly or partly open 
to the air”. 
 
3 4 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to discuss the requirements for holding a lawful 
gathering, and to determine whether these requirements extend to gatherings on 
privately owned property. In this regard, this chapter sought, firstly, to outline and 
interpret the definition of a “gathering”. Secondly, this chapter sought to outline the 
requirements to hold a lawful gathering in accordance with the Gatherings Act. Lastly, 
this chapter aimed to determine whether the definition of a gathering extends to 
privately owned property. 
The definition of a “gathering” in the Gatherings Act was discussed and compared 
to the definition of a “demonstration”. A few concerns regarding the interpretation of 
these concepts were briefly highlighted. The requirements for conducting a lawful 
gathering were discussed, with a particular focus on the procedures to be followed 
immediately preceding the gathering in sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Gatherings Act. This 
is important as the following chapter assumes that these procedures are followed and 
that a lawful gathering is thus constituted. 
The types of property to which the requirements for a lawful gathering applies was 
determined with reference to legislation, case law and academic commentary. It was 
found that the Gatherings Act extends to public roads, publicly owned property, as well 
as privately owned property. However, the Act only extends to privately owned 
                                                          
101 P Heymann Towards peaceful protests in South Africa (1992) 11. 
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property when the property is open or accessible to the public, and is actually used 
publicly. Furthermore, the nature of privately owned property being considered “public” 
in cases where access to the property is restricted, may change depending on the 
facts of each case. This will be influenced by the nature of the restriction, as well as 
the duration of the gathering. However, whether it extends to privately owned places 
or premises will depend on whether it is wholly or partly open to the air. This requires 
that the gathering be an open-air gathering, or that it be held outside the confines of 
the walls of a building. 
Ultimately, this chapter sought to establish whether the definition of a gathering in 
the Gatherings Act extends to privately owned property. In light of the conclusion that 
the definition does, in fact, extend to privately owned property in certain circumscribed 
cases, the next chapter will focus on whether exercising the right to assemble and 
demonstrate on privately owned property has any effect on section 25(1) of the 
Constitution. Therefore, the conclusions drawn in this chapter will be used to 
determine whether the Gatherings Act permits a deprivation of property in a manner 
inconsistent with section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE EFFECT OF HOLDING A “GATHERING” ON PRIVATELY 
OWNED PROPERTY 
4 1 Introduction 
In chapter two, the focus was on the history of the legislative framework on protests, 
which highlighted the need for new legislation regulating protests in the new 
constitutional dispensation. In chapter three, the content of the Regulation of 
Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 (“Gatherings Act”) was discussed, with a particular focus 
on the requirements for holding a lawful gathering and the extent to which it applies to 
privately owned property. In chapter three, it was shown that the Gatherings Act 
permits a gathering in or on any public place or premises, whether privately owned or 
publicly owned, provided they are freely accessible to the public, are actually used 
publicly, and are not inside the walls of a building. This finding raises the question of 
whether the property owners of such public places may rely on section 25(1) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, to claim that the Gatherings Act 
permits a deprivation of property in a manner inconsistent with section 25(1). 
This chapter will determine whether the Gatherings Act permits a deprivation of 
property in a manner inconsistent with section 25(1), and, if so, in which 
circumstances. It will do so, firstly, by determining the types of property owners that 
may rely on section 25(1) when a gathering is held on their property. Secondly, this 
chapter will determine whether action typically associated with gatherings constitutes 
a deprivation. In this regard, the understanding of “deprivation” outlined by the 
Constitutional Court, will also be considered. This assessment will determine whether 
the commencement of a “gathering” on privately owned property amounts to a 
deprivation of property for purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution. Lastly, the 
circumstances in which a deprivation may be consistent with section 25(1) of the 
Constitution will be discussed. This will include a discussion on whether the 
deprivation is authorised in terms of law of general application and whether it is 
arbitrary. The discussion on arbitrariness will include a suggestion of factors the courts 
could use to determine whether a deprivation of property caused by a gathering is 
substantively arbitrary.  
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to determine whether the Gatherings Act 
permits a deprivation of property. If there is a deprivation of property, this chapter will 
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determine whether the deprivation is consistent with the requirements of section 25(1) 
of the Constitution. Should an owner be entitled to rely on section 25(1) and prove that 
the gathering held on her property causes a deprivation, this chapter sets out a 
framework to deal with the question whether such deprivation is consistent with the 
requirements for a valid deprivation in section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
 
4 2 Beneficiaries of section 25(1) of the Constitution  
Before deciding whether section 25(1) is applicable in the case of property owners 
affected by the Gatherings Act, it is necessary to identify the types of property owners 
that may rely on section 25(1) of the Constitution. These property owners will be the 
only beneficiaries of section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
Section 25(1) of the Constitution states that “[n]o one may be deprived of property 
except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary 
deprivation of property.” This provision refers to “no one”, which means that natural 
persons may not be denied the right in section 25(1),1 and are beneficiaries of section 
25(1) as such. Furthermore, section 8(4) of the Constitution states that “[a] juristic 
person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required by the nature 
of the rights and the nature of that juristic person.” Van der Walt argues that nothing 
precludes a juristic person from being a beneficiary of section 25 of the Constitution.2 
However, the facts of each individual case will need to be considered before a 
determination in each case can be made.3 
The position of the state as a beneficiary of the rights in section 25 was addressed 
by the Constitutional Court in Tshwane City v Link Africa (Pty) Ltd.4 In this case, the 
court held that Tshwane City Municipality forms part of the state and can thus not be 
a beneficiary of the right contained in section 25(1) of the Constitution.5 Van der Walt 
                                                          
1 I Currie & J de Waal The bill of rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 34. 
2 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 70. See also T Roux “Property” in S 
Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 2013) ch 46 9; H 
Mostert & PJ Badenhorst “Property and the bill of rights” in Y Mokgoro & P Tlakula (eds) Bill 
of rights compendium (RS 2015) ch 3FB 12. 
3 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 70-71. 
4 2015 6 SA 440 (CC). 
5 Tshwane City v Link Africa (Pty) Ltd 2015 6 SA 440 (CC) paras 53-54. 
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also argues that the state, including state departments and state organs, cannot enjoy 
the protection of section 25 of the Constitution and is thus not a beneficiary of the 
rights contained in section 25 of the Constitution.6 He does, however, argue that 
exceptions may be granted for partially state owned bodies or semi-autonomous state 
bodies.7 
Given the discussion above, it is clear that only private property owners may rely 
on section 25(1) of the Constitution in cases where the Gatherings Act permits a 
deprivation of their property. These private property owners may include natural 
persons such as private landowners, or juristic persons such as privately owned 
companies. Therefore, the state, including municipalities, may not rely on section 25(1) 
of the Constitution when a gathering causes a deprivation of its property. 
 
4 3 An illustration of how the Gatherings Act permits a deprivation of 
property for purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution 
4 3 1  Overview 
The definition of “deprivation” in section 25(1) of the Constitution will be used to 
show how the Gatherings Act permits a deprivation of property. To illustrate this, 
reference will be made to instances where action typically associated with a gathering 
caused some or other interference for property owners. This conduct will then be 
tested against the Constitutional Court’s understanding of a “deprivation”.  
 
4 3 2 Examples of action typically associated with a gathering that may cause a 
deprivation of property 
A number of cases have involved action by people gathering in a certain area, which 
could potentially cause a deprivation of property for purposes of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution. In Fourways Mall (Pty) Ltd v South African Commercial Catering 
(“Fourways Mall”),8 a trade union held a protected strike aimed at one of the lessees 
of a privately owned shopping mall where members of the trade union were employed. 
                                                          
6 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 71-72. 
7 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 72. 
8 1999 3 SA 752 (W) 754. See also 2 3 4 above. 
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The trade union conducted the strike by blocking the entrances of the shopping mall, 
and impeding the movement of customers of the targeted lessee, as well as that of 
other lessees in the shopping mall. Their actions also extended to intimidating 
members of the public, employees of the targeted lessee, as well as employees of 
other lessees of the shopping mall. 
A similar scenario occurred in Growthpoint Properties Limited v South Africa 
Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union (SACCAWU) (“Growthpoint”).9 In this 
case, a group of people (members of the respondent) occupied the basement parking 
lot of a privately owned shopping mall to hold a picket in accordance with a picketing 
agreement between the respondent and the business employing members of the 
respondent. This business leased its premises from the applicant, and the shopping 
mall was accessible to the public at large. The members of the respondent resorted to 
actions such as shouting, singing, ululating, blowing whistles and banging instruments 
as part of their picket. These actions halted the operations of nearby businesses and 
intimidated patrons of the shopping mall. 
In Hotz v UCT,10 students at the University of Cape Town erected a shack in a road 
on the university’s premises as a form of protest against the university’s failure to 
address its colonial heritage and the manner in which it failed to provide poorer 
students with accommodation. The position of the shack, as well as the gathering of 
students surrounding it, not only disrupted traffic, but also the flow of pedestrians. 
In a case study referred to by Layard, protestors intended to occupy Paternoster 
Square in London in October 2011.11 The square was privately owned, but was open 
to the public at large.12 The protestors intended to occupy the privately owned place 
for an indefinite period, rather than cause a once-off, temporary disruption to the 
public-accessibility of the square. In order to achieve this purpose, they intended to 
                                                          
9 2010 JDR 1015 (KZD). 
10 2016 4 All SA 723 (SCA). 
11 A Layard “Public space: Property, lines, interruptions” (2016) 2 Journal of Law, Property and 
Society 1 5. 
12 A Layard “Public space: Property, lines, interruptions” (2016) 2 Journal of Law, Property and 
Society 1 6. 
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set up tents at the square and remain on the property overnight as part of their 
protest.13 
Based on the analysis above, actions typically associated with gatherings include 
entry onto privately owned property, the occupation of privately owned property, 
interfering with the use and enjoyment of property, disrupting traffic to and from such 
property, intimidating people who have entered or who wish to enter such property, 
and affecting the businesses closely related to such property. These actions could 
potentially cause a deprivation of property for purposes of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution. 
 
4 3 3 The understanding of “deprivation” by the Constitutional Court  
The understanding of deprivation in terms of section 25(1) has been considered by 
the Constitutional Court in various judgments. In First National Bank v Commissioner, 
South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister 
of Finance (“First National Bank”),14 a lien was obtained by the Commissioner of the 
South African Revenue Services over several vehicles on the premises of Lauray 
Manufacturers CC, in terms of section 114 of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964. 
The purpose of the lien was to obtain security for outstanding taxes owed by Lauray 
Manufacturers CC to the South African Revenue Services. One of such vehicles 
belonged to First National Bank, which had been leased to Lauray Manufacturers CC 
via an instalment sale agreement. First National Bank alleged, successfully, that 
section 114 of the Customs and Excise Act caused a deprivation of their property in 
conflict with section 25(1) of the Constitution. In this case, the court stated that “[i]n a 
certain sense any interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private 
property involves some deprivation in respect of the person having title or right to or in 
the property concerned.”15 
According to Van der Walt, this definition should mean that “deprivation” should be 
interpreted widely, so that it could include all the interferences envisaged by the 
                                                          
13 A Layard “Public space: Property, lines, interruptions” (2016) 2 Journal of Law, Property and 
Society 1 6. 
14 2002 4 SA 768 (CC). 
15 First National Bank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank 
of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 57. 
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definition.16 According to Roux, this wide definition would likely result in court’s 
accepting “almost any”17 interference with the use and enjoyment of property as a 
deprivation for purposes of section 25(1), which would thus focus the inquiry on the 
remainder of the requirements in section 25(1).18 
Subsequently, the wide interpretation favoured by the court in First National Bank, 
was narrowed in Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v 
Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC for Local 
Government & Housing in the Province of Gauteng (“Mkontwana”).19 In this case, the 
parties before the court agreed that the necessary legislation (section 118(1) of the 
Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 and section 50(1)(a) of the 
Gauteng Local Government Ordinance 17 of 1939) caused a deprivation of property 
for purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution. Despite this agreement by the parties, 
the court nonetheless formulated the following definition of “deprivation”: 
 
“Whether there has been a deprivation depends on the extent of the interference with or 
limitation of use, enjoyment or exploitation. It is not necessary in this case to determine 
precisely what constitutes deprivation. No more need be said than that at the very least, 
substantial interference or limitation that goes beyond the normal restrictions on property 
use or enjoyment found in an open and democratic society would amount to deprivation.”20 
 
                                                          
16 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 204. See also T Roux “Property” in 
S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 2013) ch 46 17-18, 
who argues that due to the wide interpretation of “deprivation”, the inquiry as to whether there 
has been a deprivation for purposes of section 25(1) will have very little impact on the overall 
section 25(1) inquiry in future cases. 
17 T Roux “Property” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 2 ed 
(RS 2013) ch 46 18. See also H Mostert & PJ Badenhorst “Property and the bill of rights” in Y 
Mokgoro & P Tlakula (eds) Bill of rights compendium (RS 2015) ch 3FB 41. 
18 T Roux “Property” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 2 ed 
(RS 2013) ch 46 18. 
19 2005 1 SA 530 (CC). 
20 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; 
Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC for Local Government & Housing in the Province of 
Gauteng 2005 1 SA 530 (CC) para 32. See also the discussion in I Currie & J de Waal The 
bill of rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 538; H Mostert & PJ Badenhorst “Property and the bill of 
rights” in Y Mokgoro & P Tlakula (eds) Bill of rights compendium (RS 2015) ch 3FB 42. 
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Given this definition, it is clear that the court restricted the definition of a deprivation 
laid down by the court in First National Bank.21 According to the definition of 
deprivation in Mkontwana, an interference with the use, enjoyment and exploitation of 
private property will only amount to a deprivation for purposes of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution if the interference has a significant impact.22 According to Van der Walt, 
this interpretation clouded the meaning of “deprivation”.23 In his criticism of the 
Mkontwana judgment, he argues that although the court in this case professed to apply 
the interpretation of a “deprivation” established in First National Bank, it actually 
departed from it.24 
In Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Coega Development Corporation,25 the court 
accepted the definition of “deprivation” adopted by the court in Mkontwana. It stated 
that the impact of an interference needs to have “sufficient magnitude”26 before section 
25(1) is triggered. Determining the magnitude of the interference will require a context-
sensitive approach,27 and will depend on the duration and degree thereof.28 The 
context in this case led the court to conclude that a mere threat of expropriation did 
not amount to a deprivation of property, because it did not affect the property owner’s 
ability to use or exploit its property.29 
The definition of a deprivation was further modified by the court in National Credit 
Regulator v Opperman.30 In this case, the court held that an impact would be 
                                                          
21 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 204. 
22 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; 
Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC for Local Government & Housing in the Province of 
Gauteng 2005 1 SA 530 (CC) para 32. 
23 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 204. 
24 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 204. 
25 2011 1 SA 293 (CC). 
26 Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Coega Development Corporation 2011 1 SA 293 (CC) para 41. 
See also I Currie & J de Waal The bill of rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 538. 
27 Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Coega Development Corporation 2011 1 SA 293 (CC) para 40. 
28 The Treasure Chest v Tambuti Enterprises (Pty) Ltd 1975 2 SA 738 (A) 748H. According to 
IM Rautenbach “Introduction to the bill of rights” in Y Mokgoro & P Tlakula (eds) Bill of rights 
compendium (RS 2015) ch 1A 195, the Constitutional Court has done little in determining the 
exact seriousness and degree of an interference before it triggers section 25(1) of the 
Constitution. 
29 Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Coega Development Corporation 2011 1 SA 293 (CC) para 43; 
46. 
30 2013 2 SA 1 (CC). 
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significant enough for the interference to amount to a deprivation if it has a legally 
relevant impact on the rights of the property interest holder.31 This position was 
confirmed in South African Diamond Producers Organisation v Minister of Minerals 
and Energy,32 in which the court held that an interference had to have a “legally 
relevant impact”33 on the property owner for it to be considered substantial. 
Based on the discussion above, a deprivation of property for purposes of section 
25(1) of the Constitution at the very least involves the interference with the use, 
enjoyment or exploitation of property.34 However, this interference may also need to 
have a significant impact on the rights of the property owner before it may be 
considered a deprivation for purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution.35 This 
significant impact could specifically require that it be legally relevant to the rights of the 
property owner before it can be considered significant.36 Despite these discrepancies 
in the definition of a deprivation, the question of whether a deprivation of property 
occurs for purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution would need to be decided on 
a case-by-case basis, and thus requires a context-sensitive analysis.37 
 
4 3 4 Concluding remarks  
In order for section 25(1) of the Constitution to apply, the Gatherings Act needs to 
permit a deprivation of property as envisaged by section 25(1) of the Constitution. In 
                                                          
31 National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC) para 66. 
32 (CCT234/16) [2017] ZACC 26 (24 July 2017). 
33 South African Diamond Producers Organisation v Minister of Minerals and Energy 
(CCT234/16) [2017] ZACC 26 (24 July 2017) para 48. 
34 This accords with the definition of a deprivation in First National Bank v Commissioner, 
South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of 
Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 57. 
35 This accords with the definition of a deprivation in Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign 
v MEC for Local Government & Housing in the Province of Gauteng 2005 1 SA 530 (CC) para 
32. 
36 This accords with the definition of a deprivation in National Credit Regulator v Opperman 
2013 2 SA 1 (CC) para 66; South African Diamond Producers Organisation v Minister of 
Minerals and Energy (CCT234/16) [2017] ZACC 26 (24 July 2017) para 48. 
37 This accords with the findings in Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Coega Development 
Corporation 2011 1 SA 293 (CC) para 40. 
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other words, the property owner must be able to show that the conduct permitted by 
Gathering Act amounts to a deprivation of her property.  
The Gatherings Act serves to temporarily suspend the ability of the property owner 
to use or enjoy her property. This suspension will be temporary, as it will only be for 
the duration of the gathering. This temporary suspension amounts to an interference 
of the property owner’s ability to use or enjoy her property, which alone has a 
significant enough impact to affect her legal entitlements. The actions discussed in 4 
3 2 above, which include the entry of a large number of people onto privately owned 
property,38 disrupting pedestrian and vehicular traffic to and from such property,39 
intimidating people who have entered or who wish to enter such property,40 occupying 
privately owned property for an indefinite period,41 and affecting the businesses 
closely related to such property,42 interfere with the ability of the property owner to use 
and enjoy her property. Should this interference occur under the auspices of the 
definition of a “gathering”, then the mere presence of more than 15 people on the 
property, as required by the definition of a “gathering”, would amount to an 
interference. This interference is significant enough to affect her legal entitlements, 
and thus qualifies as a deprivation for purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution.  
Based on the above discussion on the definition of a “deprivation”, as well as the 
content of the Gatherings Act discussed in chapter 3, it is clear that the Gatherings Act 
permits an interference with the property rights of private property owners that may 
have a significant impact. Therefore, the Gatherings Act permits a deprivation of 
property for purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution. Since the Gatherings Act 
permits a deprivation of property, it needs to be considered whether the deprivation 
                                                          
38 This was the case in Fourways Mall (Pty) Ltd v South African Commercial Catering 1999 3 
SA 752 (W); Growthpoint Properties Limited v South Africa Commercial Catering and Allied 
Workers Union (SACCAWU) 2010 JDR 1015 (KZD); Hotz v UCT 2016 4 All SA 723 (SCA); 
the Paternoster Square case study. See also 4 3 2 above. 
39 This was the case in Hotz v UCT 2016 4 All SA 723 (SCA). See also 4 3 2 above. 
40 This was the case in Fourways Mall (Pty) Ltd v South African Commercial Catering 1999 3 
SA 752 (W); Growthpoint Properties Limited v South Africa Commercial Catering and Allied 
Workers Union (SACCAWU) 2010 JDR 1015 (KZD). See also 4 3 2 above. 
41 This was the case with the Paternoster Square case study. See also 4 3 2 above. 
42 This was the case in Fourways Mall (Pty) Ltd v South African Commercial Catering 1999 3 
SA 752 (W); Growthpoint Properties Limited v South Africa Commercial Catering and Allied 
Workers Union (SACCAWU) 2010 JDR 1015 (KZD). See also 4 3 2 above. 
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complies with the requirements for a valid deprivation in section 25(1) of the 
Constitution. 
 
4 4 Circumstances in which a deprivation is consistent with section 25(1) of 
the Constitution  
4 4 1 Overview 
The requirements for a valid deprivation in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution 
is two-fold. Firstly, the deprivation of property may not occur except in terms of law of 
general application. Secondly, section 25(1) requires that the law should not permit an 
arbitrary deprivation. While little has been written on the law of general application 
requirement in section 25,43 the non-arbitrariness requirement was given content in 
First National Bank.44 In this decision, the court held that a deprivation is arbitrary if it 
is procedurally unfair or if there is insufficient reason for such deprivation.45 Should 
insufficient reason for the deprivation exist, the deprivation will be substantively 
arbitrary.46 
 
4 4 2 The deprivation must occur in terms of law of general application 
The deprivation of property envisaged by section 25(1) of the Constitution may not 
occur except in terms of law of general application. Van der Walt interprets the first 
requirement as amounting to an authorisation of the deprivation in terms of the 
particular law.47 The law also needs to be clear, precise and accessible enough so 
that affected parties are able to understand the degree of their rights and duties.48 An 
                                                          
43 AJ van der Walt “Property law in the constitutional democracy” (2017) 28 Stellenbosch Law 
Review 8 17. Although Van der Walt refers to the “law of general application” requirement in 
section 25(2) of the Constitution specifically, this argument can be extended to the “law of 
general application” requirement in section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
44 First National Bank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank 
of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
45 First National Bank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank 
of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 67. 
46 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 245. 
47 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 232. 
48 Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) para 47. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
70 
 
absence of such a law, or the absence of the general applicability of a particular law, 
means the first requirement would not be met, and the subsequent deprivation would 
not survive scrutiny under section 25(1). Furthermore, an Act of Parliament will 
typically qualify as being a law of general application.49 
As stated above, the legislation authorising the deprivation is the Gatherings Act. 
The Act is an Act of Parliament, the text of which is readily available to those who are 
affected by its content. The Act applies generally, because its provisions are not solely 
applicable to certain individuals. Therefore, the Gatherings Act qualifies as law of 
general application for purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
 
4 4 3 The deprivation may not be procedurally arbitrary 
The first component of arbitrariness deals with procedural arbitrariness, which is a 
flexible concept dependent on the facts of each particular case.50 The procedural 
arbitrariness of a deprivation will be in issue should the deprivation occur in terms of 
the Gatherings Act itself, or where the deprivation was dependent on administrative 
action authorised by the Gatherings Act. Van der Walt argues that procedural 
arbitrariness will only be determined in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution when 
the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”)51 “does not apply for 
some reason.”52 
                                                          
49 See Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City 
Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC for Local Government & Housing in the 
Province of Gauteng 2005 1 SA 530 (CC) para 83; S Woolman & H Botha “Limitations” in S 
Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 2013) ch 34 51. 
50 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; 
Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC for Local Government & Housing in the Province of 
Gauteng 2005 1 SA 530 (CC) para 65. See also Reflect-All 1025 CC v MEC for Public 
Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government 2009 6 SA 391 (CC) para 40. 
51 The right to administrative justice is enshrined in section 33 of the Constitution, 1996. The 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 gives effect to section 33, as envisaged by 
section 33(3). Section 3 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 deals with 
the procedural fairness of administrative action. 
52 AJ van der Walt “Procedurally arbitrary deprivation of property” (2012) 23 Stellenbosch Law 
Review 88 93. 
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According to Van der Sijde, the procedural arbitrariness of a deprivation may be 
challenged in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution, as well as PAJA.53 The 
subsidiarity principles formulated by the Constitution provide useful guidelines to 
determine whether procedural fairness should be challenged on the basis of section 
25(1) of the Constitution, or on PAJA.54 In terms of the subsidiarity principles, reliance 
should only be placed on PAJA when the deprivation is brought about by 
administrative action, rather than a legislative provision itself.55 In other words, the 
subsidiarity principles dictates that in cases where a deprivation is caused by 
administrative action, reliance should be placed on PAJA, because it was enacted to 
give effect to section 33 of the Constitution.56 Therefore, the provisions of PAJA may 
not be bypassed in favour of challenging the procedural arbitrariness of the deprivation 
in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution.57 
Roux argues for an approach that would have a similar effect to the position 
advanced by Van der Sijde. According to Roux, deprivations caused by administrative 
action will trigger section 33 of the Constitution, whereas deprivations caused directly 
by a law of general application will trigger section 25(1) of the Constitution.58 This is 
clear from the wording of the respective sections, as section 33 deals with 
                                                          
53 E van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation: A systemic 
constitutional approach LLD dissertation Stellenbosch (2015) 123. 
54 E van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation: A systemic 
constitutional approach LLD dissertation Stellenbosch (2015) 123. The principle of subsidiarity 
dictates that legislation giving effect to a particular constitutional right needs to be invoked 
before relying on the right directly. Only in cases where the legislation fails to give effect to the 
right, should the right be relied upon directly. See also South African National Defence Union 
v Minister of Defence 2007 8 BCLR 863 (CC) para 51 in which the court noted that legislation 
giving effect to a constitutional right may not be bypassed by relying directly on the 
Constitution; P de Vos & W Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law in context (2014) 
586. 
55 E van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation: A systemic 
constitutional approach LLD dissertation Stellenbosch (2015) 123. 
56 E van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation: A systemic 
constitutional approach LLD dissertation Stellenbosch (2015) 123. 
57 E van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation: A systemic 
constitutional approach LLD dissertation Stellenbosch (2015) 123. 
58 T Roux “Property” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 2 ed 
(RS 2013) ch 46 25. See also E van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property 
and regulation: A systemic constitutional approach LLD dissertation Stellenbosch (2015) 125. 
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administrative action, while section 25(1) deals with a law of general application.59 As 
a result, there will be no overlap in cases where a litigant may need to decide whether 
to challenge a deprivation in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution or in terms of 
PAJA.60 
PAJA will thus only be applicable when the deprivation of property is dependent on 
administrative action authorised by the Gatherings Act. In cases where the deprivation 
is not brought about by administrative action, but rather caused directly by a law of 
general application, the procedural arbitrariness of the deprivation should be 
challenged in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution.61 Despite the different litigation 
routes followed, the principles used to assess procedural arbitrariness will be the same 
for reliance on both PAJA and section 25(1) of the Constitution.62 These principles 
indicate that the deprivation caused by the Gatherings Act is not dependent on 
administrative action, and the procedural arbitrariness of the deprivation would thus 
be adjudicated in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution. However, there are limited 
circumstances in which the deprivation caused by the Gatherings Act could be brought 
about by administrative action. This would occur in cases where the responsible officer 
permits a gathering to proceed even though grounds exist for the prohibition of the 
gathering in terms of section 5(1) of the Gatherings Act.63 The responsible officer may 
                                                          
59 T Roux “Property” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 2 ed 
(RS 2013) ch 46 25. See also E van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property 
and regulation: A systemic constitutional approach LLD dissertation Stellenbosch (2015) 125. 
60 T Roux “Property” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 2 ed 
(RS 2013) ch 46 25. See also E van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property 
and regulation: A systemic constitutional approach LLD dissertation Stellenbosch (2015) 125. 
61 E van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation: A systemic 
constitutional approach LLD dissertation Stellenbosch (2015) 124. 
62 E van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation: A systemic 
constitutional approach LLD dissertation Stellenbosch (2015) 125. 
63 Section 5(1) of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 states: 
“(1) When credible information on oath is brought to the attention of a responsible officer that there 
is a threat that a proposed gathering will result in serious disruption of vehicular or pedestrian traffic, 
injury to participants in the gathering or other persons, or extensive damage to property, and that 
the Police and the traffic officers in question will not be able to contain this threat, he shall forthwith 
meet or, if time does not allow it, consult with the convener and the authorized member, if possible, 
and any other person with whom, he believes, he should meet or consult, including the 
representatives of any police community consultative forum in order to consider the prohibition of 
the gathering.” 
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only prohibit a gathering in terms of section 5(2) of the Gatherings Act if one of the 
grounds in section 5(1) exists, and failure to prohibit the gathering would thus amount 
to a failure to make a decision for purposes of PAJA.64 In such a case, the action taken 
by the administrator would need to be tested against the principles of procedural 
fairness under administrative law.65 In this regard, the procedure followed by the 
responsible officer in deciding not to prohibit a gathering will be tested against the 
procedures in the Gatherings Act, in order to determine whether the deprivation is 
procedurally unfair.66 Although this creates some interesting questions for discussion, 
it remains beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, this thesis will only focus on 
deprivations caused directly by the Gatherings Act itself, and not by administrative 
action authorised by the Gatherings Act. 
According to Van der Walt, the principles of procedural fairness in administrative 
law should be used when legislation directly brings about a deprivation of property, 
even though no administrative decision was made.67 In terms of these principles, the 
deprivation would only be procedurally fair when the legislation in question provides 
for judicial oversight,68 because this would effectively grant the property owner the 
opportunity to be heard.69 Furthermore, the court in Chevron SA (Pty) Limited v Wilson 
                                                          
64 According to section 1 of PAJA, administrative action includes the failure to make a decision. 
The decision not to prohibit a gathering will be made when the notice of the gathering is made 
public in terms of section 4(5)(a) of the Gatherings Act.  
65 See C Hoexter Administrative law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 368, in which she argues that 
section 3(5) of PAJA recognises that procedures in the empowering provision may differ from 
the procedures in PAJA, and will survive constitutional scrutiny if it is deemed to be fair. See 
further Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau 2014 8 BCLR 930 (CC), in which 
the Minister failed to follow the prescribed procedures in sections 71(1) and (2) of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008, and thus deemed the administrative action taken procedurally 
unfair. 
66 These procedures include those in section 5 of the Gatherings Act, as well as the review 
and appeal procedures in section 6 of the Gatherings Act. These procedures are consistent 
with the procedural fairness requirements in section 3(2)(b) of PAJA. See further C Hoexter 
Administrative law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 366-368. 
67 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 269. 
68 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 270.  
69 In Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs 2005 (3) SA 589 (CC) para 
112, the court held that persons affected by an administrative decision should be given the 
opportunity to make representations before the decision is made. C Hoexter Administrative 
law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 363 argues that people should be given the opportunity to 
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t/a Wilson’s Transport (“Chevron”),70 further qualified the requirement for the provision 
of judicial oversight, by stating that the law permitting the deprivation may not strip the 
court of its discretion. In this case, the court held that section 89(5)(b) of the National 
Credit Act 34 of 2005 caused a procedurally arbitrary deprivation of property because 
the provision obliged courts to order the repayment of money paid in terms of an invalid 
agreement envisaged by section 89.71 If these principles are tested against the 
deprivation permitted by the Gatherings Act, it would require the Act to provide for 
judicial oversight, which does not strip the judiciary from exercising its discretionary 
powers. Section 6(5) of the Gatherings Act provides the necessary judicial oversight, 
because it grants any interested party the power to approach a court to challenge the 
approval or prohibition of a gathering, or any conditions placed on a gathering.72 This 
provision can be used by the property owner to challenge the commencement of the 
gathering on her property, and will thus satisfy the administrative law requirement that 
all parties are given the opportunity to be heard.73 Furthermore, section 6(5) states 
that the court may amend, strike out, or impose additional conditions, or approve or 
prohibit a gathering “as it deems fit”. Based on these provisions, it is clear that the 
Gatherings Act grants the property owner the opportunity to be heard, by providing for 
judicial oversight. Furthermore, these provisions do not limit the court’s discretion, and 
can thus not be interpreted as being procedurally arbitrary in terms of the Chevron 
principle. 
 
                                                          
influence decisions that may affect them by granting them the power to participate in those 
decisions. See further J Klaaren & G Penfold “Just administrative action” in S Woolman & M 
Chaskalson (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2005) ch 63 81. 
70 2015 10 BCLR 1158 (CC). 
71 Chevron SA (Pty) Limited v Wilson t/a Wilson’s Transport 2015 10 BCLR 1158 (CC) paras 
10; 24. 
72 The responsible officer may approve a gathering in terms of section 4(2)(a) or section 4(4)(a) 
of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993, or prohibit a gathering in terms of section 
5(2) of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. 
73 C Hoexter Administrative law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 363. 
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4 4 4 The deprivation may not be substantively arbitrary 
4 4 4 1 Overview 
The second component of arbitrariness deals with substantive arbitrariness, and 
requires that sufficient reason be given for the deprivation.74 In First National Bank, 
the court stated that the test for substantive arbitrariness may range from a rationality 
to a proportionality test.75 In this regard, the court stated that the substantive non-
arbitrariness test may only require rationality to be established, but will sometimes also 
require proportionality similar to the test in section 36(1) of the Constitution to be 
established. In this case, a proportionality test seemed to be favoured, as the court 
listed factors to be taken into account when considering if the reasons for the 
deprivation are sufficient. These factors included the means sought to give effect to 
the law in question, the link between the purpose of the deprivation and those affected 
by it, and the need to consider the complexity of relationships involved.76 This part of 
the chapter will focus on establishing what could amount to “sufficient reason” for the 
deprivation caused by the Gatherings Act. In this regard, the courts could consider 
three factors when establishing whether “sufficient reason” exists. 
 
4 4 4 2 “Sufficient reason” in the Gatherings Act itself 
In some cases, legislation may provide reasons for a deprivation.77 Based on the 
requirements for holding a lawful gathering in terms of the Gatherings Act, it is clear 
                                                          
74 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 
100. 
75 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 
100.  
76 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 
100. 
77 According to P Dhliwayo a constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right 
to exclude LLD dissertation Stellenbosch (2015) 183-184, the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000, which gives effect to section 9 of the 
Constitution, provides reasons for the limitation of the owners’ right to exclude. In other words, 
the legislation permitting the deprivation provides sufficient reason for the deprivation. 
Dhliwayo argues at page 174 that the purpose of a limitation on an owners’ right to exclude 
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that the commencement of a “gathering” on privately owned property does not depend 
on the consideration of the constitutional rights exercised during a gathering, as well 
as the need to hold a gathering on privately owned property. In other words, at no 
point does the definition of a gathering, or the procedures immediately before the 
commencement of a gathering, take the interests of the property owner into account. 
Had the Gatherings Act provided for the consideration of such interests, and permitted 
the gathering to commence anyway, the property owner would have to attack the 
legislation on the basis that it causes an arbitrary deprivation of property. 
Therefore, merely meeting the definition of a gathering and adhering to the 
requirement procedures in sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Gatherings Act is sufficient for a 
lawful gathering to commence, none of which take the above considerations into 
account. While the Gatherings Act prohibits certain gatherings, it can only be 
prohibited based on one of the grounds listed in section 5(1).78 These grounds also do 
not seem to take the above considerations into account when determining whether a 
gathering should be prohibited outright. As a result, it is evident that the Gatherings 
Act provides no reason why a “gathering” may be held on privately owned property.  
Therefore, the determination of whether the Gatherings Act permits a substantively 
arbitrary deprivation will need to be decided on a case-by-case basis. This will require 
the consideration of “sufficient reason” outside the confines of the Gatherings Act itself. 
 
                                                          
caused by the legislation, will appear in the legislation itself. In some cases, the legislation 
may even perform the balancing of conflicting rights, and will offer guidance on how the conflict 
should be resolved. Therefore, the reasons for a deprivation that limits the owners’ right to 
exclude is often found in the legislation itself.  
78 Section 5(1) of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 states: 
“(1) When credible information on oath is brought to the attention of a responsible officer that there 
is a threat that a proposed gathering will result in serious disruption of vehicular or pedestrian traffic, 
injury to participants in the gathering or other persons, or extensive damage to property, and that 
the Police and the traffic officers in question will not be able to contain this threat, he shall forthwith 
meet or, if time does not allow it, consult with the convener and the authorized member, if possible, 
and any other person with whom, he believes, he should meet or consult, including the 
representatives of any police community consultative forum in order to consider the prohibition of 
the gathering.” 
See also 4 4 3 above. 
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4 4 4 3 Complexity of constitutional rights involved 
One of the reasons why the Gatherings Act may permit a deprivation of property 
could be due to the magnitude and complexity of constitutional rights that are typically 
exercised during a gathering. The importance of these rights, particularly when they 
come into conflict with property rights, will be central in determining whether sufficient 
reason exists to justify the commencement of a gathering on privately owned property. 
This complexity of constitutional rights was outlined by Wallis JA in Hotz v UCT: 
 
“…[T]he right to protest against injustice is one that is protected under our Constitution, not 
only specifically in section 17, by way of the right to assemble, demonstrate and present 
petitions, but also by other constitutionally protected rights, such as the right of freedom of 
opinion (s 15(1)); the right of freedom of expression (s 16(1)); the right of freedom of 
association (s 18) and the right to make political choices and campaign for a political cause 
(s 19(1)).”79 
 
Based on this remark, it is clear that the participants of a gathering may be 
exercising a combination of any of the above constitutional rights throughout the 
duration of the gathering. While all of these rights are important, the emphasis here 
will fall on the importance of the right to assemble and demonstrate, as well as the 
right to freedom of expression. The first of these rights is entrenched in section 17 of 
the Constitution, which states that “[e]veryone has the right, peacefully and unarmed, 
to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions.”80 
In some cases, the right to assemble and demonstrate may come into conflict with 
other constitutional rights, which would require an evaluation of the importance of the 
recognition and protection of the right to assemble and demonstrate. The importance 
of the recognition and protection of the right to assemble and demonstrate is five-fold. 
Firstly, the importance relates to the historical context of South Africa, and the need to 
“channel the violence inherent in mass action into a less dangerous and perhaps even 
constructive form”.81 It is in this sense that the constitutional protection of the right to 
assemble and demonstrate is necessary, because it helps avoid the manner in which 
                                                          
79 Hotz v UCT 2016 4 All SA 723 (SCA) para 62. 
80 Section 17 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
81 S Woolman “Assembly, demonstration and petition” in I Currie & J de Waal (eds) The bill of 
rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 377 385. 
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legislation was used to suppress these rights under the apartheid regime.82 Woolman 
and De Waal argue that these statutes not only showed how local authorities and the 
national government displayed disinterest in the importance of the right to assemble, 
but also how these institutions “demonstrated even less sympathy for assemblers.”83 
When the judiciary had to interpret the legislation that regulated and effectively 
suppressed gatherings, they failed to consider the political context in which the 
assemblies took place.84 These arguments indicate that a need exists to recognise the 
right to assemble and demonstrate in terms of the Constitution. This need arises not 
only from the repressive nature of the state towards dissent, but also from the need to 
find solutions to problems raised during gatherings, without resorting to violence. 
Secondly, the importance of the right to assemble and demonstrate when it comes 
into conflict with other constitutional rights, lies in the need to promote government 
accountability, as well as the ability of the people to do so in a society based on a 
constitutional democracy. According to Woolman, this is reflected in the need to 
“create space for the large, vocal social formations that service representative 
democracies”,85 the need to “supplement representative democracy through a form of 
direct democracy”86 and the need to “improve government accountability and 
responsiveness between elections”.87 These grounds are central to the recognition of 
the right to assemble and demonstrate in terms of section 17 of the Constitution, which 
                                                          
82 These statutes include, inter alia, the Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950, which 
granted the Minister of Justice the power to prohibit a gathering if he was of the opinion that it 
would involve the advancement of a communist agenda; the Criminal Law Amendment Act 8 
of 1953, which imposed harsher penalties on perpetrators involved in political protests; the 
Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956, which granted the Minister of Justice the power to prohibit 
a gathering should it be in the interest of maintaining  peace or preventing racial hostility. See 
also 2 2 2 above. 
83 S Woolman & J de Waal “Voting with your feet” in D van Wyk, J Dugard, B de Villiers & D 
Davis (eds) Rights and constitutionalism – The new South African legal order (1994) 292 292. 
84 S Woolman & J de Waal “Voting with your feet” in D van Wyk, J Dugard, B de Villiers & D 
Davis (eds) Rights and constitutionalism – The new South African legal order (1994) 292 293. 
See also 2 2 2 above. 
85 S Woolman “Assembly, demonstration and petition” in I Currie & J de Waal (eds) The bill of 
rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 377 385. 
86 S Woolman “Assembly, demonstration and petition” in I Currie & J de Waal (eds) The bill of 
rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 377 385. 
87 S Woolman “Assembly, demonstration and petition” in I Currie & J de Waal (eds) The bill of 
rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 377 385. 
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grants the people the power to express their will through a channel other than those 
offered by political parties and the state.88 Section 17 allows the people to put pressure 
on the state for failing to fulfil the promises contained in section 1 of the Constitution, 
and to hold elected officials accountable.89 This accords with the argument by Dugard, 
who argues that denying someone the right to public assembly is undemocratic.90 The 
denial of this right is often aimed at those who operate outside the structures offered 
by political parties, and will likely be met with creative forms of resistance.91 Therefore, 
it is clear that the need for the recognition of a right to assemble and demonstrate is 
necessary for the effective functioning of a democracy in which people are able to 
express their dissent freely. Similarly, in S v Mamabolo,92 the court stated that various 
rights, including the right to assemble and demonstrate, promote a freedom to “speak 
one’s mind”93 and participate in the everyday activities of society. Furthermore, in 
South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas,94 the Constitutional Court 
found that all forms of public assembly have become part of the South African 
society.95 These assemblies are central to a democratic society, in which they are 
used as an instrument through which dialogue is encouraged.96 This seeks to frame 
the right to assemble and demonstrate around the concept of democracy. It also 
reaffirms the views above by linking the right to assemble and demonstrate to the idea 
of government accountability. In this regard, the instruments of dialogue referred to 
above can operate as a catalyst for bringing about demands made by participants in 
a gathering, which are essential for justice and democracy.97 Therefore, it is clear that 
the recognition of the right to assemble and demonstrate are essential in a 
                                                          
88 S Woolman “My tea party, your mob, our social contract: Freedom of assembly and the 
constitutional right to rebellion in Garvis v SATAWU (Minister for Safety & Security, Third 
Party) 2010 (6) SA 280 (WCC)” (2011) 27 South African Journal on Human Rights 346 348.  
89 S Woolman “My tea party, your mob, our social contract: Freedom of assembly and the 
constitutional right to rebellion in Garvis v SATAWU (Minister for Safety & Security, Third 
Party) 2010 (6) SA 280 (WCC)” (2011) 27 South African Journal on Human Rights 346 348. 
90 J Dugard Human rights and the South African legal order (1978) 186-187. 
91 J Dugard Human rights and the South African legal order (1978) 186-187. 
92 2001 3 SA 409 (CC). 
93 S v Mamabolo 2001 3 SA 409 (CC) para 28. 
94 2013 1 SA 83 (CC). 
95 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC) para 68. 
96 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC) para 68. 
97 A Branch & Z Mampilly Africa uprising: Popular protest and political change (2015) 4. 
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constitutional democracy as a means of holding the state accountable. Exercising the 
right to assemble and demonstrate thus serves as a means of holding those in power 
to account. 
Thirdly, the importance of the right to assemble and demonstrate when it comes 
into conflict with other constitutional rights, lies in the need to stimulate public debate. 
According to Woolman, the recognition of the right is necessary in order to “create 
space for the large, vocal social formations that service representative democracies”,98 
while acting as a “catalyst for debate”.99 The first of these grounds, namely the need 
to create public spaces for the benefit of advancing democracy, are often adopted in 
a vocal manner. According to Dlamini,100 encouraging debate will not only assist in 
developing the public discourse, but also play a vital role in “consolidating and 
deepening democracy.”101 Wessels argues that it not only allows people to participate 
in public debate, but also has the potential to unite people from different political 
affiliations.102 According to Botha, the purpose of protests is not only to disrupt or 
create inconvenience, but also to gain support from the public at large.103 By bringing 
the public into close contact with the views expressed, attention and discussion is 
stimulated.104 While protests may take different forms depending on the participants, 
their demands and their affiliations,105 they are often performed through “loud, noisy, 
disruptive, and sometimes dangerous”106 behaviour. Therefore, the action of protest 
                                                          
98 S Woolman “Assembly, demonstration and petition” in I Currie & J de Waal (eds) The bill of 
rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 377 385. 
99 S Woolman “Assembly, demonstration and petition” in I Currie & J de Waal (eds) The bill of 
rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 377 385. 
100 Q Dlamini “Mass action and the law: Can South Africa do without the Regulation of 
Gatherings Act?” (2009) 1 African Journal of Rhetoric 86 89-90. 
101 Q Dlamini “Mass action and the law: Can South Africa do without the Regulation of 
Gatherings Act?” (2009) 1 African Journal of Rhetoric 86 90. 
102 L Wessels My rights! Your rights? Let’s talk! (2007)183. 
103 H Botha “Fundamental rights and democratic dissent: Reflections on freedom of assembly 
in the ‘protest capital of the world’” Paper presented at third bi-annual German-South African 
dialogue on democracy entitled The preconditions of democracy (2016) The University of the 
Western Cape (Copy of paper on file with author). 
104 In Re Munhumeso 1995 1 SA 551 (ZS) 557. 
105 A Branch & Z Mampilly Africa uprising: Popular protest and political change (2015) 4. 
106 S Woolman “My tea party, your mob, our social contract: Freedom of assembly and the 
constitutional right to rebellion in Garvis v SATAWU (Minister for Safety & Security, Third 
Party) 2010 (6) SA 280 (WCC)” (2011) 27 South African Journal on Human Rights 346 348. 
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itself should be viewed as “a direct expression of popular sovereignty, and if so, as a 
direct challenge to the status quo.”107 In this regard, the importance of protest should 
not only be viewed as a means of action and dissent, but also as a means of gaining 
public support. While these views hold that expression and assembly are often linked 
during public debate, Botha warns that these two rights should be viewed 
independently from each other when they are invoked during such debates.108 He 
warns against bundling these two rights together when protests occur, because more 
weight is often attached to the right to freedom of expression than to the right to 
assemble.109 His views are based on the fact that action and assembly have symbolic 
value, and should thus be viewed independently from expression.110 Although they 
should be viewed independently, the existence of a link between these two rights is 
undeniable, because some rights in the Constitution “could not be struggled for and 
realised without the right to free expression [and] assembly”.111 Therefore, by 
assessing these views, it is evident that the recognition of a right to assemble and 
demonstrate is important for the stimulation of public debate. In other words, 
recognising the right to assemble and demonstrate not only encourages the need to 
partake in debates, but also the need to do so publicly. 
Fourthly, the importance of the right to assemble and demonstrate when it comes 
into conflict with other constitutional rights lies in the need to give a voice to the 
                                                          
107 S Woolman “My tea party, your mob, our social contract: Freedom of assembly and the 
constitutional right to rebellion in Garvis v SATAWU (Minister for Safety & Security, Third 
Party) 2010 (6) SA 280 (WCC)” (2011) 27 South African Journal on Human Rights 346 348. 
108 H Botha “Fundamental rights and democratic dissent: Reflections on freedom of assembly 
in the ‘protest capital of the world’” Paper presented at third bi-annual German-South African 
dialogue on democracy entitled The preconditions of democracy (2016) The University of the 
Western Cape (Copy of paper on file with author). The right to freedom of expression is 
protected in section 16 of the Constitution, 1996.  
109 H Botha “Fundamental rights and democratic dissent: Reflections on freedom of assembly 
in the ‘protest capital of the world’” Paper presented at third bi-annual German-South African 
dialogue on democracy entitled The preconditions of democracy (2016) The University of the 
Western Cape (Copy of paper on file with author). 
110 H Botha “Fundamental rights and democratic dissent: Reflections on freedom of assembly 
in the ‘protest capital of the world’” Paper presented at third bi-annual German-South African 
dialogue on democracy entitled The preconditions of democracy (2016) The University of the 
Western Cape (Copy of paper on file with author). 
111 J van der Westhuizen “Freedom of expression” in D van Wyk, J Dugard, B de Villiers & D 
Davis (eds) Rights and constitutionalism – The new South African legal order (1994) 264 270. 
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voiceless. According to Woolman, the importance of the recognition of the right 
includes the need to “empower out-groups”,112 as well as the need to “enhance the 
stability and the legitimacy of the political processes by allowing for the articulation of 
minority views”.113 He argues that different degrees of power held by different groups 
of people has often led to one-sided discourse, and the right to freedom of assembly 
has forced society to confront this reality.114 Botha argues that views expressed during 
protests are often not the views of someone who has the power to express these views 
in any other setting.115 This, he states, is usually the case where the poor or 
marginalised are forced to do something to change the oppressive circumstances they 
find themselves in.116 Freedom of assembly grants such people the scope to create 
their own “deliberative structures”117 in spaces of their own design.118 Gargarella offers 
a similar view on the rights of the poor, oppressed and marginalised.119 He refers to 
what he deems a right of resistance, particularly in instances where people are 
                                                          
112 S Woolman “Assembly, demonstration and petition” in I Currie & J de Waal (eds) The bill 
of rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 377 385. 
113 S Woolman “Assembly, demonstration and petition” in I Currie & J de Waal (eds) The bill 
of rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 377 385. 
114 S Woolman “Freedom of assembly” in S Woolman & M Chaskalson (eds) Constitutional 
law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2005) ch 43 2. 
115 H Botha “Fundamental rights and democratic dissent: Reflections on freedom of assembly 
in the ‘protest capital of the world’” Paper presented at third bi-annual German-South African 
dialogue on democracy entitled The preconditions of democracy (2016) The University of the 
Western Cape (Copy of paper on file with author). 
116 H Botha “Fundamental rights and democratic dissent: Reflections on freedom of assembly 
in the ‘protest capital of the world’” Paper presented at third bi-annual German-South African 
dialogue on democracy entitled The preconditions of democracy (2016) The University of the 
Western Cape (Copy of paper on file with author). 
117 W le Roux “Between a brick and a ballot? Rethinking the relationship between disruptive 
and deliberative democracy” Paper presented at Rethinking the encounter with the police: 
From Marikana to Ferguson (2017) The University of the Western Cape (Copy of paper on file 
with author). 
118 H Botha “Fundamental rights and democratic dissent: Reflections on freedom of assembly 
in the ‘protest capital of the world’” Paper presented at third bi-annual German-South African 
dialogue on democracy entitled The preconditions of democracy (2016) The University of the 
Western Cape (Copy of paper on file with author). 
119 R Gargarella “The right of resistance in situations of severe deprivation” in T Pogge (ed) 
Freedom from poverty as a human right (2007) 359 370.  
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suffering from severe deprivation, in whichever form it may take place.120 While he 
argues that such persons should resist and defy any legal prohibitions that further 
reinforces their deprivation, he also mentions that non-traditional forms of protest such 
as the occupation of unused land, as well as the blocking of highways, should be used 
as a form of resistance.121 Therefore, the need to recognise the right to assemble and 
demonstrate could be grounded on the fact that it allows minority views to be heard. 
As discussed above, these views are often those of the powerless, which further 
reiterates the need to uphold the right when it comes into conflict with property rights. 
Lastly, the recognition and protection of the right to assemble and demonstrate in 
international law displays the manner in which this right is treated internationally. The 
protection of the right can be found in various international instruments.122 For 
example, article 20(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that 
“everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.”123 
Extensive protection is also afforded by article 21 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights,124 as well as article 11 of the African Charter on Human and 
                                                          
120 R Gargarella “The right of resistance in situations of severe deprivation” in T Pogge (ed) 
Freedom from poverty as a human right (2007) 359 370. 
121 This right of resistance is similar to article 20(2) of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) 1520 UNTS 217. 
This article states that “[c]olonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free 
themselves from the bonds of domination by resorting to any means recognized by the 
international community.” According to S Murphy “Unique in international human rights law: 
Article 20(2) and the right to resist in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” 
(2011) 11 African Human Rights Law Journal 465 492, article 20(2) recognises a right to resist. 
However, it should only be invoked in circumstances where domestic law fails to sufficiently 
protect the right to freedom of assembly, expression and association. In other words, the right 
to resist as envisaged by Article 20(2) would usually fall outside the confines of ordinary 
domestic law. 
122 The position of international law in the South African legal system is provided for in section 
231 of the Constitution. Section 233 of the Constitution further compels courts to make findings 
consistent with international law. Furthermore, section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution requires 
courts to consider international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. 
123 UNGA Res 217 (III) (Adopted 10 December 1948). This document is not a treaty in itself, 
and does not require the signature or ratification by member nations. When the document was 
passed by the United Nations General Assembly, South Africa abstained from the vote. 
124 999 UNTS 171 (Adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976). South 
Africa signed this agreement on 3 October 1994. South Africa subsequently ratified the 
agreement on 10 December 1998. Article 21 states: 
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Peoples’ Rights.125 The significant protection of the right to assemble and demonstrate 
under international law further solidifies the extensive protection of the right afforded 
under South African law. 
Apart from the right contained in section 17 of the Constitution, the right to freedom 
of expression is also often exercised during a gathering. The right to freedom of 
expression is entrenched in section 16 of the Constitution, which does not extend to 
forms of expression that involve propaganda for war, hate speech and the incitement 
of imminent violence.126 The entrenchment of this right, and the magnitude of the 
protection it enjoys under the Constitution, contrasts with the lack of protection it 
received before the advent of democracy. The position during apartheid was 
mentioned in Islamic Unity Convention v The Independent Broadcasting Authority.127 
In this case, Langa DCJ concluded that the heavy restrictions on political and artistic 
expression during apartheid amounted to a “denial of democracy”.128 This denial was 
a cause for concern because the right to freedom of expression today is considered 
to be “the lifeblood of an open and democratic society cherished by our 
Constitution.”129 The functioning of the South African democracy was thus dependent 
on the right to freedom of expression being recognised and protected. Therefore, any 
denial of the right to freedom of expression would be to the detriment of the existence 
and advancement of a democratic society. 
                                                          
“The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise 
of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), 
the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
125 1520 UNTS 217 (Adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986). South Africa 
signed this agreement on 9 June 1986. South Africa subsequently ratified the agreement on 
9 June 1996. Article 11 states: 
“Every individual shall have the right to assemble freely with others. The exercise of this right shall 
be subject only to necessary restrictions provided for by law, in particular those enacted in the 
interest of national security, the safety, health, ethics and rights and freedoms of others.” 
126 Section 16 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
127 2002 4 SA 294 (CC). 
128 Islamic Unity Convention v The Independent Broadcasting Authority 2002 4 SA 294 (CC) 
para 27. In this case, Langa DCJ compared the contrasting right of freedom of expression 
recognised in common law to the restrictive artistic and political rights of expression 
experienced under the oppressive apartheid government. 
129 Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 235 (CC) para 92. 
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Since the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 
1993, the protection afforded to the right to freedom of expression changed 
significantly. The ability for people to express themselves freely had moved from being 
heavily restricted and limited to being a right “zealously guarded”130 by way of the 
Constitution. In South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence,131 
O’Regan J stated that this formerly limited right now serves to act as a “guarantor of 
democracy” as a result of its entrenchment in the Bill of Rights.132  
The views on the importance of the protection of the right to freedom of expression 
are not unique to South Africa. The protection of the right is recognised in foreign 
jurisdictions through domestic laws, globally through international law, and universally 
through the work of academics. For example, article 19 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights,133 article 19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,134 as well as article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,135 
                                                          
130 Philips v the Director of Public Prosecutions 2003 4 BCLR 357 (CC) para 23. 
131 1999 6 BCLR 615 (CC). 
132 In South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 1999 6 BCLR 615 (CC) 
para 7, O’Regan J stated that freedom of expression needs to be protected to ensure that the 
search for truth and self-fulfilment is upheld. See also L Johannessen “Freedom of expression 
and information in the new South African constitution and its compatibility with international 
standards” (1994) 10 South African Journal on Human Rights 216 218, who argues that the 
protection of free expression is essential in seeking and attaining the truth, encouraging 
participation in social and political decision-making and recognising the diversity of individuals, 
and allowing them to achieve self-fulfilment. See further E Neisser “Hate speech in the new 
South Africa: Constitutional considerations for a land recovering from decades of racial 
repression and violence” (1994) 5 Seton Hall Constitutional Law Journal 103 117, who adds 
that the protection of this right also serves to maintain stability in society. 
133 UNGA Res 217 (III) (Adopted 10 December 1948). Article 19 states that “[e]veryone has 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions 
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media 
and regardless of frontiers.” 
134 999 UNTS 171 (Adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976). Article 
19(2) states that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall 
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regard less of 
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his 
choice.” 
135 1520 UNTS 217 (Adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986). Article 9(2) 
states that “[e]very individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinions 
within the law.” 
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recognise and protect the right to freedom of expression. Furthermore, the value of 
international recognition of the right to freedom of expression was the subject of a work 
by Indian writer Sorabjee, who referred to the protection of the right in a third-world 
country.136 He described how freedom of expression should be seen as a means to 
an end, rather than an end in itself. The means to the end, he states, would involve 
the perpetuation of a community in which respect for human rights is advanced and 
the rule of law is respected and upheld. 137 
The importance of the right to assemble and demonstrate, as well as the right to 
freedom of expression, as discussed above, is illustrated by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court decision in Fraport.138 In this case, the complainants were banned 
from accessing parts of an airport to exercise their rights to demonstrate and freedom 
of expression without the permission of the stock corporation who owned and operated 
the airport. This ban was upheld by the Frankfurt am Main Regional Court as well as 
the Frankfurt am Local Court. On appeal to the Federal Constitutional Court, the court 
considered the property rights of the respondent, as well as the rights of the 
complainant to freedom of assembly and freedom of expression. The court held that 
proportionality requires a limitation on the rights to freedom of assembly and freedom 
of expression to have a legitimate purpose.139 This limitation was not confined to the 
airport’s right to undisturbed possession of property in private law, but required 
something more.140 Instead, reliance on the owners’ right to undisturbed possession 
can only be justified when it serves the public good, which includes due regard being 
given to the importance of the right to freedom of assembly and freedom of expression. 
This case illustrates that when the exercise of constitutional rights are the cause of a 
disturbance of the property owner’s rights to undisturbed possession, the owner 
cannot merely rely on her right to undisturbed possession of her property to exclude 
those exercising their constitutional rights on the property. Furthermore, the court held 
that the limitation on the owner’s rights to undisturbed possession would also depend 
on the access the property owner grants the public to their property. The court stated 
that where access to property is granted to the public for specific purposes, or to which 
                                                          
136 SJ Sorabjee “Hate speech dilemma” (1993) 318 Fortnight 27 27. 
137 SJ Sorabjee “Hate speech dilemma” (1993) 318 Fortnight 27 27. 
138 BVerfGE 128, 226 (2011), Fraport. 
139 BVerfGE 128, 226 (2011), Fraport para 86. 
140 BVerfGE 128, 226 (2011), Fraport para 86. 
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the public has no general access (such as places where airline passengers board and 
de-board or check in their luggage), the right to freedom of assembly and freedom of 
expression cannot extend to the exercise thereof in such places,141 but is only limited 
to places to which the public has general access.142 
 
4 4 4 4 Proximity of gathering to privately owned property and the related 
relationships involved 
In some cases, there may be a need to hold a gathering on privately owned property 
for it to have its desired effect. Depending on the circumstances, close proximity could 
range from holding the gathering near privately owned property to holding the 
gathering on privately owned property. Allowing the gathering to commence in close 
proximity to the property in question would effectively allow participants to exercise 
their right to freedom of expression, and ensure that the intended recipient of their 
views are able to receive these views. 
Firstly, in the context of the “privatisation of public spaces”143 such as shopping 
malls, Woolman argues that when protests are directed at a particular business owner, 
it is necessary for it to take place within close range of the business to have any 
effect.144 This notion, he states, is displayed through the regulation of picketing in 
section 69 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. This provision grants members of 
a trade union to picket in “any place to which the public has access but outside the 
premises of an employer”,145 which Woolman argues extends to privately owned 
places such as shopping malls.146 The provision goes further by allowing the picket to 
take place on the premises of the employer, provided permission is granted by the 
employer.147 His argument indicates that the necessity of exercising certain rights on 
                                                          
141 BVerfGE 128, 226 (2011), Fraport para 65. 
142 See also 3 3 3 3 above. 
143 S Woolman “Assembly, demonstration and petition” in I Currie & J de Waal (eds) The bill 
of rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 377 388. 
144 S Woolman “Assembly, demonstration and petition” in I Currie & J de Waal (eds) The bill 
of rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 377 388. 
145 Section 69(2)(a) of the Labour Relations Act. 
146 S Woolman “Assembly, demonstration and petition” in I Currie & J de Waal (eds) The bill 
of rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 377 389. 
147 Section 69(2)(b) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
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privately owned property is already recognised through legislation. His argument also 
raises the question whether such necessity should extend to gatherings in terms of 
the Gatherings Act. This question can be answered with reference to chapter 3, in 
which it was concluded that the Gatherings Act does not apply to areas inside the walls 
of a building, such as shopping malls.148 Therefore, although the Labour Relations Act 
permits picketing inside the walls of a building, such as shopping malls, the Gatherings 
Act does not permit gatherings inside the walls of buildings.149  
Secondly, the need to hold a gathering in close proximity to privately owned 
property stems from the access granted to the public to such property. In situations 
where owners grant access to their property to the public, they can no longer blindly 
rely on their property rights to the exclusion of others, without due regard to the rights 
of those on their property. While this issue has not been considered in South African 
law, a number of cases in the United States demonstrates the importance of holding 
a gathering on privately owned property. In Marsh v Alabama,150 the court held that 
the circumscription of a property owner’s rights are directly related to the magnitude 
of access granted to the public.151 In other words, the rights of the property owner to 
exclude others from her property become more limited or restricted the more she make 
her property accessible to the public. Therefore, in such cases, an owner may not rely 
on her right to exclude when a gathering commences on her property. Instead, the fact 
that the owner made her property available to the public could be used to justify why 
a gathering should be held in close proximity to her property. 
This position was confirmed in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v 
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc,152 where the court emphasised that the rights of owners 
become more circumscribed by the constitutional and statutory rights of others. In this 
case, picketers, who were members of a food employees’ union, organised a picket to 
commence at the parking and pickup area of a popular shopping mall. The content of 
the picket involved union members calling for employees to join the union, and calling 
for business owners to encourage their employees to do so. Joining the union would 
result in such employees receiving union wages and other related benefits. The 
                                                          
148 See 3 3 4 above. 
149 See 3 3 4 above. 
150 326 US 501 (1946). 
151 Marsh v Alabama 326 US 501 (1946) 506. 
152 391 US 308 (1968). 
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shopping mall in this case was owned by a private body, but the land upon which the 
mall was situated was owned by the municipality. The land upon which the mall was 
built was thus leased to the owners of the shopping mall. Even though the mall was 
privately owned, it was open to members of the public. A ban was imposed on the 
picketers, which prevented them from picketing inside the shopping mall, as well as in 
the parking and pickup area. This ban was imposed despite the fact that the picketers 
were peaceful for the duration of the picket and only picketed in the pickup area and 
the parking lot. The picketers were instructed by the owners of the shopping mall to 
conduct their picket in the area immediately outside the gates of the shopping mall, 
which was situated next to a highway. 
The Court of Common Pleas of Blair Country, Pennsylvania, as well as the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court awarded an injunction preventing the picketers from 
picketing and entering the property on which the shopping mall was situated.153 On 
appeal, the United States Supreme Court confirmed the principle in Marsh v 
Alabama:154  
 
“[T]he State may not delegate the power, through the use of its trespass laws, wholly to 
exclude those members of the public wishing to exercise their First Amendment rights on 
the premises in a manner and for a purpose generally consonant with the use to which the 
property is actually put.”155 
 
The court also held that access to property, which is not ordinarily open to the public, 
may be denied completely when First Amendment rights are sought to be exercised 
on the property.156 However, when the privately owned property is open to the public, 
First Amendment rights may be exercised on the property subject to limitations. While 
                                                          
153 Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v Logan Valley Plaza, Inc 391 US 308 
(1968) 312. 
154 Marsh v Alabama 326 US 501 (1946) 506. 
155 Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v Logan Valley Plaza, Inc 391 US 308 
(1968) 319. According to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, 1791: 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” 
156 Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v Logan Valley Plaza, Inc 391 US 308 
(1968) 320. 
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the court in this case recognised the fact that First Amendment rights may be limited 
when they are exercised on privately owned property that is open to the public, these 
limitations need to be within reason.157 Such limitations may include size, manner and 
form limitations, with the purpose of causing as little disruption as possible for other 
members of the public, as well as other businesses and operations.158 As a result of 
these findings, the court ruled that the injunction should be reversed.159 Therefore, the 
picketers were allowed to enter the privately owned shopping mall premises. 
The principle in Marsh v Alabama,160 was also applied in Lloyd Corp v Tanner.161 
The facts of this case is similar to the facts in Amalgamated Food Employees Union 
Local 590 v Logan Valley Plaza, Inc, in that it also concerns a privately owned 
shopping mall with a pickup and parking area. This shopping centre had standard 
operating hours during which members of the public were permitted to use the mall 
facilities.162 However, members of the public were also permitted to access the 
shopping mall area outside ordinary operating hours to partake in “window shopping”. 
Despite the encouragement by the owners of the mall for members of the public to 
window shop outside ordinary operating hours, security had been deployed to keep 
an eye on any suspicious characters accessing the mall after hours. If any suspicious 
activity was detected, the security guards were permitted to remove individuals 
involved in the suspicious activities from the mall premises. 
Since the mall commenced its operations, the centre had employed a “no 
handbilling policy”.163 However, a group of members of the public wished to distribute 
materials in the shopping mall as part of the handbilling process, who argued that a 
ban on handbilling infringed upon their First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court 
of the United States upheld a ban on handbilling at the privately owned shopping mall 
                                                          
157 Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v Logan Valley Plaza, Inc 391 US 308 
(1968) 321. 
158 Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v Logan Valley Plaza, Inc 391 US 308 
(1968) 321. 
159 Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v Logan Valley Plaza, Inc 391 US 308 
(1968) 325. 
160 326 US 501 (1946). 
161 407 US 551 (1972). 
162 Lloyd Corp v Tanner 407 US 551 (1972) 553. 
163 Lloyd Corp v Tanner 407 US 551 (1972) 554. Handbilling refers to the distribution of leaflets 
or similar smaller printed notices by hand. 
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on the basis that the handbilling itself had no connection to the owners of the property 
or its employees.164 The court thus held that due to the lack of such connection, the 
handbilling could have taken place elsewhere, so as not to infringe upon the property 
rights of the property owner. 
Therefore, courts could merely consider whether a rational link exists between the 
gathering and the property upon which the gathering takes place. Alternatively, courts 
could consider whether the gathering could have had its desired effect elsewhere, 
despite the presence of a rational link between the gathering and the property. 
Therefore, depending on whether the court adopts a rationality or proportionality test 
when determining whether sufficient reason for the deprivation exists, it may be able 
to justify the deprivation of property by considering the proximity of the gathering to 
the property in question. Courts adopting a rationality test will thus only require that 
the rational link exists, while courts adopting a proportionality test will require that no 
less invasive means be present before the deprivation may be justified. 
 
4 4 4 5 Concluding remarks 
Should a lawful gathering commence on privately owned property after the 
necessary procedures in section 2, 3 and 4 of the Gatherings Act have been followed, 
the property owner may claim that her right in section 25(1) of the Constitution has 
been infringed. In particular, the property owner may claim that the deprivation 
permitted by the Gatherings Act is arbitrary. This section sought to identify factors that 
courts could take into account when determining whether the deprivation permitted by 
the Gatherings Act is substantively arbitrary. This involved a discussion on what may 
amount to “sufficient reason” for the deprivation caused by the Gatherings Act. 
It was found that the Gatherings Act itself does not provide sufficient reason for 
gatherings to be held on privately owned property. As a result, “sufficient reason” 
beyond the scope of the Gatherings Act had to be established. The first of these 
reasons involve the complexity of constitutional rights being exercised during the 
course of a gathering. A gathering may involve the exercise of a number of 
constitutional rights, but this section focused on the right to assemble and 
demonstrate, as well as the right to freedom of expression. The mere complexity of 
                                                          
164 Lloyd Corp v Tanner 407 US 551 (1972) 564. 
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constitutional rights involved could, but may not necessarily, be sufficient reason for 
the deprivation of property permitted by the Gatherings Act not to be considered 
arbitrary. However, based on the discussion in 4 4 4 3 above, it is clear that the 
magnitude and extent of constitutional rights being exercised during a gathering is not 
enough to declare the deprivation arbitrary.  
The second of these reasons relate to the importance of having a gathering on 
privately owned property given the relationship between the gathering and the property 
itself. The cases in 4 4 4 4 above illustrate that the mere exercise of a constitutional 
right is insufficient in enforcing such right against the rights of the property owner. 
These cases indicate that a link needs to exist between the reason for conducting the 
gathering and the privately owned property upon which the gathering takes place. This 
link could be between the property owner and the participants of the gathering, or 
between the property and the purpose of the gathering. In other words, the gathering 
would need to take place on the privately owned property to give the desired effect to 
the various constitutional rights being exercised by the participants of the gathering. If 
the gathering could have taken place elsewhere and still achieved its desired effect, 
then the deprivation permitted by the Gatherings Act would most likely be substantively 
arbitrary and thus be inconsistent with section 25(1) of the Constitution. However, this 
would only be the case where the court decides not to justify the deprivation by 
adopting a rationality test. Instead, the court would need to favour a proportionality 
test, and rather consider whether less invasive means could have been employed, 
without resorting to an outright deprivation or a deprivation with a more invasive effect. 
 
4 5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the question of whether the Gatherings Act permits a deprivation of 
property in a manner inconsistent with section 25(1) of the Constitution was 
addressed. In this regard, this chapter established whether private property owners 
may rely on section 25(1) of the Constitution to claim that the Gatherings Act, through 
interferences caused by the gathering, permits a deprivation of property in a manner 
inconsistent with section 25(1) of the Constitution. In addressing this issue, this 
chapter sought to answer a number of questions. 
Firstly, a determination was made as to what types of property owners may rely on 
section 25(1) of the Constitution and their right not to be deprived of their property in 
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a manner inconsistent with section 25(1) of the Constitution. It was found that only 
private property owners may rely on section 25(1) of the Constitution in cases where 
their rights are affected by the Gatherings Act. It was also found that these private 
owners may include natural or juristic persons. 
Secondly, a determination was made as to what constitutes a deprivation, in order 
to determine whether the commencement of a “gathering” on privately owned property 
will amount to a deprivation for purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution. It was 
found that a deprivation refers to any interference with the use, enjoyment and 
exploitation of private property. It was also found that this interference may need to 
have a legally significant impact for it to be considered a deprivation, but will depend 
on the facts of each individual case. Based on this definition of a deprivation, the 
manner in which the Gatherings Act permits a deprivation of property for purposes of 
section 25(1) of the Constitution was illustrated. It was found that this deprivation 
occurs through the temporary suspension of the property owner’s ability to use, enjoy 
or exploit her property. 
Lastly, the circumstances in which a deprivation may be consistent with section 
25(1) of the Constitution was discussed. This included a discussion on whether the 
deprivation was made in terms of law of general application and whether it is arbitrary. 
It was found that the Gatherings Act amounts to “law of general application” for 
purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution. It was also found that the procedural 
arbitrariness requirement will depend on whether provision is made for the property 
owner to be heard. The deprivation could not be procedurally arbitrary, because the 
Gatherings Act provides the opportunity for the property owner to be heard, by granting 
the courts the power to rule on whether the gathering may commence. With regard to 
substantive arbitrariness, sufficient reason for the deprivation had to be established. It 
was found that because no reason for the deprivation is provided in the Gatherings 
Act itself, sources beyond the confines of the Gatherings Act had to be considered. In 
this regard, courts could consider two factors when deciding whether sufficient reason 
for the deprivation exists. Firstly, the courts could consider the complexity of 
constitutional rights being exercised by the participants during a gathering. However, 
it is unlikely that the complexity of these rights is enough to declare the deprivation 
non-arbitrary. Therefore, the second factor for courts to consider could be the proximity 
of the gathering to the privately owned property. In this regard, a sufficient link between 
the reason for the gathering and the privately owned property upon which it takes 
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place, should exist before the deprivation could be considered non-arbitrary. 
Furthermore, the courts may also require that the gathering could not have had the 
same impact elsewhere, before the deprivation is considered non-arbitrary. In this 
regard, it is up to the courts to consider whether the necessary link, and the desired 
impact of the gathering, exists. 
This chapter aimed to identify circumstances in which the Gatherings Act may 
permit a deprivation of property in a manner inconsistent with section 25(1) of the 
Constitution. Factors to be taken into account by the court when deciding whether the 
deprivation may be justified were suggested and discussed. These factors could serve 
as a guide when courts have to decide whether the Gatherings Act permits a 
deprivation of property in a manner inconsistent with section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
5 1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis was to determine whether the Regulation of Gatherings Act 
205 of 1993 (“Gatherings Act”) permits a gathering on privately owned property. Once 
this was established, it had to be determined whether a gathering may cause a 
deprivation of property in a manner inconsistent with section 25(1) of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. In order to solve the primary research problem, 
chapters two, three and four sought to address several research aims related to the 
main research problem. 
Chapter two sought to establish the historical framework surrounding the right to 
assemble and demonstrate. This framework included the position of the right to 
assemble and demonstrate before, during and after apartheid. In this regard, reference 
to the legislative suppression of mass government resistance during apartheid, as well 
as the interpretation of this legislation by the judiciary, was necessary. The recognition 
of the right to assemble and demonstrate in the new constitutional dispensation was 
also discussed, which dealt with the various forms of protection of the right and the 
drafting and recognition of the right in the Constitution. 
In light of this history, chapter three sought to outline the new legislative framework 
regarding the right to assemble and demonstrate. The Gatherings Act, being the 
primary legislative tool used to give effect to the right to assemble and demonstrate, 
required a thorough analysis. The requirements for holding a “gathering” in terms of 
the Gatherings Act, as well as crucial aspects of the definition of a gathering, were 
central to this analysis. This aided in establishing the types of property to which the 
Gatherings Act applies, subject to it being “wholly or partly open to the air”. 
Chapter four sought to establish whether the Gatherings Act impacts section 25(1) 
of the Constitution, and, if so, the extent of such impact. In order to do so, the 
beneficiaries of section 25(1), as well as the requirements for a valid deprivation in 
terms of section 25(1), was discussed. This discussion was used to establish factors 
that courts could take into account when determining whether the Gatherings Act 
causes a deprivation of property in a manner inconsistent with section 25(1) of the 
Constitution. 
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This chapter will bring together the conclusions drawn in the above chapters. In this 
regard, the relationship between these conclusions, as well as the significance they 
hold, will be determined. Ultimately, this chapter will determine whether the research 
aims set out in chapter one have been reached, and whether a solution to the research 
problem has been found. 
 
5 2 The right to assemble and demonstrate: A historical analysis 
In chapter two, the history of the regulation of protests, which preceded the new 
constitutional dispensation and the promulgation of the Gatherings Act, was illustrated. 
This chapter sought to provide a more fruitful understanding of the importance of the 
promulgation of the Gatherings Act. 
It was found that apartheid-era statutes heavily restricted the ability of people to 
assemble and demonstrate. These statutes granted significant powers to various 
ministers, the state president, local authorities, as well as magistrates in particular 
areas to prohibit specific gatherings or a particular class of gatherings.1 These 
functionaries also had the power to ban certain persons from attending gatherings.2 
These powers were exercised with little regard to the manner in which it silenced anti-
government sentiments. When these actions failed to suppress mass political dissent, 
the government passed new legislation, or handed down emergency regulations in 
terms of existing legislation, to ensure the effective suppression of mass political 
dissent.3 When faced with cases regarding the exercise of these powers, the judiciary 
similarly failed in interpreting these statutes with due regard to the political climate in 
which these cases were heard.4 However, the judiciary was more willing to consider 
the political context of the cases before it as the magnitude of political protests and 
violence intensified in the 1980s.5  
The announcement by President FW de Klerk declaring the unbanning of political 
organisations and the release of political prisoners marked the beginning of the end of 
the legislative framework that enforced the government’s apartheid policies. As a 
                                                          
1 See 2 2 2 above. 
2 See 2 2 2 above. 
3 See 2 2 2 above. 
4 See 2 2 2 above. 
5 See 2 2 2 above. 
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result, the Multi-Party Negotiation Process commenced,6 which led to the adoption of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (“Interim 
Constitution”). The right to assemble, demonstrate and present petitions was 
recognised and protected in section 16 of the Interim Constitution. Thereafter, the 
Goldstone Commission was appointed to investigate political violence in the 1980s 
and 1990s, and the recommendations made to the Commission by a multinational 
panel of experts served as the framework for legislation regulating assembly. The 
submissions made by the multinational panel of experts included recommendations 
relating to notice of a gathering and negotiations before the commencement of a 
gathering.7 These submissions led to the promulgation of the Gatherings Act, which – 
in whole or in part – repealed apartheid-era statutes regulating gatherings.8 After the 
promulgation of the Gatherings Act, the Constitutional Assembly Theme Committee 4 
on fundamental rights (Freedom of assembly, demonstration and petition) drafted the 
provisional text for the right to assemble, demonstrate, picket and present petitions. 
The 1996 Constitution was subsequently adopted by the Constitutional Assembly, and 
section 17 states that “[e]veryone has the right, peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, 
to demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions.”9 
Chapter two thus sought to illustrate the history that led up to the promulgation of 
the Gatherings Act. It was found that the regulation of assemblies and demonstrations 
changed from being heavily-regulated, in which gatherings were prohibited at the whim 
of various state bodies and institutions, to a constitutionally-protected right that was 
often adjudicated in terms of the Gatherings Act. The discussion on this history served 
to provide the ideal platform for an analysis of a “gathering” in terms of the Gatherings 
Act. 
 
                                                          
6 I Currie & J de Waal The bill of rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 5; J Brickhill & R Babiuch 
“Political Rights” in S Woolman & M Chaskalson (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 2 ed 
(OS 2007) ch 45 5; IM Rautenbach “Introduction to the bill of rights” in Y Mokgoro & P Tlakula 
(eds) Bill of rights compendium (RS 2015) ch 1A 11. 
7 See 2 3 2 above. 
8 See 2 3 3 above. 
9 Section 17 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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5 3 “Gathering” in terms of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 
In chapter three, key concepts from the Gatherings Act were discussed. In this 
regard, the procedures to be followed immediately before the commencement of a 
gathering, as well as the extent to which the Act applies to privately owned property, 
was illustrated. 
A “gathering” had to be distinguished from a “demonstration”, which are both 
defined in section 1 of the Gatherings Act. These terms can essentially be 
distinguished from one another by referring to the number of participants involved in 
each of them: a demonstration involves 15 people or less, while a gathering involves 
more than 15 people.10 This distinction is important, because only a “gathering” is 
subject to the procedures prescribed in the Gatherings Act. These procedures are 
found in sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Gatherings Act, and deal with the appointment of 
key persons prior to the gatherings,11 notice of a gathering,12 and other miscellaneous 
procedures to be followed before the commencement of a gathering.13 A gathering in 
terms of the Gatherings Act will thus only be lawful when these procedures are 
followed.14 
Given the distinction of a gathering from a demonstration and the procedures to be 
followed before the commencement of a gathering, it was necessary to determine 
whether the Gatherings Act permits a gathering on privately owned property. In this 
regard, the definition of a gathering in section 1 of the Gatherings Act was analysed, 
which focused particularly on the types of property to which the definition applies. This 
required an understanding of what exactly constitutes a “public road”,15 and “any other 
public place or premises wholly or partly open to the air”.16 
A “public road” is defined in the National Road traffic Act 93 of 1996, which repealed 
the Road Traffic Act 29 of 1989 referred to in the definition of a gathering. This 
definition offered no scope to extend the definition to privately owned property.17 
                                                          
10 Section 1 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. See also 3 2 1 above. 
11 See section 2 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. See also 3 2 2 above. 
12 See section 3 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. See 3 2 3 above. 
13 See section 4 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. See 3 2 4 above. 
14 See 3 2 above. 
15 Section 1 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. 
16 Section 1 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. 
17 See 3 3 2 above. 
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However, it was found that the Gatherings Act applies to privately owned property 
“wholly and partly open to the air”. Despite privately owned property not being 
mentioned in the definition of a gathering, various sources have indicated that the 
definition may well extend to privately owned property. This conclusion was reached 
based on lessons from the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956,18 the public-
accessibility of the property,19 as well as the ability of the property owner to lawfully 
evict persons from the property.20 Based on the analysis of these concepts, it was 
found that privately owned property needs to be open to or accessible to the public,21 
or certain members of the public who have a contractual right to be on the property,22 
and should actually be used publicly,23 in order for the definition of a gathering to 
extend to privately owned property. Refusal by a property owner to object to the regular 
entry by persons onto the property, would amount to an invitation for the public to enter 
the property.24 Furthermore, privately owned property typically open to the public that 
is occupied by demonstrators will remain “public”, even when measures restricting 
access during the demonstration are put in place.25 However, this may change 
depending on the length of time the demonstrators actually occupy the property.26 
The interpretation of “any other public place or premises” is subject to the fact that 
it be “wholly or partly open to the air”, before the property in question may fall within 
the scope of the definition of a gathering. In this regard, a gathering could occur in 
“any other public place or premises”, provided it is also “wholly or partly open to the 
air”. It was found that “wholly or partly open to the air” requires the gathering to be an 
open-air gathering, or one that is not completely confined inside the walls of a 
building.27 
                                                          
18 See 3 3 3 2 above. 
19 See 3 3 3 3 above. 
20 See 3 3 3 4 above. 
21 See 3 3 3 3 above. 
22 See 3 3 3 4 above. 
23 See 3 3 3 3 above. 
24 S Wilson & I de Vos in Ex Parte: Council for the Advancement of the South African 
Constitution In Re: Restraint of protest on or near university campuses Chambers, 
Johannesburg (22 December 2016) para 104. See also 3 3 3 4 above. 
25 See 3 3 3 5 above. 
26 See 3 3 3 5 above. 
27 See 3 3 4 above. 
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Chapter three thus concluded that the Gatherings Act extends to privately owned 
property. However, it will only extend to privately owned property in circumstances 
where the property is open or accessible to the public, and where the property is 
actually used publicly. The property should also be open-air, or not confined to the 
walls of a building. This conclusion leads to the issue of whether a gathering may have 
any effect on the rights of private property owners, and their right in section 25(1) of 
the Constitution in particular. 
 
5 4 The effect of holding a “gathering” on privately owned property 
In chapter four, the relationship between section 25(1) of the Constitution and the 
effect of a “gathering” held on privately owned property was addressed. In this regard, 
the purpose of chapter four was to determine whether section 25(1) of the Constitution 
may be used by a private property owner to allege that the Gatherings Act permits a 
deprivation of property in a manner inconsistent with section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
It was found that only private property owners may rely on section 25(1) of the 
Constitution in cases where their rights are affected by the Gatherings Act. These 
private owners may include natural or juristic persons. Therefore, the state may not 
rely on section 25(1) of the Constitution in cases where a gathering takes place on 
publicly owned or state owned property.28 
Based on the determination of the types of property owners that may rely on section 
25(1), the content of section 25(1) was discussed. Section 25(1) of the Constitution 
states that “[n]o one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general 
application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.” A deprivation 
refers to any interference with the use, enjoyment and exploitation of private 
property.29 This interference needs to have a legally significant impact for it to be 
considered a deprivation for the purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution, but this 
will depend on the facts of each individual case.30 Based on this definition of a 
deprivation, the manner in which the Gatherings Act permits a deprivation of property 
was illustrated. The actions typically associated with a gathering were tested against 
                                                          
28 Tshwane City v Link Africa (Pty) Ltd 2015 6 SA 440 (CC) paras 53-54. See also 4 2 above. 
29 First National Bank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank 
of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 57. 
30 See 4 3 above. 
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the definition of a deprivation.31 It was found that the entry of persons onto privately 
owned property, the occupation of privately owned property, the disruption of flow of 
vehicular and pedestrian traffic, the intimidation of people, and the interference with 
businesses on the property, temporarily suspends the ability of the property owner to 
use, enjoy or exploit her property.32 This temporary suspension amounts to an 
interference, with enough of an impact to affect the legal entitlements of the property 
owner, and thus amounts to a deprivation for purposes of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution.33 
Based on the finding that the Gatherings Act permits, in certain cases, a deprivation 
of property, the circumstances in which a deprivation may be consistent with section 
25(1) of the Constitution was discussed. A deprivation would only be consistent with 
section 25(1) if it occurs in terms of law of general application, and when the law does 
not permit an arbitrary deprivation of property. It was found that the Gatherings Act 
amounts to “law of general application” for the purposes of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution.34 The Gatherings Act would thus be the law that could potentially permit 
an arbitrary deprivation of property. According to the court in First National Bank v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Minister of Finance,35 arbitrariness should be split into procedural and 
substantive arbitrariness.36 The procedural arbitrariness requirement will depend on 
whether the Gatherings Act grants the private property owner the opportunity to be 
heard by means of judicial oversight.37 It was found that the Gatherings Act provides 
for judicial oversight in section 6(5), which grants the courts the discretion to make a 
ruling with regard to the confirmation, amendment or deletion of the notice indicating 
the intention to hold a gathering. 
The substantive arbitrariness inquiry required a more thorough analysis, which 
involved a determination of whether sufficient reason for the deprivation exists. 
                                                          
31 See 4 3 above. 
32 See 4 3 above. 
33 See 4 3 above. 
34 See 4 4 2 above. 
35 2002 4 SA 768 (CC). 
36 First National Bank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank 
of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 67. 
37 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 270. See also 4 4 3 above. 
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Sufficient reason can be determined by courts by analysing a number of factors. As a 
point of departure, the Gatherings Act itself was assessed to establish whether the Act 
takes the rights of the property owner, as well as the rights of the participants of the 
gathering, into account before a gathering may proceed.38 It was found that the 
commencement of a gathering was not dependent on an analysis of these rights,39 
and as a result hereof, sources beyond the confines of the Gatherings Act had to be 
consulted to establish whether “sufficient reason” for the deprivation exists. 
The complexity of constitutional rights being exercised was the first factor used to 
determine whether there was sufficient reason for the deprivation. While a number of 
constitutional rights could be exercised during a gathering, emphasis was placed on 
the right to assemble and demonstrate, as well as the right to freedom of expression, 
especially when these rights come into conflict with other constitutional rights. With 
regard to the right to assemble and demonstrate, the history of the suppression of the 
right, the role it plays in holding those in power accountable, and the manner in which 
it upholds the institution of democracy, was considered.40 Furthermore, the manner in 
which it stimulates debate, the platform it creates for minorities to express their 
opinions, and the protection it enjoys in international law, was addressed.41 With 
regard to the right to freedom of expression, the history of suppression of the right, the 
manner in which it serves as a “guarantor of democracy”,42 and the extensive 
protection it enjoys under international law and other jurisdictions, was considered. 
However, the importance and complexity of the exercise of these two rights, amongst 
others, during a gathering, is insufficient to justify the deprivation caused by the 
Gatherings Act.43 Instead, in spite of the complexity of these rights, a gathering on 
privately owned property can only be justified when a relationship between the 
property and the gathering exists.44 In this regard, the importance of holding a 
                                                          
38 See 4 4 4 2 above. 
39 This is, however, subject to section 5(1) and section 5(2) of the Regulation of Gatherings 
Act 205 of 1993, which grants the responsible officer the power to prohibit a gathering under 
certain circumstances. 
40 See 4 4 4 3 above. 
41 See 4 4 4 3 above. 
42 South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 1999 6 BCLR 615 (CC) para 
7. 
43 See 4 4 4 3 above. 
44 See 4 4 4 4 above. 
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gathering in close proximity to privately owned property was used as a second factor 
to determine whether there was sufficient reason for the deprivation. It was found that 
a sufficient link needs to exist between the property or property owner, and the 
gathering or gatherers, before “sufficient reason” for the deprivation can be 
established.45 In some cases, “sufficient reason” for the gathering may only exist if the 
gathering could not have had its desired impact in a place other than the privately 
owned property upon which the gathering takes place.46 
While this chapter could not conclusively determine whether the Gatherings Act 
permits a deprivation of property in a manner inconsistent with section 25(1) of the 
Constitution, it illustrated circumstances in which sufficient reason for the deprivation 
may exist. The above analysis used case law and academic commentary to highlight 
factors courts could take into account when determining whether the deprivation 
caused by the Gatherings Act may be justified. 
 
5 5 Concluding remarks 
In this thesis, it was found that the Gatherings Act permits gatherings on privately 
owned property in circumstances where the place or premises upon which the 
gathering takes place is public. These places or premises will be considered public 
when they are open or accessible to the public, when they are actually used publicly, 
and when it is open-air or not confined to the walls of a building. 
It was also found that a gathering on privately owned property may constitute a 
deprivation for purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution. In terms of the 
requirements for a valid deprivation in terms of section 25(1), it was found that the 
deprivation is authorised by a law of general application. Furthermore, it appears that 
the deprivation is not procedurally arbitrary, since the Gatherings Act provides the 
property owner the opportunity to be heard through its judicial oversight provisions. It 
was also found that the substantive arbitrariness of the deprivation permitted by the 
Gatherings Act will need to be decided on a case-by-case basis. However, the courts 
could consider the complexity of constitutional rights being exercised during a 
gathering, as well as the importance of the close proximity of the gathering to privately 
owned property when determining whether sufficient reason for the deprivation exists. 
                                                          
45 See 4 4 4 4 above. 
46 See 4 4 4 4 above. 
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Therefore, it can be concluded that private property owners who open their property 
to the public can only rely on section 25(1) of the Constitution in situations where the 
maximum efficacy of the gathering is dependent on holding the gathering on the 
privately owned property in question. In other words, the absence of a sufficient link 
between the gathering or gatherers and the property or property owner is necessary 
before private property owners may successfully rely on section 25(1). In this regard, 
the solution to the main research problem is two-fold. Firstly, the definition of a 
gathering extends to privately owned property, but only in certain circumstances. 
Secondly, the gathering permitted by the Gatherings Act may constitute a deprivation 
of property if the actions typically associated with gatherings is considered. However, 
the deprivation may be justified in cases where it is non-arbitrary, and will depend on 
the facts of each individual case. This will require a context-sensitive analysis of the 
content and purpose of the gathering, and its relationship with the property or property 
owner in question. 
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